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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the development of Cape Town's 
water supply between 1840 and 1920. The thesis examines the 
effect that the augmentation water supply had on municipal 
politics and the development of the municipality of Cape 
Town. 
It is argued that the high cost of water supply, arising out of 
Cape Town's geographic situation, had a major impact on its 
municipal government. In the nineteenth century the dominant 
class was divided between merchants who wanted water and the 
rentier classes who had to pay for it. In the subsequent 
political struggle for control of the municipality, the working 
class, which supported the rentier class were alienated. As a 
resul·t they resisted municipal improvement, delaying a solution 
to the water problem until the twentieth century. 
Chapter One examines the period from 1840 to 1900 where water 
supply was related to attempts to bring about municipal and 
sanitation reform. While this succeeded, by the late 1890's 
ratepayers reacted against excessive municipal spending, 
ultimately to the detriment of planned water schemes in the 
hinterland. 
(iv) 
Chapter Two argues that in the period between 1900 and 1910 
businessmen attempted to link water supply to the unification of 
the municipalities of the Cape Peninsula. This resulted in a 
struggle between the city and the suburbs for over the control of 
the water resources of the hinterland. 
Chapter Three examines municipal unification in 1913 and the 
repercussions it had for water supply. The focus falls on a 
municipal referendum in 1917 in which the class divisions of half 
a century were a factor in the choice of a hinterland water 
scheme. 
The dissertation concludes that water is important for explaining 
class divisions in municipal politics. It is suggested that the 
impact of water on municipal history is not unique, but in Cape 
Town's experience it was prolonged and intense. A further 
conclusion is that it affected the process of municipal 
unification between 1902 and 1913, shaping the form of the modern 
city. 
A wide range of sources were used including municipal archive 
material and government reports and commissions. Newspapers and 
cartoons have been used extensively as they were instruments in 
the struggle for reform. Comparisons are drawn with the 
experience of overseas cities in an attempt to provide a coherent 
model for understanding the place of water supply in urban 
history. 
( v ) 
The dissertation represents an attempt to provide a better 
understanding of Cape Town's history during this period and 
therefore relates municipal history to wider political, 
economic and social changes taking place. It also 
complements recent histories on sanitation, race and 
municipal politics which fall in this period. 
( v i ) 
PREFACE 
The original topic selected for this dissertation concerned the 
relationship between Cape Town and its hinterland with regard to 
its food and water supply circa 1900. In the course of initial 
research it rapidly became apparent that Cape Town's water supply 
problem formed a major subject on its own. Apart from an 
abundance of material documenting the physical development of the 
city's dams and water supply schemes, articles from contemporary 
newspapers revealed that the issue of water supply was an 
important part of the political life of the municipality. It 
soon became obvious that there was a strong connection between 
water supply and municipal politics which in turn affected the 
form and shape of the emerging municipality. 
Further research revealed that political controversies arising 
from the problem of water supply dated back to the founding of 
the municipality in 1840. It was discovered that it had 
dominated municipal politics for over 70 years, as is indicated 
by the title of this dissertation, "The politics of water 
supply". The objective of this dissertation is therefore to 
examine the relationship between water and municipal government 
and is not a history simply concerned with the development of 
water alone. 
(vii) 
Although the history of Cape Town's water supply represents a 
relatively well defined topic, it nevertheless presented several 
problems. Firstly almost no work has been completed on the 
history of water supply in other South African cities, resulting 
in a reliance on overseas literature for the purpose of 
comparative analysis. Secondly the issue of water supply is 
closely related to problems such as drainage and sewerage which 
were also sources of political conflict. The limited scope of an 
MA thesis has not made it possible to give these issues the full 
attention they deserve. 
A third problem encountered arises from the fact that the 
dissertation covers a period of 80 years. For this reason 
the city's social, political and economic transformation during 
this period farms an important theme. While conflicts involving 
water are examined in detail, these have been placed within a 
general interpretation of the evolution of the municipality. 
A further problem arising out of the timespan covered relates to 
changes in the meaning of the terminology of class, ethnicity 
and economy. For this reason a note on terminology has been 
included at the beginning of the dissertation. 
This dissertation represents a contribution towards an urban 
history of Cape Town. An attempt has been made to integrate 
this study with recent works relating to sanitation, race and 
municipal politics in nineteenth-century Cape Town. 
(viii) 
Although it had been intended to make this dissertation a 
comparative study in relation to other South African towns, the 
lack of research in this field has made this difficult. Where 
appropriate, comparisons have been made with Victorian cities in 
Britain and its colonies as well as with the United States. 
result a model of the role of water supply in municipal 
government has been presented in the concluding chapter. 
As a 
( i x ) 
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
Terms of race and class usually need explanation in complex 
societies like Cape Town. Because this dissertation spans nearly 
a century, it is obvious that definitions change their meaning 
as society evolves. This brief note on terminology attempts to 
draw attention to terms of unclear and changed meaning. 
Class definitions used include underclass, dominant class, 
working class, business class, merchant class and rentier class. 
The term underclass has been used in the nineteenth century as 
Cape Town had no true working class due to the lack of industry. 
Similarly the term 'merchant class' has been used to describe 
those involved in commercial activities in the nineteenth 
century, while the term business class is more appropriate for 
the twentieth century. 
Racial and ethnic terminology used like coloured, malay and Dutch 
are also problematic. The term malay has been avoided unless 
used by contemporary commentators because it cannot be 
precisely defined in this period. Elsewhere the term 
'coloured' is used. The description of Dutch and English 
speakers have been confined to the white inhabitants during the 
nineteenth century. 
( x ) 
Other terms needing definition include those referring to 
place. In the nineteenth century the meaning of the place Cape 
Town is restricted to the city's old boundaries until municipal 
unification in 1913. The word Town House refers to the seat of 
city government before it was transferred to the City Hall in 
the twentieth century. 
cwsc 
cswc 
JWC 
LC 
MLA 
MLC 
MPC 
MUC 
SMWB 
SJWDC 
TBHB 
( x i ) 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Citizen's Water Supply Committee 
Citizen's Steenbras Water Committee 
Joint Water Committee 
Legislative Council 
Member of the Legislative Assembly 
Member of the Legislative Council 
Member of the Provincial Council 
Municipal Union Conference 
Suburban Municipal Water Board 
Suburban Joint Water and Drainage Committee 
Table Bay Harbour Board 
MAP 1 
MAP 2 
MAP 3 
MAP 4 
MAP 5 
MAP 6 
MAP 7 
MAP 8 
( x i i ) 
MAPS Facing page 
River Systems of the Cape Peninsula. 
The Table Valley Drainage System. 
Table Valley Water Supply before 1890. 
The Table Mountain Water Supply System. 
Peninsula Municipalities and the 
Jurisdiction of Water Authorities. 
Water Schemes Contemplated in Cape Town's 
Hinterland. 
Water Schemes Proposed within the 
Cape Peninsula. 
The 1917 Water Referendum 
1. 
2. 
26. 
93. 
116. 
119. 
180. 
192. 

INTRODUCTION 
THE POLITICS OF WATER SUPPLY 
"In previous centuries water supply was one 
of several environmental factors which set 
limits to urban growth. Now by sophisticated 
technology and enlarged wealth, this confine-
ment was broken; but for the larger cities 
the massive costs of extending supplies 
brought political turmoil ... " 
PJ Waller <1 ' 
Water supply represented a problem for Cape Town from the very 
beginning. While the settlement had been established for the 
provision of food and water for the ships of the Dutch East India 
Company [DEICJ, the site at Table Bay was chosen because it was a 
safe anchorage, rather than for its quality as a replenishment 
station.<=' Although fresh water was available, it was limited, 
making the construction of a reservoir a priority once 
fortifications had been completed.< 3 ' The DEIC had never 
intended to establish a large or permanent settlement, thus at 
the time it was of little consequence that the site had 
insufficient water to sustain a large town or city. 
While water shortages remained a problem throughout the DEIC 
period, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that it began 
to have an impact on the town's economic, social and political 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
( 3) 
P.J. Waller~ Town 0 City, and Nation, England 1850-1914, Oxford, 198~, p.3 2. 
The DEIC choice was dicated by the need for a station 
approximately halfway between Europe and the East Indies. 
As much of the African East and West coast south of the 
equator was controlled by the Portugese, the Cape was the 
only real choice. 
H.W.J. Picard~ Masters of the Castle, Cape Town, 1972, 
pp.46-48. This was built under the authority of Commander 
Wagenaar to supply the Company's ships. Part of this 
reservoir, which originally measured 55 x 15m survives 
within the Golden acre complex. 
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development. The rapid growth in population that took place from 
the 1870's meant that new sources of supply had to be found by 
the municipality to sustain the emerging city. The enormous cost 
of extending these supplies brought political turmoil to Cape 
Town's local government. This conflict, which has been termed 
the politics of water supply, was to dominate municipal politics 
for three quarters of a century. While economics lay at the 
heart of the politics of water supply, the water problem was in 
turn linked to a variety of issues. Water shortages were directly 
related to questions of health, sanitation and disease which were 
important social and political issues in their own rlght. 
Typically water shortages were accompanied by an upsurge in 
disease or the outbreak of an epidemic, consequently bringing the 
issue of water supply and sanitation to a head. Indeed since. the 
establishment of the municipality in 1840, water and sanitation 
became linked to a struggle for civic improvement and for the 
creation of a more responsible and efficient city government 
capable of addressing these issues. 
The politics of water supply thus represented a juncture for the 
interrelated issues of civic and sanitation reform. Furthermore 
the recurring nature of water shortages gave rise to a clear 
pattern, where each time the city's sanitation threshold was 
reached, renewed political crises erupted, which almost always 
resulted in decisive changes in the municipality's economic and 
political direction. 
The water problem was not confined to Cape Town. The 
establishment of the suburban municipalities in the Cape 
Peninsula during the late nineteenth century was followed by a 
struggle between the city and the suburbs for control over the 
water resources of the hinterland. This added a further 
dimension to the politics of water supply, as local rivalry 
clouded the issues and delayed a solution to the problem. 
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Ultimately the growing severity of water shortages experienced by 
the suburbs forced them to agree to the formation of a single 
unified municipality of Greater Cape Town in 1913, as a means of 
securing the future growth of the Cape Peninsula. 
The significance of the issue of water supply extends far beyond 
the political and economic conflicts outlined above. This thesis 
argues that Cape Town's problem of water supply is unique in 
terms of the extent of the impact it had on its history. While 
the quotation from Waller at the opening of lhis chapter implies 
that the problem of water supply is an issue that faces every 
city at some point in its history, in the case of Cape Town the 
problem was both prolonged and intense. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will examine the reasons for this. 
The persistence of the issue of water supply may be attributed to 
three factors. The first concerns Cape Town's geographic and 
environmental situation which determined the specific nature of 
its water problem. The second, as it has already been suggested, 
concerns the cost of augmenting supplies, which was beyond the 
financial resources of the municipality. Lastly, a solution to 
the problem of water supply was delayed as a result of it 
becoming subject to class and racial conflicts which had arisen 
within Cape Town at this time. The water and sanitation crisis 
had different social and economic consequences for the city's 
heterogeneous population, giving rise to conflicting perceptions 
of the cause of the problem and its solution. 
In addition to examining the factors which underlay the dominance 
of the issue of water supply in Cape Town's municipal affairs, 
this chapter will also attempt to place it within a broader 
perspective and to determine its role within the city's history. 
Comparisons will be made with other South African towns, as well 
as with the experience of British and colonial cities in their 
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development of water supply. Furthermore the problem of 
sanitation and water supply will be located within the context of 
the Victorian city, and related to issues such as urbanisation, 
industrialisation and municipal reform of which it is very much a 
part. 
THE GEOGRAPHIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT AND ITS 
RELATION TO THE ECONOMICS OF WATER SUPPLY 
Waller's concept of water as an environmental factor 'setting 
limits to urban growth' points to the heart of Cape Town's water 
problem. The fact that Cape Town is one of the few cities in the 
world that is not situated on or near a major source of fresh 
water is in itself indicative of the scale of the problem. Even 
the streams found in the immediate vicinity of Cape Town are non-
perennial, a consequence not only of the large seasonal variation 
in rainfall typical of the region's mediterranean climate, but 
also because of their small catchment areas which are located a 
very short distance from the sea. (see map one at the beginning 
of the chapter showing the Cape Peninsula's river system and map 
two overleaf for the Table Valley drainage basin) The Cape 
Peninsula's hydrographic features strongly resemble that of a 
small island. The spine of mountain range running the length of 
the peninsula, culminating in the Table Mountain massif, 
represented a mixed blessing in terms of water supply. While most 
of the Peninsula's rainfall flowed off directly into the sea, 
Table Mountain itself had the effect of a sponge, so that water 
was captured and slowly released throughout the year through 
numerous springs at the base of the mountain which lay just above 
the city. While these springs were the main source of water for 
the first 150 years of Cape Town's existence, the supply was 
barely sufficient for the dry summer months, and it was only a 
matter of time before this source was outgrown. Once these 
springs had been exhausted, the next most accessible source of 
supply was located at the top of Table Mountain itself, or more 
accurately the sloping plateau or 'back table' which lies 
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directly behind it. This source was of a greater although 
limited quantity. By the end of the nineteenth century the city 
had outgrown this too, and was forced to direct its attention 
towards the Peninsula's hinterland to augment its water supplies 
further. 
The nearest source of water outside of the Cape Peninsula lay 
within the Hottentots Holland and Wemmershoek Mountains, some 50 
kilometers away from the city. The distance itself, even at the 
time, was not an overwhelming obstacle, as many of the world's 
cities drew water supplies from afar.< 4 > Although the hinterland 
possessed a far greater quantity of water than available within 
the Peninsula even these sources were hardly more than large 
streams. The problem therefore involved one of considerable 
expenditure in return for a relatively small amount of water, as 
large dams had to be built to maximise the capture of water from 
these watersheds, which would then have to transported by 
pipeline over long distances. Other South African cities such as 
Johannesburg and Kimberley had similar problems but, unlike Cape 
Town, their source of supply was the powerful Vaal River which 
required relatively modest expenditure for its catchment in 
return for an almost unlimited supply of water. 
Distance is not the most important criterion amongst 
environmental factors which determine a city's water supply. In 
his study of the water supply of major cities in the USA, Louis 
Cain identifies four types of water resources upon which cities 
are located, each of which having a distinct impact on the 
evolution of their water and sanitation systems, with different 
( 4) P.J. Waller, Town, City, and Nation, p.302. Examples of 
distances between water schemes and contempory British 
cities include: Birmingham (70 miles); Manchester (80 
miles); Leicester (60 miles); Nottin~ham (40 miles); 
Liverpool (50 miles) and Derby (35 miles). 
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economic consequences.ce> Cain argues that cities situated on 
major rivers or lakes tend to experience problems over the 
quality of drinking water caused by the discharge of effluent,ce> 
while cities situated near minor rivers or at the sea tend to be 
more concerned with water shortages.' 7 > While Cain's attempt at 
creating an environment related economic model is overdrawn and 
simplistic, it does underline the correlation between a city's 
geographic location and its economic consequences. 
The main expense borne by major river and lake cities is directed 
towards improving their sanitation systems. This usually 
requires a single large capital investment, minimizing the 
likelihood of protracted political conflict over its cost. The 
experience of coastal cities such as Cape Town, Boston in the 
state of Massachusetts,ce> and Sydney in Australia<~>, was the 
opposite, as expenditure was directed towards the augmentation of 
their water supply and less on drainage and sewerage.' 10 > In 
common with cities dependant on minor rivers, coastal cities have 
to develop multiple sources for their water supply,< 11 > at 
greater cost and over a long period of time, thus increasing the 
potential for political conflict. 
( 5) 
( 6) 
( 7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( 10) 
( 11) 
L.P. Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location and 
Sanitation", Research in Economic: History, Volume 2, 1977, 
University of Illinois, p.338. 
Pollution of the water supply of lake cities is inevitable, 
as they are located within natural drainage basins. Cities 
located on large rivers suffer from upstream pollution. 
L.P. Cain! "An Economic: History of Urban Location", p.338. 
Coastal cities situated on large rivers generally cannot 
use this for water supply due to salinity from tidal 
action. 
ibid., p.344-349. 
D. Clark, "'Worse than Physic': Sydney's Water Supply 1788-
1888", M. Kelly (editor), Nineteenth-Centurl Sidney, Essa5s 
in Urban History, Sydney University Press, 978, pp. 54-6 . 
Coastal cities had the advantage of being able to discharge 
untreated sewerage straight into the sea, obviating the 
need for costly purification or containment. 
L. P. Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location", p. 372. 
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The cost of augmenting water supply went far beyond the expense 
of building reservoirs and dams. Ideally, water should not be 
provided without the existence of an efficient sanitation system, 
as an uncontrolled supply contributed to the spread of water-
borne diseases and epidemics. The introduction of a regular 
water supply therefore required pipes for distribution to 
households, sewers to carry water borne sewerage, and a drainage 
system to dispose of waste water. The massive cost of extending 
supplies exhausted municipal resources which often meant long 
delays before the construction of a sanitation system. 
Furthermore, the improvement in water supply was usually followed 
by an increase in its utilization as well as wastage. Without 
adequate drains and sewers, the benefit of a regular supply often 
brought a high social cost in terms of the rise in incidence of 
water-borne diseases which were translated into high mortality 
rates.c 12 > 
The question of the cost of providing water to Cape Town is a 
fundamental one, and as Waller suggests, it is the primary source 
of all political conflict over water supply. The impact of this 
cost was compounded by the fact that the responsibility for 
providing water rested entirely with Cape Town's municipality, 
which was not always the norm with cities of this period. While 
it is true that many other city governments were also responsible 
for providing water, the costs were rarely as great, and were 
often borne by a variety of institutions, such as central 
(12) D. Dunstan, Governing the Metropolis. Politics, Technoloij! 
and Social Change in a Victorian Cita: Melbourne 1850-18 , 
Melbourne, 1984, p.235. Also see E .. van HeyninaenL 
"Public Health and Society in Cape Town 1880-1910rt, ~h.D. 
thesis, (University of Cape Town), 1989, p.21. Van 
Heyningen suggests that "Cape Town must be regarded as 
aberrant in terms of world mortality change because the 
evidence ••. suggests that a clean and adeguate water 
supply water-borne sewerage and the development of a 
sophisticated medical infrastructure had litte imp,act 9n 
the survival of Cape Town's labouring population.' This 
might be explained by the fact that a sanitation system was 
only developed in working class areas of the suburbs after 
municipal unification in 1913. 
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government, water boards and private water companies. For 
example in the case of Johannesburg, water was provided by the 
Rand Water Board, which supplied water to a number of towns as 
well as gold mines, with the resulting economy of scale 
effectively reducing the cost of water.< 1 3> At Kimberley, water 
was supplied by a private water company until the 1920's,< 14 ' and 
although water was expensive for consumers, this absolved the 
municipality from committing itself to long term capital 
expenditure. The suburban municipalities of the Cape Peninsula 
were similarly supplied by a water company from 1889 until it was 
taken over by a water board in 1900. The municipalities of Port 
Elizabeth, Durban and East London which, like Cape Town, were 
also responsible for providing water, spent considerably less on 
water schemes as these towns were all situated near to large 
rivers. cie> Moreover, in post-Union South Africa the state began 
to assume a more direct role in local government, consequently 
the cost of developing water schemes, especially for the smaller 
rural towns, was increasingly borne by the provincial 
government.<1°> 
Amongst overseas cities, most municipalities did not directly 
bear the full responsibility of providing water. Indeed almost 
all British towns as well as colonial settlements such as 
(13) 
( 14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
_ .. 
J. Shorten, The Johannesburg Saga, Johannesburg, 1970, 
p.571. 
B. Robertsi Civic Centurl. The first one hundred years of 
the Kimber ey municipali y, Kimberley, 1978, p.25. 
W.P.M. Henderson, Durban, Fifty Years of Municipal History, 
Durban, 1904, pp.225-248; R. Lynsky, They Built a City, 
Durban,1982; The Centenary Executive Committee, East 
London Centur~: 1848-1948 East London 1948, pp.~75; 
Port Elizabet Publicity Association 2 Souvenir Brochure 1860-1960: Port Elizabeth Municiral Lenturt' Port 
Elizabeth, 1960, pp.45 53. Detai ed litera ure on these 
municipalities is generally lacking. 
See Appendix A for comparisons between the water schemes of 
major South African cities. 
A.de V. Minnaar, "Graaf-Reinet's Water Problems", in 
Contree, Number 22, pp.26-28. 
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Toronto<i 7 > and Sydney,<ie> and many American cities, including 
Boston, New Orleans and Chicago,<i•> relied on water companies to 
develop their supplies. Water companies were unable to provide 
water to cities on a large s~ale and were reluctant to lay on 
water to working class households due to the high capital outlay 
and low financial return. <20 > Water companies were also not 
prepared to provide drains and sewers because they offered no 
profit. As general rule private enterprise proved unwilling to 
provide capital investment unless short term profits were assured 
and the period of investment was short. A clear pattern may be 
determined amongst towns served by water companies •. Once a 
'sanitary threshold' <2 i> was reached where private companies 
could no longer meet demand, or could not profitably provide 
water for all classes of society, controversy broke out between 
the merits of public and private ownership.< 22 > Consequently, 
municipal government or water boards were forced to take over the 
function of providing water. Even then lack of finance often 
prevented the development of schemes, sometimes for many years. 
Often it took a natural disaster such as a major fire, drought or 
the outbreak of an epidemic to stimulate either the local 
government or the state to take action. 
Cape Town differed markedly from the typical pattern where 
control over water supply passed from private to public 
ownership. Indeed water supply had been in the 
( 17) 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
E. Jones and D. McCalla, "Toronto Waterworks 1840-77: 
Continuity and change in Nineteenth-Century foronto 
Politics".!. Canadian Historical Review, Volume lX, Number 3, 
1979, pp.~00-323. 
S. Fitzgerald.!. Rising Damp: Svdney 1870-90, Melbourne, 
1987, pp.81-8~. 
L.P. Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location", pp.337-
377 
N.M. Blake, Water for the Cities, Syracuse University 
press, 1950, p.77. 
D. Clark, "Worse than Physic",' p.55. 
L.P. Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location", p.372. 
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hands of the municipality since its inception in 1840. The most 
likely reason for the absence of private enterprise was because 
the springs that supplied the city were scattered, and even if a 
water company had succeeded in gaining control over them, little 
profit could have been made from this meagre supply. If 
anything, Cape Town's experience was diametrically opposed to 
that of most Victorian cities in that suggestions were constantly 
made for the removal of the waterworks from the authority of the 
inefficient municipality to a government board.<~3 > For as long 
as Cape Town was able to resist these pressures, the development 
of its water supply was the subject of political conflict within 
the municipality. 
Clearly environmental factors such as climate and Cape Town's 
geographic location had a major impact on the cost of providing 
water and the form which the supply took. While it has been 
argued that the financing of water schemes was a major source of 
political conflict within municipal government, this is only one 
dimension of the politics of water supply. The issue of water 
supply was closely related to a fundamental process of social, 
economic and political transformation taking place within Cape 
Town during this period. 
(23) Suggestions were often made by Cape Town's press for the 
establishment of a water company. However this took place 
before the collapse of water companies in Britain, nor did 
they seriously entertain the financial viability of such a 
venture. The water company established in the Southern 
Peninsula in 1889 was successful for a time as it 
controlled the Albion springs, a comparatively large source 
of water supply which did not require significant capital 
investment on its development. 
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WATER SUPPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SOCIALiECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF CAPE TOWN FROM THE 1~50's TO THE 1920's 
Up until the 1870's Cape Town's economic structure centered on 
its function as a port. The city had very little in the way of 
industry, and in some respects typified a British provincial 
town, administering its rural hinterland. Its function as a 
conduit for the colony's agricultural products and imported 
manufactured goods underpinned the dominance of traders and the 
merchant elite in its economy and social structure during the 
first half of the century.<~4 ) 
The 1870's represent one of the most important turning points in 
Cape Town's history. The discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 
1867 dramatically accelerated the growth of the town and at the 
same time hastened the process of a social, political and 
economic transformation that had been under way since the Second 
British Occupation of the Cape in 1806. 
The most tangible changes that took place during this period were 
those relating to Cape Town's physical growth, both in terms of 
the expansion of its built environment and increase in the size 
of its population. Between 1875 and 1911 Cape Town's population 
increased from 33 000 to 139 000, effectively quadrupling within 
a period of 36 years.< 2 ~) This took place within the context of 
high mortality rates due to the regular outbreak of epidemics, 
and with a constant migration of people to the gold and diamond 
fields of the interior. This growth was largely the result of 
(24) 
(25) 
D. Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters: 
Municipal Politics in Cape Town, 1840-54", MA dissertation, 
University of Cape Town, 1986, pp.69-76. 
G.42-1876, Results of a census of the Colony of the Cape of 
Good Hope .•• 1875; and UG.32-1911, Census Returns. 
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the twin processes of immigration and urbanisation,<2o) which 
effectively altered the language and racial mix within the city, 
increasing tensions between the dominant political and economic 
interests. The influx of immigrants and anglicisation of the 
Afrikaner elite underlay the gradual shift towards English 
control over the city's political institutions and the 
transformation of its economic base. 
The process of political change was already well under way by the 
mid-nineteenth century. Initially political power within 
municipal government had been in the hands of the merchant elite, 
large land-owning families and senior colonial officials, but by 
the mid-1840's it had shifted towards a heterogeneous group of 
rising local merchants, shopkeepers and landlords, mostly of 
Dutch origin.<27) This group was supported by householders and 
tenants, who benefited from the rentier class's dominance of the 
Town House< 2 e' by their keeping municipal rates to a minimum. 
Their authority was however challenged during the 1850's and 
1860's by a group of mainly English-speaking merchants, 
businessmen and professional classes who questioned the 
priorities of municipal government which stood accused of serving 
the interests of the landlord or rentier class, who neglected the 
town's need for an improved sanitation system and water supply. 
The challenge against the rentier class's dominance of the town 
council was resisted until the early 1880's, by which time the 
problem of water supply and sanitation had approached a crisis, 
which posed a serious threat to the future of the town. 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
C. Simkins and E.B. Van Heyningeni "Fertility, mortality 
and migration in the Cape Colony 891-1904", in The 
International Journal of African Studies, Volume--z2", 
Number 1, 1989, pp.79-111. 
D. Warrenl. "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
pp.225-23L. 
The Town House was the seat of municipal government until 
the City Hall was completed in 1905. 
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The 1880's represent an important turning point in Cape Town's 
municipal history, and mark the beginning of the development of 
an effective water supply and sanitation system. During this 
period water and sanitation were at the centre of a political 
conflict that divided the dominant classes over how the city 
should respond to the changes brought about by the Mineral 
Revolution, which threatened the functioning of the existing 
order. The economic boom of the 1870's and 1880's overloaded the 
city's infrastructure and brought with it a host of social 
problems which in turn reflected the inadequacies within 
municipal government. 
The disintegration of pre-industrial socioeconomic relationships 
within the underclass was also to place strains on the fabric of 
the city. Of major concern to Cape Town's elite was the large 
underclassc~9 > which had rapidly swelled the city's population 
since emancipation in 1838. Because of the lack of industry, the 
underclass tended to be engaged in seasonal labour and casual 
employment, although a significant number became artisans and 
traders. < ::::o > The transitory nature of labour and the shifting 
population added to the problem of disease, overcrowding, 
sanitation and water supply. Cape Town's merchant and business 
classes came to see the continuation of the city's prosperity 
being dependant on issues such as the political containment of 
the city's underclass, the political reform of the municipality 
and the improvement of sanitation and water supply. 
It was this desire for fundamental social and political reform 
which brought reformist merchants, businessmen and the 
(29) 
(30) 
The term 'underclass' is used by Bickford-Smith to describe 
Cape Town's labouring population in the 19th century, as 
there was no true industrial working class of any 
significance. 
V. Bickford-Smith "Cape Town on the Eve of the Mineral 
Revolution (c.187S)", paper presented to the Fifth Workshop 
on the History of Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 1985, 
p.14. 
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professional classes into conflict with the rentier classes 
controlling the town council. The owners of large properties, 
landlords and householders had long resisted expensive water and 
sanitation schemes financed through property rates as these were 
perceived to be to the benefit of the city's merchants and 
businessmen. The key issue was one of the cost of municipal 
improvements, and as Bickford-Smith argues in his study of this 
period, the issue of water supply and sanitation were central in 
the battle for the political control of Cape Town.<~ 1 > 
Race and class are important elements of the politics of water 
supply. While the politics of water supply is closely linked to 
the struggle between the dominant classes for control over the 
municipality, it was also during this period that there emerged a 
perception amongst the working classes of water supply as the 
prerogative of Cape Town's merchant and business interests. This 
had arisen out of attempts to isolate the underclass politically 
because of its support for the rentier class, which formed an 
obstacle to municipal reform. This perception explains much of 
the dynamics of the politics of water supply in the early 
twentieth century. Indeed although reformers gained control of 
municipality in the 1880's, for the next 40 years they were 
confronted with working class as well as middle class opposition 
to new water schemes. 
From the turn of the century, attention was directed towards the 
question of the municipal unification of the Cape Peninsula. In 
the same way water supply had been bound to the issues of 
sanitation and municipal reform during the nineteenth century, 
water was central to the process of unification. The main cause 
of the advancement of unification was the Cape Peninsula's 
(31) V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, class and ethnicity in Cape 
Town, 1875-1902", Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 
1988, p.15. 
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need for a common sanitation and water strategy to sustain urban 
growth. This was strongly resisted by householders and smaller 
businessmen within Cape Town, who saw unification as a strategy 
to provide the suburbs with water at the ratepayer's expense. 
Similarly attempts at developing a joint city and suburban water 
scheme in the hinterland were met with strong resistance and 
resulted in the ascendance of an anti-water and anti-unification 
group within the city council. 
Ultimately as the Cape Peninsula's demand for water grew, 
opposition to municipal unification subsided. The creation of 
a single municipality for Greater Cape Town in 1913 did not bring 
an end to the city's water problem, a solution to which was 
delayed a further five years due to divisions within the council 
and continued ratepayer resistance to the development of a 
hinterland scheme. 
WATER SUPPLY IN THE CONTEXT OF MUNICIPAL REFORM 
IN THE VICTORIAN CITY 
In common with nearly all Victorian cities, Cape Town's municipal 
government wus confronted by a phase of rapid urban growth which 
demanded fundamental reform in order to survive. The issue of 
municipal reform had emerged in Britain by the mid-nineteenth 
century, setting a precedent for colonial towns and cities. 
In Britain during the 1850's and 1860's a struggle broke out 
between municipalities and parliament as the former attempted to 
raise finance and acquire statutory powers to tackle urban 
problems brought about by the Industrial Revolution.c~=> The 
reformed municipalities that arose out of early struggles became 
(32) J.R. Kellet, "Municipal Socialism Enterprise and Trading 
in the Victorian City", Urban History Yearbook, 1978, p.36; 
p.40. 
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the stronghold of the middle classes. In the 1870's and 1880's 
concepts of 'municipalisation', civic pride' and 'municipal 
socialism' developed as local governments redefined their role 
within society.< 33 ' 
Cape Town was not unaffected by this movement which had seen the 
gradual extension of municipal authority from the provision of 
basic services such as the improvement of water supply and 
sanitation, to the operation of electricity, street lighting, 
markets, abattoirs and tramways, eventually touching on almost 
every aspect of city life up to the building of public baths, 
parks, libraries and art galleries.< 34 > Furthermore, there was 
also a tendency towards the creation of a more professional and 
powerful city government employing the skills of engineers, 
medical officers, accountants and administrators. Indeed the 
response and adaptation to the process of urbanisation and 
industrialisation were increasingly taken at the level of the 
municipal rather than the parliamentary level, where councillors 
exercised direct control over policy. Cape Town however had no 
Joseph Chamberlain, nor did the Cape parliament provide any 
social legislation to stimulate this process. 
At Cape Town the thrust for municipal reform finally came from 
outside the town council, when the rentier class's control over 
the municipality was finally broken in the 1880's. While civic 
leaders consciously emulated forms of municipal government which 
had developed in Britain, the acceptance of municipal reform was 
not wholehearted or without opposition. By the end of the 
nineteenth century many municipalities had overreached themselves 
in the race for municipalisation and improvement. In Cape Town, 
(33) 
(34) 
J.R. Kellet "Municipal Socialism", pp.36-40· A.S.A. 
Briggs, Victorian Cities, Harmondsworth, 1982, pp.184-240. 
F. Dolman, Municipalities at Work, London, 1895, pp. 
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as in Britain, there emerged a new class of civic leaders, often 
of lesser social standing and economic substance, who urged 
caution in an era of excessive municipal expenditure and heavy 
municipal indebtedness. It has been argued by E.P. Hennockc~~' 
that this was not a conflict of class interest, but rather a 
clash over which type of business attitude should be dominant in 
local government; that of economic caution or enterprise, which 
demanded a choice between 'improvement or economy'. A similar 
reaction occurred in Cape Town where smaller businessmen and the 
middle classes often rebelled at the cost of municipal 
improvement, particularly when the construction of new dams and 
reservoirs were undertaken during periods of economic depression. 
But while divisions within the town council over the cost of 
water schemes was not necessarily along class lines, the opposing 
factions drew on the support of different classes, and appealed 
to racial prejudices, to bolster opposing economic and political 
positions. 
The emergence of water supply as a political issue was a 
phenomenon that was not confined to Cape Town. One of the best 
documented examples of water supply developing into a political 
issue took place in nineteenth-century Liverpool. Fraser has 
argued that attempts to develop the 'Rivington Pike Scheme' was 
"for many years the most important issue in Liverpool's 
affairs". c3 ""> The development of this scheme at a cost of £450 
000, inappropriately coincided with a period of economic 
depression causing it to develop into a major political issue. 
Fraser argues that 'Anti Pikests' were motivated by the need for 
'economy' and were indifferent to Liverpool's sanitary needs.c~7 ' 
Leading Pikests were "wealthy merchants" and "professional men" 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
E.P. Hennock, Fit and Pro~er Persons. Ideal and Reality in 
Nineteenth-Century Orbanovernment, London, 1973, p.3 7. 
D. Fraseri Power and Authority in the Victorian City, 
Oxford, 1~79, p.33. 
ibid.' p.35. 
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while 'Anti Pikests' were "shopkeepers and tradesmen" who were 
opposed to increased rates.c 3 ei This conflict argues Fraser, 
"weakened the social and political standing of the Corporation 
and [changed] the social composition of the Council".c 3~> 
The example provided by Liverpool's Rivington Pike scheme 
coincides closely the reaction against Cape Town's hinterland 
scheme in the early twentieth century. Working class perceptions 
of these water schemes benefiting the rich, and middle class 
opposition to excessive municipal spending resulted in small 
businessmen and householders reasserting their control over the 
city council. While in Liverpool the politics of water supply 
was limited to a single incident, in Cape Town water was a 
recurring issue, taking different forms over time. Many of the 
conflicts that arose may be compared to the experience of various 
cities such as Bolton, Bradford and Leeds,c 4 o> but nowhere was 
the politics of water supply more intense, as persistent, or so 
closely bound up with issues of race and class. 
Comparisons made between the manner in which different cities 
managed their water supply problems are useful in that they 
provide a perspective against which Cape Town's responses may be 
measured. Comparisons are limited by the fact that every city is 
differentiated by its government structure, its social and 
economic order and by its geographic location. For example, the 
municipal government of Melbourne, which is situated in a 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
D.Fraser, Power and Authority, p.35. 
ibid. 
B.Barber, "Aspects of Municipal government,1835-1914" in 
D.Fraser(ed), A History of Modern Leeds,(Manchester), 1890, 
pp.316-319.; A. Elliot, "Municipal government in Bradford 
in the mid-nineteenth century", in D. Fraser(ed)i Munici~al 
Reform and the Industrial City, (Leicester), 198L, pp.ii -
i22.; J. Garrard, Leadershi~ and power in Victorian 
industrial towns,(London),983, pp.91-93,189-19i. 
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similar colonial political and economic context, differs 
substantially from Cape Town in that its water supply was 
controlled by the colonial government through a board of works, 
effectively diminishing its political impact on its municipal 
development.c 4 i> Examples of other towns and cities reveal 
unlimited combinations of interaction between water supply and 
municipal politics. Thus in the city of Bolton, the issue of 
augmenting water supply was not so much shaped by opposing 
interests within the city, as by conflicting claims for control 
of the hinterland by surrounding towns and rural industries.' 4~' 
A different example is that of Bradford, where a struggle took 
place between the municipality and a private water company for 
control over water supply.' 4~' While the exp~rience of each town 
and city is unique, there are aspects of the politics of wate'. 
supply that are common to nearly all. While this dissertation 
will stress what is unique to Cape Town, it will also attempt to 
draw comparisons to determine an underlying pattern of the 
politics of water supply within urban history. 
Despite this search for commonality, it will be stressed that the 
issue of water supply had a specific importance in Cape Town's 
municipal history. Indeed, the functioning and perception of 
water supply as a 'class interest' represents the basis for the 
extent of its impact o~ the city's social, economic, political 
and spatial development. 
( 41) 
(42) 
(43) 
D. Dunstan, Governing the Metropolis, pp.233-288. 
J. Garrard, Leadership and Power, pp.91-92. 
A. Elliot, "Municipal government in Bradford", pp.119-122. 
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THE HISTORY OF CAPE TOWN'S WATER SUPPLY 1840-1920 
The history of the development of Cape Town's water supply can be 
divided into three distinct phases in the period covered by this 
dissertation, each forming the subject of a separate chapter. 
These three periods represent stages of the outward expansion of 
the city's water supply from springs in Table Valley to the water 
supply schemes of the hinterland. The first period begins with 
the establishment of the municipality in 1840 and finishes with 
the turn of the century, the second lasts from 1900 to 
approximately 1910 prior to municipal unification, with the final 
period ending in the early 1920's with the resolution of the 
problem of water supply. Each of these periods approximates with 
fairly well-defined phases within Cape Town's municipal history. 
Indeed the development of the city's water supply corresponds 
with changes in the form of municipal government, as well as with 
the ascendance of different 'classes' who controlled the town 
council. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation which documents the 
building of the Table Valley reservoirs and the Table Mountain 
dams, it is argued that Cape Town's problem of water supply and 
sanitation became the focus of an attempt to reform the city's 
municipality between the 1850's and 1880's. The ascendance of 
reform minded men within the town council during the 1880's was 
followed by a golden era of civic achievement with the 
construction of two major dams and an integrated sanitation 
system. By the turn of the century, the municipality had 
financially overextended itself on these projects, and as a 
result the reformists suffered a political setback when they were 
ousted from the town council by economically conservative small 
businessmen and householders. 
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In Chapter Two it is argued that by the turn of the century the 
issue of sanitation had largely been resolved, and concern over 
water supply was related to limits which shortages might place on 
urban growth as well as the development of industry. Once again 
the question of augmenting supplies became the source of 
political conflict within the city council as a result of 
attempts to develop a water scheme in the hinterland jointly with 
the suburban municipalities. This was perceived by many middle 
and working class householders not to be in the city's interest 
but to the benefit of businessmen and the wealthy classes 
residing in the Peninsula's suburban municipalities. Opposition 
to the hinterland water supply scheme which was to serve the 
entire Cape Peninsula was to lead to serious water shortages in 
the suburbs. It is argued that this was to force the suburban 
municipalities to forgo their independence and seek unification 
with Cape Town by 1913. 
Chapter Three which covers the period from 1910 to the 1920's, 
concerns the events that led to the construction of the Steenbras 
Dam. The focus of this chapter falls on a referendum that took 
place in 1917, in which ratepayers were faced with a choice 
between two hinterland schemes. The referendum was to develop 
into a major political conflict in which class and racial 
divisions that had developed over the issue of water supply over 
half a century brought their full weight to bear. 
The final chapter will assess the significance of water supply in 
the history of Cape Town, especial with regard to the evolution 
of its municipal government. 
Page 23 
WATER SUPPLY AND URBAN HISTORY 
While a materialist approach to the history of Cape Town 
primarily hinges on important economic changes, such as the 
economic impact of the Second British Occupation, the discovery 
of diamonds, the development of industry, or the 1930's 
depression; other influences, as Christopher Saunders has 
recently suggested,< 44 > are equally important in shaping the 
urban landscape. 
One of the objectives of this dissertation is to illustrate the 
degree to which aspects of municipal development which are often 
perceived to be obscure, such as the provision of water supply, 
as well as the building of drains and sewers, do form an integral 
part of interpreting urban history. Most urban histories touch 
on the development of water supply, but often in an ephemeral 
way. Thus the building of dams and reservoirs are held up as 
examples of civic and engineering achievement and as monuments to 
the modern city state< 4 ~> while it is nearly always assumed that 
the development of water schemes were for the general good of the 
city, in terms of improved health and raised living standards, or 
to facilitate industrialisation. Yet questions concerning the 
social and political cost, or the economic impact of providing 
water are rarely raised or related to the overall process of 
urban development.< 46 > 
(44) 
(45) 
C. Saunders, "Methodological issues in South African Urban 
History", (draft paper of a report commissioned by the 
H.R.S.C.J, 1990, pp.36-37. 
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To attempt to write a history of a city's water supply would be a 
sterile and meaningless exercise if it were isolated from the 
broader context of urban history. In this respect this 
dissertation draws on the recent work of Digby Warren,< 47 > 
Bickford-Smith< 4 e> and Van Heyningen< 4~> in attempting to develop 
an integrated perspective to Cape Town's history. This study 
therefore does not simply represent a history of the city's dams, 
pipelines and sewers but an attempt to interpret the significance 
of water within the context of a city in the process of 
transition. Only through such an approach can the significance of 
water supply become apparent and contribute towards an 
understanding Cape Town's history. 
Finally, while this dissertation attempts to draw comparisons 
with other towns and cities, with particular reference to Anglo-
American urban history, its main objective is to determine what 
is unique to Cape Town. Indeed, while it is useful to identify a 
commonality in the experience of urban places, it is also true, 
as Gordon Pirie has suggested in his review of South African 
urban history, that it is pointless to provid~ a string of 'more 
examples of the same' .<~0 > While it cannot be denied that Cape 
Town's dominant classes consciously copied the experiences of 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
K.S. Hunt, "The Development of the Municipal Government in 
the Eastern Province ... with Special Reference to 
Grahamstown 1827-1862", MA.thesis(Rhodes University)~ in 
Archives Year Book for South African History, (Vol24J, 
1963.; A. de V. Minaar "Graaf Reinet's Water Problems", in 
Contree, Number 22(198S),pp.23-30.1 W.L. Speight, "Water 
supply beginin9s in South Africa: the history of the Cape 
effort, in Municipal Affairs, 9(99) 1943, pp23-25.· R. 
Taylor, "Cape Town's Municipal Services a Century Ago", in 
Contree, Number 15(1984),pp.24-27; "Cape Town Water Supply: 
History of Cape Town", in Municipal Engineer, 10(2), 1979, 
pp53-57. 
D.Warren· "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters: 
Municipai Politics in Cape Town, 1840-54", MA dissertation, 
University of Cape Town, 1988. 
V. Bickford Smith, "Commerce class and ethnicity in Cape 
Town, 1875-1902", Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge 
1988. 
E.B. van Heyningen, "Public Health and Society in Cape 
Town 1880-1910", Ph.D thesis, university of Cape Town, 
1989. 
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British municipal government, it is as important to reveal and 
probe distinctive problems and responses unique to the South 
African condition. 
(50) G.H. Pirie, "South African urban history", Urban History 
Yearbook, 1985, p. 24. 

CHAPTER ONE 
WATER, SANITATION AND MUNICIPAL REFORM 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPE TOWN'S WATER SUPPLY 
1840 TO 1900 
In most general histories of Cape Town, the subject of the city's 
water supply is relegated to a paragraph or two, usually 
describing the engineering achievements of dam building, and the 
enormous financial cost of such undertakings.<i> Thus in the 
period from 1840 to 1900, the most significant achievements would 
encompass the construction of the 'Number One' and 'Number Two' 
reservoirs in Table Valley by the early 1860's; the completion of 
the Molteno reservoir in the 1880's and the opening of the 
Woodhead and Hely Hutchinson dams on Table Mountain by the turn 
of the century. 
In this chapter it is argued that the history of water supply 
goes beyond the physical development of dams and reservoirs. 
Indeed these structures are much like fossils, in that they are 
tangible pieces of the jigsaw puzzle of the city's history, but 
they tell us little of the men who had them built or their 
social, political and economic costs. While water supply 
represents the literal lifeblood of a city, its effect on urban 
life reaches beyond the sustenance of men and support of their 
commercial activities. 
( 1 ) 
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During the nineteenth century the need for water was closely 
related to attempts to develop a sanitation system as disease was 
a major cause for concern. Despite this, neither the issue of 
water supply or a drainage and sewerage system could be addressed 
before Cape Town's municipality was fundamentally reformed. As 
the town council was controlled by classes unsympathetic to large 
scale social improvement, water and sanitation became political 
issues in a struggle to oust these vested interests. As a 
consequence of this conflict, water supply became associated with 
a range of political, social and economic issues. As a political 
issue water supply had a major impact on the evolution of the 
city's government. On a social level it became embroiled in a 
web of class interests, racial conflict and ethnic rivalry, which 
essentially reflected a division between those who wanted water 
and those who would have to pay for it. On an economic level, 
the enormous financial cost of augmenting supplies, generated 
more conflict which was to persistently dominate municipal 
politics well into the twenieth century. 
The development of Cape Town's water supply in the nineteenth 
century can be clearly broken down into three periods: (i) 1840 
to 1861; (ii) 1861 to 1882; and lastly (iii) 1882 to 1897. 
of these periods coincide with a distinct phase in the 
Each 
development of the town's water supply. Each of these periods 
also coincides closely with various stages in the evolution of 
the city's municipal government, and reflects the gradual 
economic and social change taking place in latter half of the 
century. 
In the first period, following the establishment of the 
municipality, the first haphazard attempts were made to secure a 
reliable water supply for the town. During the 1840's, political 
confrontations overshadowed civic improvements, delaying a 
solution to the problem of water supply, until the shortage 
itself eventually precipitated a political crisis. It was during 
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this period that the battle lines were formed by those who wanted 
water, sanitation and civic reforms. 
The period between 1861 and 1882 is an intermediary one, both in 
terms of water supply and in the internal politics of the 
municipality. It is during this period that fundamental changes 
in Cape Town's economy and society begin to take place, setting 
the scene for rapid transition from a conservative, anti-reform, 
unprofessional municipality towards a reformist, progressive ~nd 
professional municipal government, whose ascendancy is covered by 
final part of this chapter. We begin by briefly describing the 
situation found in the period prior to the establishment of the 
municipality in 1840. 
CAPE TOWN'S WATER SUPPLY UNDER THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION: 
1806 TO 1840 
The poorly developed state of Cape Town's water supply and 
sanitation system before the 1840's was a reflection of the 
limited.power and authority of the local government. Prior to 
the establishment of the municipality in 1840, Cape Town had been 
administered by the Burgher Senate, an ineffectual and 
unrepresentative body that had been created by the British during 
the First Occupation in 1796. Although conceived as a temporary 
administration for the duration of the initial occupation, the 
Burgher Senate continued to function up until 1828, and 
represents Cape Town's first recognisable local government.< 2 > It 
was during this period that the first concerted efforts were made 
( 2) The Burger Senate was replaced by the Burger Council 
during the Batavian period between 1803 and 1806, and was 
to take on municipal and representative functions. With 
the British re-occupation of the Cape, the Burger Senate 
was reconstituted as a ~urely municipal institution. See 
J.J. Oberholster "Die Burger-Senate 1795-1828" MA 
thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1936, pp.112-113. 
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to address the town's water supply problem. In 1806 the Burgher 
Senate referred the problem of the town's water supply to the 
British authorities, which resulted in the appointment of a 
Superintendent of Water Works.<~> Due to its limited powers to 
raise revenue,< 4 > the Burgher Senate was only able to make 
minimal progress. Apart from the laying of iron pipes in the 
main thoroughfares in 1811 and the construction of a small 
reservoir in Hof Street in 1816<~>, little else was accomplished 
by the time of the 'Senate's' abolition in 1828, when the 
responsibility for water supply passed into the hands of the 
Civil Engineer and Superintendent of Government Works.< 0 > 
During the 1830's, the town experienced severe water shortages, 
which was partly a legacy of the Burgher Senate's political and 
economic impotence, but also a consequence of the fact that the 
local government was then in a state of transition, with the town 
being inefficiently administered by government-appointed 
magistrates and officials. An indication that the colonial 
authorities recognised the seriousness of the issue of water 
supply during this interim period came in 1834 when the Secretary 
of State allowed the establishment of a separate government 
office for the Cape Town Water Works, and the appointment of an 
advisory Water Committee under the authority of John Chisholm, as 
the Superintendent of Water Works.< 7 > This Committee was unable 
(3) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/811, Minutes of the sub committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supplies, 1914-1915, Appendix A, 
Historical Sketch, p.2. 
(4) J.S. Visagie, Synopsis of records of the Secretary of the 
Burger Senate, Cape Archives, Inventory no. 1/84, p.4. Its 
sources of revenue included an inhabitant tax; a house tax; 
a tax on market produce, grain store and road toll. 
(5) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1, Appendix A, p.2. 
(6) CWC: Secretary Water Committee 1834-1840, Cape Archives 
inventory. Historical back~round to the period prior to the 
incorporation of the municipality of Cape Town in 1840, 
pp.1-2. 
(7) ibid. 
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to improve on the administration of the Burgher Senate. The 
problem in part stemmed from the fact that the authorities 
exercised little control over the use of water and had no overall 
plan to augment and manage water supply. For example, water was 
distributed unregulated through 36 public fountains, and the 
absence of hand pumps meant that water could be drawn with a 
minimal amount of labour, causing much waste.< 9 ) This lack of 
control over water supply, combined with the absence of a proper 
drainage and sewerage system, was a major cause of Cape Town's 
unsanitary state. This was reflected in the town's high 
mortality rate and the recurrence of disease and epidemics.<~> 
By the mid-1830's the authorities accepted that the time had 
arrived for the establishment of an independent local authority, 
to administer the town and take over the responsibility of its 
improvement. This resulted in the establishment of the municipal 
Board of Commissioners and Wardmasters in 1840. This body was 
however ill-equipt to govern the town, which was to see 
relatively little progress during the period of its 
administration over the next twenty years. 
THE MUNICIPAL BOARD AND WATER SUPPLY: 1840-1861 
In terms of its power and authority, the Board of Commissioners 
and Wardmasters cio) differed substantially from the Burgher 
Senate, although it was far from effective in its functioning. 
Its most fundamental difference was that it was directly 
( 8) 
( 9) 
(10) 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/4/8/1, Appendix A, p.3. 
S. Judges, "Poverty, Living Conditions and Social 
Relations: Aspects of Life in Cape Town in the 1830's", 
Unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1977, 
pp.58-59. 
The Board of Commissioners represented the executive while 
the Wardmasters had a subordinate supervisory function. 
Page 31 
elected,' 11 > and, with provision being made for two separate 
boards, this theoretically provided checks and balances on its 
power. In reality, the narrow property qualifications required 
of its representatives ensured that it served the interests of a 
few, while the system of two boards engendered friction, 
competition and petty jealousy within the Town House, impairing 
the effectiveness of the administration of the town. Furthermore, 
the absence of a representative government in the colony 
determined that the Municipal boards became a platform for 
political aspirations and grievances,' 12 > to the detriment of the 
efficient administration of the town. 
The 1839 [municipal] ordinance also allocated a wider range of 
responsibilities to the Board, including the functions of 
maintaining the town's fountains and reservoirs and stipulating 
that it provide an adequate supply of water.' 1 ~> Most important, 
unlike the Burgher Senate, the Board of Commissioners and 
Wardmasters was given limited power to tax immovable property, 
allowing it a degree of financial independence and the ability to 
undertake much needed improvements to the town. While this 
enabled some development to take place, in effect, the Board's 
financial powers were not sufficient to enable it to undertake 
substantial improvements. 
( 1 1 ) 
(12) 
( 13) 
D. Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters: 
Municipal politics in Cape Townt 1840-1854", Unpublished 
MA. thesis, University of Cape own, 1986, p.13. Although 
it was directly elected only about one in ten of the town's 
population are estimated to have qualified as voters. 
D. Warren, "The role of the Cape Town Municipality in Cape 
politicsJ. 1848-1853", unpublished paper, University of Cape 
Town, 19t::j9, p. 4. 
Ordinance 4 of 1839, which came into operation in 1840. The 
function of the Commissioners included the responsibility 
of providing street watchmen, fire engines! erecting lamp 
posts, keeping streets in repair, municipa finances 
control of Somerset Hospital, waste lands, markets, the 
shambles, the public granary, weights and measures, and the 
general health of the community. Wardmasters were to 
maintain a register of inhabitants, voters, births, deaths 
and property valuations as well as to report public 
nuisances and contravention of health regulations. In 
practise many of these services were inadequate or entirely 
neglected. 
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Thus, in spite of these increased powers, during the next twenty 
years,c 14 > the Board of Commissioners and Wardmasters made only 
limited progress towards solving Cape Town's water shortage. Its 
most significant contribution was the building of two adjoining 
storage reservoirs below the Oranjezicht Estate [see map 3], at a 
total cost of £10 900.cie> The first of these, called the No.1 
Reservoir, was completed in 1852, and had a capacity ten times 
that of the Hof Street 'water house' which had served the town 
since 1816.ci~> The No.2 Reservoir, which was completed in 1860, 
held 12 000 000 gallons, almost five times that of its sister 
reservoir.c 17 > But the No.1 and No.2 reservoirs only extended 
the supply of water available during the dry summer months, and 
no new sources of water supply outside of 'Table Valley' were 
exploited by the municipality. Indeed when contrasted with the 
town's growing consumption of water, the supply provided by the 
two storage reservoirs was hopelessly inadequate. 
The reason for the slow progress in augmenting water supply is to 
be found in three fundamental flaws in the constitution of the 
Municipal Board, namely; the complete lack of authority to raise 
loans for improvements; the existence of conflicting interests 
between the Board of Commissioners and Wardmasters, and finally, 
the lack of power to expropriate land necessary for securing 
water. Furthermore the Board failed in its attempt to make the 
waterworks self financing, thus the augmentation of water supply 
came to represent an direct burden on ratepayers and municipal 
resources.< 1 •> 
(14) 
( 15) 
(16) 
(17) 
( 18) 
Ordinance 4 of 1839 was to expire after a twenty year 
period. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/6/1, Augmentation of Water Supplies, 1914-
1915, Memoranda on Cape Town water Supply Works, pp.11-12. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1, Appendix A, p.2. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/6/1, Memoranda, p.12. 
D. Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
p.113. 
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Soon after its establishment the Municipal Board attempted to 
offset the cost of providing water by levying a variety of 
additional taxes. This was resisted by the colonial government, 
which resented any extention of the Board's authority. In the 
1840's Cape Town had attempted to levy a special water rate on 
the residents of the Green Point municipality which it was 
obliged to supply with water in terms of the municipal ordinance, 
but this had been blocked by government intervention.< 1 ~> In 
1841 the Commissioners had also attempted to levy a rate on water 
supplied to the colonial government, but this was rejected by the 
authorities in 1843.<=0 > In the following year the municipality 
sought to impose a rate on water used from springs on private 
estates, but this was also strongly resisted.< 21 > Although a 
special water rate was charged for houses with private water 
leadings, these were few and brought in a negligible income. 
The Board's failure to make the waterworks self financing should 
be measured against the fact that the municipality's overriding 
objective was to keep its expenditure to a minimum, as municipal 
inco~e was mainly derived from house rates.<==> Furthermore, it 
is argued by Warren in his study of municipal politics during 
this period, that an important check on municipal expenditure 
came from the Wardmasters, who routinely reduced the annual 
estimates proposed by the Commissioners.<=3 > This reflected the 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
In 1939 Municipality of Green Point claimed the right to 
Table Mountain's water supply. This was refused by the 
government in favour of the city. Instead 1 Cape Town had to 
supply Green Point with water at no profi~. Although Green 
Point was charged for this water, the Commissioners were 
unsuccessful in attempting to apply a special water rate as 
was enforced in Cape Town. 
D. Warren "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
pp.108-llS. The Commissioners claimed that the civil and 
military departments of the colonial government wasted 
water because it was not rated. See 3/CT 1/1/5/3 APP622, 
Report of the Revenue Committee. 
D. Warren,"Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
p.154. 
ibid, p.153. 
ibid, p.144. 
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Wardmaster's defence of the interests of householders and 
tenants< 24 > by keeping the municipal rate on fixed property as 
low as possible.< 2 e> 
Given the financial constraints imposed by wardmasters, as well 
as the inadequate powers of the municipal ordinance, the 
commissioners main objective regarding water supply therefore 
seems to have been limited to economising on water consumption 
and consolidating existing sources of supply from the Table 
Mountain springs, thereby keeping expenditure to a minimum. Such 
an approach was hardly conducive to a long term solution to Cape 
Town's water supply, while any sudden change in supply or demand 
could precipitate a crisis. 
Thus it happened in the mid 1850's, Cape Town's already 
precarious water supply was further restricted by a series of 
events, resulting in a severe water and sanitation crisis. By 
the end of the decade the issue of water supply was to bring the 
town's entire system of government into question. While the 
Municipal Board received the blame for the crisis, the water 
shortages may be attributed to a variety of factors beyond its 
control. 
One of the underlying causes of the water shortage of the 1850's 
was that the Municipal Board did not have access to all available 
sources of water supply. Most streams and springs within Table 
Valley belonged to privately owned estates; some of which had 
entailed rights.< 2~> Consequently, much of the Board's 
expenditure on water supply during this and later periods was 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
D. Warren,"Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
p.142. 
ibid, p.144. 
For example the important Oranjezicht Estate owned by the 
Van Breda family was entailed. This was eventually removed 
by parliament in the 1870's. 
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directed at acquiring these water rights. Without the power to 
expropriate land with fair compensation, this proved to be an 
extremely expensive exercise. As agricultural land was of little 
value without water, the municipality often had to purchase 
entire estates as well as water mills owning water rights, in 
order to acquire access to springs.< 27 > One typical example was 
that of the Hope Mill which was bought in 1842, for the sum of 
£3000, the land being resold without its water rights at a loss 
of almost £2000.' 29 > The cost of this single acquisition should 
be compared to that of the No.1 Reservoir, which was completed 
ten years later at a total cost of £2700, < 2 ~> including the 
purchase of the site. 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
Between 1840 and 1868 the following water rights and 
properties were acquired by the municipality. The table 
below reveals that numerous small sites had to be purchased 
at a relatively high cost in comparison to municipal 
income. 
DATE 
Pre-1840 
1840 
1842 
1854 
1862 
1865 
1865 
1867 
1868 
c1870 
PURCHASE 
Main Spring 
Waterhof Spring 
Hope Mill/ water rights 
Orchard/Vineyard springs 
Oranjezicht Estate 
Waterhof Estate water rights 
Leeuenhof Estate spring 
Hanover Street spring 
Kotzee's spring 
Various springs & Watermills 
Annandale Mill, and rights to 
Platteklip and Silver Streams 
Silberbauers Mill; Bulls Mill 
Truters Mill; De Wets Mill 
Wichts Mill. 
Sources: A.4-1877; A9-1887. 
COST YIELD 
Gallons p.d. 
200 000 
30 000 
£3000 30 000 
£14000 30 000 
£ 858 
£ 2024 
£ 2200 15 000 
30 000 
£ 7646 20 000 
£ 6439 
Between 1840 and 1880 an estimated £250 000 was spent on 
Cape Town's waterworks including pipes,water rights and the 
reservoirs. (Mayoral Minute 1881) Annual municipal income 
rose from less than £10 000 in the 1840's to £30 000 by 
1880. 
A15-1879, Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of the select 
committee on the Orangezicht purchase, p.I. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/6/1, Augmentation of Supplies, 1914-1915, 
Memoranda on Cape Town Water Supply Works, p.11. 
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By the 1850's the Board's attempt to augment the town's water 
supply was frustrated by a growing reluctance of landowners to 
give up the remaining water rights over the Table Valley springs. 
In the 1840's, the Board had purchased the night rights of 
various springs,< 30 > but now sought to extend its control over 
the full 24 hour supply, posing a threat to agriculture and water 
operated mills in the valley. The site of the No.1 reservoir, 
whose construction had been completed in 1852, had been selected 
so as to receive additional water from untapped springs in the 
Oranjezicht area. In 1854 the municipality entered into 
negotiations with the van Breda family, the owners of Oranjezicht 
Estate, whereby an agreement was reached exempting this property 
from rates in exchange for a further 30 000 gallons per day from 
the Vineyard Spring to supplement the reservoir.c 3 i> This 
agreement was challenged by the owners of the Gort Molen Mill who 
were entitled to use of this spring water,c 32 > a claim which was 
upheld by the courts.< 33 > An appeal against this decision was 
made and lost. The municipality refused to pay Breda's costs< 34 > 
which resulted in his cutting off the town's supply from the 
smaller Lemmetjies Spring in retaliation.' 3 ~' Already faced 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
As water powered mills did not operate at night, water was 
used during these hours to replenish the Cape Town's 
reservoirs 
A15-1879 1 p.47. The Orangezicht Estate was Cape Town's most important source of water, from which the municipality 
received 27 000 gallons daily. Apart from concessions on 
property rates, by the. late 1880's the Van Breda family had 
been paid an amount of £14 000 for the use of water. See 
A9-1887, Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of the select 
committee on Wynberq and Cape Town Water Supply Bills, 
Appendix a. 
ibid., p.47. The owners of the mill were Mr. Prince and Mr 
Collison. Water was purchased by the hour, thus, the mills 
which operated during the daytime would use the day supply, 
while the municipality would use the night supply to fill 
the storage reservoirs. See Al-1859, p.34. 
A15-1879, op.cit., p.47. 
ibid, p.47. The municipality had agreed to pay van Breda's 
costs for the initial court case, but not for the appeal. 
ibid., p.47. 
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with a shortfall in anticipated supply, the municipality 
encountered an additional problem when the No.1 reservoir 
developed a leak, further reducing the town's water supply from 
this source.c 3 => 
As a result of this controversy, the Board had to reconsider its 
plans to build a second reservoir below the Orangezicht estate, 
the construction of which was due to begin in 1856. Alternative 
sites that had been contemplated included a dam on Platteklip 
Stream, but this was both difficult and costly to build, and 
there were objections that it would interfere with the rights of 
the town's 300 washerwomen who were dependant on it for their 
livelihood.c 3 7> Suggestions that the springs at Newlands be 
used were also dismissed because of their distance from Cape 
Town. 
By the late 1850's Cape Town's water supply was rapidly 
approaching a point of crisis as a result of the Board's 
inability to gain total control over the Table Valley springs. 
Apart from shortages of water for domestic and commercial 
consumption, the lack of water to flush the rudimentary drainage 
and sewerage system was to pose a serious threat to public 
health. Added to this was filthy state of the back streets and 
steegs inhabitated by the underclasses. Overcrowding was 
commonplace with cases of up to sixty people living in a house, 
sometimes with two or three families to a room.c 3 e> A further 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
C5-1859i Cape of Good HoEe(Colony), Report and Proceeding 
of the Lommittee of the egislative Council on the 
Water Supply Bill, p.25. 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857, p.97. 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857, pp.36-36. In St John's 
Street a house owned by a baker was occupied by 62 people. 
About lO'l. of the town's population lived in Loop and Long 
Street. An average of 10 people per house was estimated for 
Cape Town. 
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cause for concern was that only about one fifth of Cape Town's 
houses were supplied with water supply, with the remainder 
relying on public fountains.c 3 •> This situation was to lead to 
the appointment of a parliamentary select committee in June 1857 
to inquire into the sanitary state of Cape Town and means to 
raise finance for a drainage system.c 4 o> The government's 
concern over the situation was justified, for in the following 
year the town suffered a serious outbreak of smallpox.c 41 > 
Evidence put before the Select Committee suggests that social and 
sanitary conditions in Cape Town had deteriorated since the 
1830's.c 4 ::::> Dr. Laing, the Port Health Officer and Police 
Surgeon,c 43 > suggested that overcrowding had arisen since 
Emancipation, as most of the town's servants "slept out of the 
houses".c 44 > Laing advocated the introduction of a "sanitary 
law", and insisted that all landlords get water laid on in their 
houses. c4 e> Furthermore, he believed, perhaps rather naively, 
that the Municipality should be made to "cut off the public 
pumps" as a measure to "force all landlords to lay on 
water". c 40 > 
(39) 
(40) 
( 41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
South African Commercial Advertiser, 9 February 1848. 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857. 
Cape Argus, 30 October 1858. 148 deaths were reported from 
smallpox. 
When general!~ compared to overcrowding described by 
S.Judges, "Life in Cape Town in the 1830's". 
Laing's position as Health Officer was related to the 
harbour. As Police Surgeon he had an intimate knowledge 
Cape Town's back streets, an area into which few of the 
upper and middle classes ventured. 
of 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857, p.35. Laing commented: 
"That is the grand cause, I suspect, of all this huddling 
together •.. it may be a kind of wish to get out of a 
certain kind of restraint which they are subject to under 
the master's eye". 
ibid, p.47. 
ibid, p.48. 
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The investigations of the Select Committee revealed that the 
Municipal Board was reluctant to construct a proper drainage 
system due to its expense, which was estimated at £20 ooo.c 47 > 
This represented a cost of £5 per house, or 15 shillings a head, 
which was strongly resisted by landed proprietors and 
householders.c 4 e> 
The Municipal Board's intransigent attitude towards the issue of 
sanitation and water supply stemmed from the fact that it was 
largely dominated by the Dutch rentier class, as well as a number 
of English-speaking property owners and speculators.c 49 > Although 
no thorough research exists detailing patterns of property 
ownership amongst the rentier class, it is not improbable that 
two or three dozen families owned about a quarter of Cape Town's 
housing stock.c 00 > Indeed in the mid 1850's the Wicht family 
alone was reported to own 374 housescoi> out of total of nearly 
35QQ.C02) Property was a major source of investment in pre-
industrial Cape Town. This gave rise to a situation where hire-
.. houses were built by the rentier classes "where they liked and 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
( 51) 
(52) 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857, p.12. 
ibid, pp.18-20. 
D.Warren,, "The role of the Cape Town Municipality in Cape 
Politics', p.2. The commercial middle class is 
described by Warren as a heterogeneous group. "Its 
members ranged from bankers to brokers, landlords to 
lawyers, sheep farmers to shopkeepers. It seems to have 
been more a loose alliance of men with common aims than a 
distinct, self conscious class like the mercantile elite". 
Warren continues; "Many of the men from this group were 
colonial born, and the majority were Afrikaners". 
Apart from D.Warren's "Merchant's, Commissioners and 
Wardmasters", very little research has been conducted on 
property ownership in Cape Town. 
Cape Argus, 30 November 1858. Also D. Warren, "Property, 
Profit and Power: The Rise of a Landlord Class in Cape Town 
in the 1840' s", in ( ed) C. Saunders et a 1 • ..L Studies in the 
History of Cape Town, Volume 6, 1988, pp.41-48. 
J. ShortPn, Cape Town, p.131. 
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how they liked, with no object but rent"."~~' Of great concern 
to this rentier class was their desire to keep municipal 
expenditure to a minimum. Any large scale investment in a water 
and sanitation scheme that was financed on the basis of property 
rates would have had a negative impact on the investments of 
large scale property owners, particularly those owning rows of 
hirehouses.'" 4 ' This was clearly reflected in the city 
engineer's concern that his proposed plan to construct a drainage 
scheme should be done "gradually" to avoid opposition from 
11 1 anded proprietors 11 • c ="" > He warned that opposition would: 
"appear mostly from the proprietors of houses which 
would have to be assessed to pay the debt. Their 
houses are highly mortgaged. They receive rent, and 
pay away the rent as the interest on the bond on their 
property ...• That class is still numerous in Cape Town 
and is also a class that is influencial in the 
mun i c i pa 1 it y" . c " 0 ' 
While the Select Committee recommended that an underground 
drainage system should be introduced to Cape Town, it failed to 
suggest how this could be financed. Although its main concern 
was that a proper sanitary system be introduced, it became 
apparent that water supply was the real problem. Within eighteen 
months a second select committee had been appointed to consider a 
water supply bill for Cape Town. 
had reached critical proportions. 
By this time water shortages 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
R.W. Murray, 
p.224. 
South African Reminiscences, Cape Town, 1894, 
D. Warren, "Merchant's Commissioners and Wardmasters". For 
example, one of the largest property owning families during 
this period were the Wichts' who owned up to 374 small 
houses, accommodating about 4000 people, or an eighth of 
the town's total population. See also H.W. Picard, Grand 
Parade; the birth of Greater Cape Town 1850-1913, (Cape 
Town) , 1977, p. 7. 
un-numbered: Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the 
Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Sanitary 
State of Cape Town, June 1857, p.21. 
ibid, p.21. 
Page 41 
1 
Worst affected by water shortages were the town's poor and the 
working classes, who relied on the public pump's and fountains, 
which were now shut off at night to conserve water. The 
consequences of this was described by Dr. Laing: 
" ... many [of the working class] being employed until 
late every day, have no time for carrying it.[water] 
They used to carry water at night when they came back 
from their work, but the pumps are now locked up at 
night."<::1 7 > 
Consequently those who could afford it had to employ others to do 
so, paying up to 3 pence for two buckets.<=ie> 
they could rush to the pumps after work where: 
Alternatively, 
"sometimes twenty or thirty buckets [are] waiting to be 
filled. There is also often a row there, through the 
people quarreling about the water. 11 <::1•> 
The Anglican Dean of Cape Town complained how this situation 
affected the coloured people of Reverend Lightfoot's 
congregation: 
"It even affected the attendance of the children at his 
school; and he sees sometimes as many as twenty and 
thirty around the fountain, waiting to get their 
buckets filled, and as the children cannot carry great 
quantities they have to go oftener. He [Rev.Lightfoot] 
attributed the death of the child in the quarry to 
this want of water; it had gone there to get water for 
domestic wants, and had fallen in".< 00 > 
The Dean added: 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
(61) 
"Church of England Clergymen agree ... [it is a matter of 
great importance] in order to make them cleanly, tidy, 
and respectable, all ought to have a better supply of 
water .•.. All these horrid little lanes and streets 
ought to have water running through them, for they 
must be very unwholesome to the people living in 
them. " < e 1 > 
Al-1859, Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of the Select 
Committee ap~ointed to consider the Cape Town and Green 
Point Water upply Bill, plO. 
ibid., p.28. 
ibid., p.28. This situation was typical of other colonial 
cities. In Sydney an almost identical scene was described 
by a contemporary observer in 1951: "Half the time of the 
poor i~ taken up in obtaining water from pumps, sometimes 
more than a quarter of a mile distant. at all hours of the 
day and night these pumps are at work; two and three 
o'clock in the morning, different par~s of the 
neighbourhood are the scenes of water brawls, when the 
pumps are besieged in the struggles of the people for 
WATER" quoted in D.Clark, "'Worse than Physic': Sydney's 
Water Supply 1788-1888", M. Kelly (editor), Nineteenth-
Century S~dney, 1978, p.56. 
ibid., p. I. 
ibid.' p.31. 
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Even the middle class householders who could afford to have 
private water leadings were not unaffected. While houses at sea 
level received an oversupply of water due to 'leaking brass water 
cocks', those at higher levels frequently received no water at 
all due to lack of pressure.c 02 > An additional problem for 
property owners, was the danger of fire as there was often no 
water available for the 'fire engines' to extinguish blazes, 
resulting in houses and businesses being burnt to the ground.c 03 > 
A more serious problem, at least in the eyes of the colonial 
authorities, was the threat to industry, commerce and shipping. 
While the town's bakers and brewers frequently complained of 
shortages,c 04 > it was shipping that was worst affected as it 
drew about 20/. of Cape Town's water supply, being up to 50 000 to 
60 000 gallons per day.< 0 ~> Instances were reported of ships 
which had been turned away without water,< 00 > posing a serious 
threat to Cape Town's commerce. Furthermore the demand for water 
made by shipping had been particularly felt during the Indian 
Mutiny of 1856-7, which saw a large increase of ships bound for 
India, taxing Cape Town's water supply to the limit.c 07 > 
By the end of the 1850's Cape Town had little to show for the 
money the Board had spent on augmenting water supply, apart from 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
ibid., p.37. 
ibid., pp.1-2; 31-34. Cape Town had a single fire engine 
which belonged to the colonial engineer's department; see 
A.F. Hattersley, An Illustrated social History of South 
Africa, Cape Town, 1969, p.178. 
C.5-1859, op.cit., p.128. 
ibid., p.23. This represented approximately 20/. of Cape 
Town's water supply. 
ibid., p.23. 
C.5-1859, op.cit.! p.25. The impact this had on the town's 
water supply is given in example, where transit ships 
carrying 200 horses each, required 70 tons of water cl4 000 
gallons) for the animals alone. Furthermore, the advent of 
steam ships was to put increasing demands on water supply. 
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the leaking No.1 reservoir and with a second reservoir only 
partially constructed. As a result of the deteriorating 
situation, opposition to the Municipal Board began to gather 
momemtum. Calls for municipal reform and reports of Cape Town's 
unsanitary state filled the local press.< 69 ' At the forefront of 
calls for municipal reform were the town's merchants and 
businessmen, particularly chandlers, bakers, brewers and other 
industries such as printing, tanning and woolwashing, which 
depended on a regular and plentiful supply of water.ce~> The 
concerns of the rentier classes for a low municipal rate was 
contrary to the needs of businessmen, who were to lead the 
struggle for municipal reform between 1859 and 1861, challenging 
the vested interests which dominated the Board of Commissioners 
and Wardmasters. This coincided with the expiry of the 1840 
municipal ordinance in-1860, providing an opportunity to attempt 
to reform the municipality and redefine its authority. The 
political turmoil that arose out of the water supply crisis 
represents a major turning point in the Cape Town's municipal 
history, in which the future course of the town's government was 
to be decided. 
(68) 
(69) 
H.W.J. Picard, Grand Parade, The Birth of Greater Cape Town 
1850-1913, Cape Town, 1969,pp. 5-7. 
Although no figures are available detailing water 
consumption by business and industry in the 1850's, 
statistics from the 1870's reveal that flour mills; 
tanneries woolwashing establishments; bakeries and 
breweries were the largest consumers of water. see A.15-
1879, Appendix M. 
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THE MUNICIPAL CRISIS OF 1859-1861 
While the challenge against the Board of Commissioners and 
Wardmasters from Cape Town's merchant and commercial classes had 
arisen out of the issue of sanitation and water supply, it was 
reinforced by deeper political antagonisms that had developed 
amongst the dominant classes during the 1840's. Indeed the 
struggle to reform the municipality was in effect a part of a 
larger political struggle that was taking place within the 
dominant classes. 
It has been argued by Warren that from 1844, the Board of 
Commissioners had been abandoned by the elite merchant class, 
disillusioned by the "growing radicalism of the municipality, and 
its promotion of the business, property and political interests 
of Cape Town's burgeoning landlord and commercial class".< 70 ' By 
the late 1840's this process was accelerated, with a loosely 
defined group of merchants, shopkeepers and professional men 
withdrawing their political support from the Municipal Board as a 
result of the Convict Crisis of 1849.< 71 ' 
The source of these divisions may be attributed to the split in 
the Anti-Convict Association in 1849, when 'radicals' exploited 
the convict crisis to use the ·municipality as a vehicle to 
mobilise popular support and to challenge the authority of the 
(70) 
( 71) 
D. Warren, "Merchants, Commissioners and wardmasters", 
p .152 
D. Warren, "The role of the Cape town municipality in cape 
politicsi 1848-1853", unpublished paper, University of cape 
Town, 19~9, pp.6-16. 
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colonial government itself.< 7 :> The group that dissociated 
itself from the radical movement were overwhelmingly English-
speaking merchants, businessmen and the professional classes, who 
had closer ties with Britain. Indeed R.W. Murray, the editor of 
the Cape Argus noted that the "race feeling between Dutch and 
English which the anti-convict [crisis] increased and hardened 
became very strong" during the 1850's.< 7 ::::> The political 
divisions that emerged in Cape Town were not simply based on 
ethnic rivalry, for they coincided with the conflicting economic 
interests of merchants and the rentier classes within the local 
government. This was reflected in the fact that the merchant 
interest was expressed through the town's Commercial Exchange and 
the Mechanics Institute,< 74 > in contrast to the largely Dutch 
rentier class's dominance of the Town House. 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
D. Warren,"The role of the Cape Town Municipality in Cape 
Politics", op.cit . .z. p.14. See also R.F.M. Immelman, Men 
of Good Ho e· The Homantic Stor of The Ca e Town Cham6"E?"?" 
o ommerce; - , ape own, , p. . e 
ultras were led by J.A.H. Wicht, one of Cape Town's largest 
property owners, and whose real intention was "to promote 
Dutch ascendancy and accustom the Afrikaaner to public 
meetings, agitation, and political feuds". It is suggested 
that the rift in the Anti-Convict Association was to impact 
on the loose alliance of the commercial middle classes 
leaving the radical property owners in control of the 
municipality, who asserted their interests, thus opening 
the way to future conflict with the town's commercial and 
merchant interests. 
R.W. Murray, South African Reminiscences, p.5. 
R.F.M. Immelman, Men of Good Hope; and R.F.M. Immelman,"A 
Mechanics' Institute in Cape Town (1855-78)", in Quarterly 
Bulletin of the South African Library, Volume 11, no.I 
September 1956~ pp.19-26. The Commercial Exchange building 
was a focal point for Cape Town's Chamber of Commerce. 
During the 1850's the merchant interests was directed 
through Commercial Exchange with regard to municipal and 
parliamentary politics. Leading members of the Mechanics 
Institute included many among the merchant and professional 
classes such as.z. Saul Solomon; John Fairbairn(publisher); 
J. Rose-Innes (~uperintendant General of Education); 
William Porter (Attorney General) and William 
Blore(merchant). The Institute was almost exclusively 
representative of the English-speaking middle class with 
few artisans being members. It was influencial during the 
1850's and 1860's with the influx of skilled artisans for 
the construction of public works such as the harbour, 
railway and hospital. It sought to introduce sanitary and 
municipal improvement, and its dissemination of such 
knowledge represented an important link between Cape Town 
and Europe. 
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With the establishment of the Legislative Council in 1854, these 
divisions became more pronounced and ultimately spilt over into 
the municipal arena. The merchant class became frustrated over 
the failure of the Commercial Exchange interest to gain 
representation in the Legislative Council in 1854 largely due to 
to opposition from householders and tenants. However in 1858, 
John Stein,' 7 ~> the Commercial Exchange's candidate was elected 
at the head of the poll because as R.W. Murray aptly put it "they 
[the Commercial Exchange] had the wealth, and and [in] Cape Town 
votes were as purchaseable as snoek and rice"c 70 > Stein's 
successful election to the Legislative Council was also due to 
his strong campaign for municipal reform during the prevailing 
water and sanitation crisis which was now affecting merchants and 
householders alike. Despite the calls for municipal reform, R.W. 
Murray noted that "no merchant of any standing, nor capitalist, 
would have anything to do with municipal work.' 77 > 
The merchants reluctance to participate in elections for the 
Municipal Board in part stemmed from their perception of it as a 
demeaning occupation, but opposition from Dutch householders and 
the rentier class's hold over their tenants would have made 
success unlikely. Instead merchants sought to weaken the power 
of the municipality, and with it the power of the rentier class. 
The water and sanitation crisis represented an opportunity to 
challenge the Board while the expiry of the municipal ordinance 
in 1860 gave them the means with which to redefine the 
municipality's authority. 
(75) 
(76) 
(77) 
R.W. Murray, South African Reminiscences, p.4. John Stein 
was a prominant merchant of Hamilton Ross and Company. His 
successful election was followed by another city merchant, 
J.D. Thomson, of Thomson and Watson and Company. 
ibid. 
ibid, p.226. 
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The critical water shortages of the late 1850's therefore acted 
as a trigger for Cape Town's merchant and business classes who 
blamed the Commissioners and Wardmasters for the deteriorating 
situation, accusing them of self interest and negligence. The 
attack against the municipal board was spearheaded by Saul 
Solomon, a prominent member of the Legislative Council and 
publisher of the Cape Argus.c 7 e> The press, particularly 
Solomon's Cape Argus, had been at the forefront of demands for 
municipal reform and calls for an adequate sanitation system and 
a proper water supply for the town. Indeed, throughout the 
1850's, newspapers had focused on the plight of the poor, and 
revealed the role of the landlords who contributed to the 
unsanitary state of the town.< 7~> Since its establishment in 
1857, the Cape Argus had served as a mouthpiece for Solomon, 
incessantly attacking the municipal board on a wide range of 
issues throughout the 1860's. Of particular significance was the 
linkage it made between the problem of sanitation and water 
supply. The thrust of the reports of the Cape Argus appear to be 
aimed at not only the middle class, but also the working class, 
who formed an important part of the municipal board's electoral 
support. Indeed frequent accusations were levelled at landlords 
who bullied their tenants to return 'dirty' candidates to the 
Town House. Reformers recognised this and attempted to drive a 
wedge between the landlords and the working class ratepayers and 
tenants hoping to unhinge their power base. 
In a series of articles the Cape Argus criticised both the 
unsanitary state of the town and the vacillating attitude of the 
Commissioners to municipal reform. Cape Town's system of 
drainage was condemned as "utterly barbarous",ceoi and warned 
(78) 
(79) 
(80) 
Saul Solomon, the owner of a steam press and publisher, was 
acutely affected by water shortaQes and at one stage was 
forced to use saline well water in order to keep operating. 
The Cape Ar~us reported a series of court cases in 1858 
drawing pub ic attention to the unsanitary conditions of 
hirehouses and the negligence of landlords. 
Cape Argus, 26 January 1861. 
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that 'underground drainage' without water would represent "the 
greatest curse to befall this city".ce.i.> 
to caution: 
The Cape Argus went on 
"Instead of scores of children dying in our back 
streets, we would have hundreds and hundreds of adults 
into the bargain ..•. The only thing that has saved the 
city from typhus and cholera hitherto, has been the 
absence of underground sewerage ... [because] we have 
never had water sufficient to flush such drains if we 
had them."' 192 ' 
The Cape Argus advised that the town first priority was the 
provision of water as the "want of water lies at the root of all 
mischief". ce~> Furthermore it suggested, "when we have as much 
water as we can use, we can carry out a proper system of 
underground sewerage, ... provide drinking fountains, and public 
benefits for the working class"' 194 ' This attitude of 
benevolence which prevailed amongst reformers in the 1850's, will 
later be contrasted to the changed attitudes of the 1870's and 
1880's, where the working classes came to be seen as a major 
obstacle to municipal reform. 
Solomon was supported by many of the leading members of the 
Commercial Exchange and public figures including amongst others; 
Dr. Rose-Innes; C Fairbridge; E Syfret; M Twentyman, R.W. Murray 
and W. Elore.cee> While Solomon's first attempts at galvanising 
the town to act on the water crisis appear to have been 
nonpartisan and partly philanthropic through his concern for the 
suffering of the underclass, it soon became apparent that the 
(81) 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
Cape Argus, 31 January 1861. 
ibid. 
Cape Argus, 26 January 1861. 
ibid. 
Dr. Rose-Innes was the Colony's Superintendent General of 
Education; C.A. Fairbridge was an attorney; E Syfret had 
interests in accountingp assurance and a trust company; 
R.Murray was editor of the Cape Argusp W.Blore was a 
prominent member of the mechanics institute. 
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call for municipal reform was an extension of long-standing 
social and economic rivalry and political antagonism dividing the 
Cape Town's elite.ce~> 
In March 1859, Solomon called a meeting at the Commercial 
Exchange, ostensibly to discuss all possible solutions to the 
problem of water supply.ce7 > When it became apparent that 
Solomon was intent on reforming the municipality itself by 
removing its control over the waterworks, and investing these 
powers in an independent water board, a widespread s~ruggle 
developed between the merchant interests of the Commercial 
Exchange and the Commissioners and their supporters.cee> At a 
further meeting at the Commercial Exchange a committee was 
established to draw up a bill to petition parliament to creaie an 
independent water board with wide powers enabling it to supply 
Cape Town and the Municipality of Green Point as well as 
shipping. ce 9 > The Commissioners and their supporters however 
saw this as an attempt to dilute the power of the municipal 
boards, thereby usurping their political dominance within the 
town. 
Expressing these fears, supporters of the municipal board were to 
complain that the meetings held at the Exchange did not represent 
(86) 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
The divisions that had emerged during the convict crisis 
were deepened in 1853 oyer the franchise question. Dutch 
speaking citizens aligned themselves with the coloured 
voters and liberals a~ainst the high franchise 
qualifications. This is likely to have reinforced the bonds 
between the Dutch property owning families at the municipal 
level, strengthening their economic interests through their 
control of the Town House, at the expense of the 
increasingly alienated the commercial and merchant classes. (see footnote *178) 
C.5-1859, Cape of Good Hope (Colony)~ Report and Proceeding 
of the Committee of the Legislative Louncil on the Water 
Supply Bill, p.58. 
ibid., p.1. Property owners organised a petition against 
the proposed water supply bill, containing 907 signatures 
and representative of £600 000 of landed property. 
ibid., pp.58-62. 
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the interest of the "old inhabitants of town" and that they "were 
carried [out] in English",'"''=>> which both symbolised and 
confirmed perceptions that the protests represented a threat to 
the Dutch landholder's hegemony within local government. Indeed, 
the Swedish merchant J. Letterstedt, who opposed the creation of 
a water board out of self-interest,'"' 1 ' told a government enquiry 
into Solomon's proposed Water Bill, that the Commissioners had 
the support of the majority of the town, "and particularly the 
Dutch Community", meaning "the landholders and householders".'"'~' 
The supporters of the Board also resented the fact that the party 
"outside of the Townhouse" '"':::::> was "constantly abusing the 
Commissioners" as well as labeling them "a very dirty lot, 
because they do not clean the town".<.,. 4 > English-speaking 
property owners who supported the Board were more cautious, 
describing the supporters of reform as "respectable merchants and 
shopkeepers" but at the same time criticised them for constantly 
complaining yet failing to "take their turn at the 
municipality".<"'e> Indeed, the English-speaking merchant minority 
represented on the Board of Commissioners, such as its chairman 
Hercules Jarvis,<.,.~> seem to have to have been in an ambivalent 
position, torn between the responsibility to keep the town clean 
as well as to keep rates low, to the satisfaction of large 
(90) 
(91) 
(92) 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
(96) 
C.5-1859, p.78. 
ibid., pp.84-88; p.103. Although J Letterstedt may be 
included among ~he ranks of the mercantile elite, he 
opposed the creation of a water board for personal reasons. 
Suggestions had been made that Cape Town's water be drawn 
from springs in the Newlands and Rondebosch area. 
Letterstedt had vested interests in these, which would have 
been compromised if they were taken over for Cape Town's 
water supply. 
ibid. 
ibid., p.34. The words of P.J. Denyssen, a former secretary 
to the municipality. 
ibid., p.77. The words of a Mr Robertson, a former 
Wardmaster. 
ibid., p.79. 
see appendix A for select biography. 
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property owners; a dilemma which is reflected in contemporary 
doggere 1 : 
"Wt:iat Boots* if that day after day 
Little Hercules sits in his chair 
And cries cle(a]nse the Town while his sapient chums 
Talk twaddle in Green Market Square".<~7 > 
Aside from fears that the reformers were attempting to usurp the 
authority of the Town House, the conflict over reform and water 
supply was essentially one of conflicting economic interests 
within the town's elite classes, between those who needed water 
and those who would have to pay for it. This is revealed in the 
concern of landholders and property speculators to a clause in 
Solomon's Water Supply Bill giving the proposed Water Board 
powers to borrow up to £50 000, as well as a further clause which 
stipulated that it would have to supply between 25 and 50 gallons 
free to each household.<~e' It was feared that the cost of 
providing water in this quantity would ultimately have to be 
borne by large scale property owners. Indeed one large property 
owner, J.M. Maynard openly argued that "houses tenanted by Malays 
and fishermen, being provided with a private water 
leading, ... will be a continual drain upon the pocket of the 
proprietor" as the tenants would be unable to bear the cost of 
water or increased rents.<~~> Proponents of the Water Board 
(97) 
(98) 
(99) 
M.F. Cartwright "The filthy state of Cape Town in 1858" in QuarterlS Bulletin of the South African Librart' Volume 33, 
1978, p. 6. Supposedly written by James [ycet , proprietor 
of the London Hotel in Lon9market Street. * 'What Boots' is 
an archaic form of saying what matters'. Pr9bably wri~t~n 
in reaction to court cases.a9ain~t.the_unsa~itary condition 
of hire houses and the municipalities inaction. One of the 
worst offences by the slumlords was that of R.H.Arderne~who 
was prosecuted for building water closets over Capel DiLch, 
see C.5-59, p.21. Much publicity was generated in the 
press as a result of these court cases. 
C.5-1859. 
C.5-1859, p.107. 
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agreed that the landed proprietors should feel threatened by this 
bill as: 
" ... it will meddle with their supposed vested rights. 
They have been long accustomed to gather where the 
have not strawed*, and to supply themselves~ and 
numerous tenants, with that which has cost ~hem 
nothing" < i•::>o > . 
Solomon's attempts to establish an independent water board was 
met with stiff resistance. The Board's Chairman, Hercules Jarvis 
and eleven other Commissioners petitioned parliament against the 
Water Bill, being supported by 907 inhabitants of the town 
representing £600 000 of property.<ioi> This was countered by a 
petition of over 800 names organised by Solomon. The fate of the 
Bill was finally sealed when it was referred to a Committee of 
the Legislative Council, which was chaired by none other than 
J.A.H. Wicht(MLC), Cape Town's largest landed proprietor, who was 
instrumental in recommending its deferral.< 102 > 
Soon after the Legislative Council had shelved Solomon's water 
bill, the Board Commissioners hastened to draw up their own 
Municipal Bill to introduce before parliament during the 1860 
session to replace the 1840 municipal ordinance which was due to 
expire at the end of that year. The Bill was challenged, for 
differing reasons, by both the Wardmasters and the supporters of 
municipal reform.< 103 > This ultimately was to result in its 
(100) C.5-1859, p.133. 
*archaic form of strewed. 
(101) C.5-1859, p.1. For the original petitions see Legislative 
Council of the Cape of Good Hope LCB 282 (petitions) no.3 
and no.33, 1859. These petitions reflect ethnic! racial 
and economic divisions. The names on the Commissioner's 
petition are at least 75/. of Dutch and Malay origin. The 
names appearing on Solomon's petition contain approximately 
20/. of Dutch origin. 
(102) Hercules Jarvis was another MLC servin~ on this committee, 
and undoubtedly recommended that the bill be deferred 
(103) Wardmaster's rejection of the Municipal Bill related to an 
earlier attempt on the part of the Commissioners to abolish 
the position of Wardmaster. S.C.2-1858, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select committee appointed ••• for 
the purpose of considering and reporting upon certain 
petitions relative to a change in the Cape Town Municipal 
Ordinance. 
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withdrawal, which was to effectively leave the municipality 
without a constitution by the beginning of 1861 upon the expiry 
of the 1840 ordinance. 
The main intention of the proposed 1859 Municipal Bill had been 
to strengthen the power of the Commissioners by abolishing the 
position of Wardmasters which were seen as an impediment to the 
administration of the town. Hercules Jarvis, who had been a 
Commissioner since 1840, criticised the system of two boards, 
blaming it for many of the municipality's shortcomings, 
explaining that: 
"There has always been since the establishment of the 
municipality, more or less clashing of interests, and 
thereby the public have suffered .... cio4 > 
Jarvis added that: 
"the dirty, filthy state of Cape Town since January 
last, can alone be attributed to to the clashin9 of 
interests of the Commissioners and Wardmasters. 10 ~> 
This 'clash of interests' was not one of class conflict,' 106 > but 
rather a reflection of the Wardmasters function, who, being in 
closer contact with householders, were more responsive to their 
needs, particularly to repeated attempts to shift the burden of 
taxation from the rentier classes to their tenants.cio 7 > A more 
basic explanation for the Wardmasters' rejection of the municipal 
bill was that it would have legislated them out of office. 
(104) A.2-1859, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the Select 
Committee appointed to take into consideration the Cape 
Town Municipal Bill, p.22. 
(105) ibid., p.23. 
(106) ibid., pp.59-60. For example, a former wardmaster, a Mr 
Powrie, stated that both boards were 'composed' of "about 
the same class of men", and that there were "very many 
wealthy men among the wardmasters, as well as amongst the 
commissioners". 
(107) D.Warren. "Merchants, Commissioners and Wardmasters", 
pp.142-143. 
Page 54 
1 
The municipal reformers, still smarting from their defeat, saw 
the Commissioners' municipal bill, which was already under attack 
from the Wardmasters, as an opportunity to campaign for the 
inclusion of key aspects of their defunct Water Supply Bill in 
the proposed municipal bill. Of particular significance to the 
reformers was a clause which would have made it compulsory for 
the municipality to supply up to 50 gallons of water daily, free 
to each household. By including this in the municipal bill it 
was hoped that this would force the development of further water 
supplies, as well as contribute towards solving the town's 
sanitation problem. 
As a result of the extensive opposition from the Wardmasters and 
reformers, a Select Committee of the Legislative Assembly 
recommended amendments to the municipal bill, retaining the 
office of Wardmaster and inserting the important 'water clauses'. 
Faced with a bill "so altered" that it now provided "ample water 
to the poor householders, at the expense of the rich'',cioe> the 
Commissioners called on all their resources to prevent their own 
amended bill from being approved by parliament. Thus, it was as 
a last resort that the bill was blocked by Wicht and his 
associates in the Legislative Counci1.cio~> The cost of this 
action was high for the Commissioners, for without an enabling 
bill, the municipality was left without any statutory rights upon 
the expiry of the 1840 municipal ordinance at the end of 1860. 
Thus, due to the machinations of the Commissioners, the 
municipality was now without an ordinance or means to provide for 
an adequate water supply. By early 1861 the mood of the town 
(108) Cape Argus, 2 March 1861. 
(109) ibid. Wicht's 'party' in the Legislative Council included 
not only colonial men such as, J.M. Lauw and H.Jarvis, but 
also english 'liberal' members with whom they had allied 
over the franchise question. 
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began to sway against the Board of Commissioners who continued to 
resist renewed attempts to remove the waterworks from the 
municipality's control. 
As a result of the vacuum brought about by the expiry of the 
municipal ordinance at the beginning of 1861, the Commissioners 
called a public meeting to decide on the future of the 
municipality. The Commissioners astutely presented ratepayers 
with a proverbial Hobson's choice: to support the reintroduction 
of the Board's original municipal bill, or the versions amended 
by the Legislative Assembly or that amended by the town 
counci1.ciio> By limiting ratepayers options the Commissioners 
hoped to avoid any attempt to revive the concept of a water 
board. The Board's attempt to manipulate the meeting was 
unsuccessful. The supporters of municipal reform, led by 
Solomon, made a second attempt at reintroducing the 1859 Water 
Bill at the ratepayers meeting, and to the dismay of the 
Commissioners once again demanded the establishment of a 
independent water board.ciii> 
The Board of Commissioners received a further setback when one of 
the members of the Legislative Assembly, J.M. Lauw, who had 
previously been a party to the quashing of the 1859 water bill, 
now came out in favour of an independent water board at the 
meeting. Lauw, who had recently returned from his first visit 
to England and Europeci.i. 2 > had been impressed by the way in which 
"all towns were drained and well supplied with water".cii:'.3> Lauw 
explained that he could not promise to support the Commissioner's 
Bill in Parliament as it "did not give the corporation sufficient 
power to carry out the improvements that were •.. desirable"<ii 4 > 
(110) Cape Argus, 29 January 1861. 
(111) ibid. 
(112) ibid. 
(113) ibid. 
(114) ibid. 
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and that if it were passed "Cape Town would r-emain another- 21 
year-s in much the same state as they saw it". c11~) To the dismay 
of the Commissioner-s the meeting appr-oved the r-eintroduction of 
Solomon's Water- Bill by 44 votes to 39.c11e> Once again the 
council stood to lose contr-ol over- one of its most impor-tant 
assets while landlor-ds faced the pr-aspect of significant 
increases in water- r-ates. 
Stunned by their- unexpected defeat the Commissioner-s called a 
second meeting to be held in March 1861, ostensibly to "clar-ify" 
the situation as the public had previously rejected the water-
bill in 1859.c11 7 > The r-efor-mers now fear-ed that the 
Commissioner-s would pack the second meeting at the Town House 
with their suppor-ter-s,' 11 e> enabling them to over-turn the 
decision to reintroduce the water bill which had been taken at 
the meeting in January. The Cape Argus warned that the new 
meeting would be dominated by the "Maynard's and de Kartes of the 
Dirty Par-ty" and therefore urged reform-minded citizen's to 
(115) 
It posed the question whether: 
" ..• the water supply of Cape Town is a matter of too 
vital importance to the colony at large to be. placed 
in feeble or unworthy hands, and that, least of all, 
could persons in the position of large owners of small 
house property be entr-usted with so very delicate a 
responsibility, in the discharge of which their 
peculiar interests must be found at variance with what 
should be the dictates of duty 11 .c 120 ) 
Cape Ar~us, 29 January, 1861. Lauw was referring to the 21 
years t at had passed since the establishment of the 
municipality in 1840. It is not without irony that exactly 
another 21 years were indeed to pass before the issue of 
water supply was settled in 1882. 
(116) ibid. 
( 117) 
(118) 
A.2-1861, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Re9ort of the Select 
Comm~ttee on the Municipal Water Su~pl~ ill, p.3. The 
Boar of Commissioners asserted tha t e ratepayers had 
rejected the proposed 1859 Water Bill by way of a petition. 
Cape Ar~us, 5 March 1861. Claims were made that the 'dirty 
par-ty' ad sent messages "to the Ma 1 ays" to "bring them to 
the Townhouse", because "the water was to be taken away 
from them". 
(119) Cape Argus, 2 March 1861. 
(120) ibid. 
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As a result of mobilisation, the meeting at the Town House was 
packed with supporters of both parties. Having called the 
meeting, the Commissioners had the advantage, and with the help 
of the chairman< 1 ~ 1 ', the landed proprietors; including Jarvis, 
van Breda, Watson, Maynard, Cauvin and Versfeld argued one after 
each other for the introduction of an amendment to municipal 
bill, with the stipulation that if every dwelling was to be 
supplied with a daily minimum of 25 gallons, that it should be 
paid for by the occupants.< 1 ~~> While it is not certain whether 
this amendment had been prearranged; what was to follow, appeared 
to be a blatant manipulation of proceedings. The Cape Argus 
reported that when it came to the vote between Solomon's water 
bill and the amended municipal bill, clearly two thirds supported 
Solomon by a show of hands, yet the chairman declared he was 
unable to decide who was in the majority.< 1 ~3 > It was decided to 
divide the two parties into separate rooms for a count of heads 
but confusion broke out resulting in the chairman calling for a 
ballot.< 124 ' This was rejected by the reformers as several hours 
had since passed and many of their supporters had returned to 
their businesses.< 1 ~~> Solomon demanded that the meeting be 
reconvened at the Parade on the following day, and urged his 
supporters not to vote. The remaining supporters of the 
Commissioners however went ahead with the ballot, defeating 
Solomon's Bill by 399 votes to 9.< 12~> 
On the following day a crowd of over 1000 people gathered on the 
Parade in support of the Water Bill,< 127 > in the biggest display 
of popular expression since the anti-convict protests of 1849. 
(121) The Chairman, Mr. Robertson, was a former wardmaster. 
(122) Cape Argus, 5 March 1861. 
(123) ibid. 
(124) ibid. 
(125) ibid. 
(126) ibid. 
(127) Cape Argus, 7 March 1861. 
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The gathering included many of Cape Town's most prominent 
merchants, businessmen and political leaders.<i~e> The meeting 
represented as much a display of support for water supply as a 
demonstration against the economic and political interests served 
by the "Dirty Party" of the Town House.<i 2 -P> Indeed Solomon's 
speech in which he called for "cheap water for the poor" must be 
contrasted with the plea of the meeting's chairman, 
W.L.Blore,<i 3 o> that vote on Solomon's resolution, unlike the 
display at the Town House, be: 
"put.fairly to Englishm~n?. with English hearts, and 
having a proper apprec1a~1on of English liberty''. ci 3 i> 
Indeed Blore's sentiments reflect the wider antagonism of the 
mainly English-Speaking merchants to the stranglehold which Cape 
Town's old Dutch families and the large landlords had over the 
government of the town. As was expected, Solomon's bill was 
adopted unanimously by the meeting which also proceeded to elect 
a committee to reintroduce the water bill to parliament later 
that year. ci 32 > Within a matter of months it drew up a bill to 
constitute a new municipality and for the creation of a separate 
water board, which it went on to present before a select 
committee of the Legislative Assembly. 
Given the manifestation of popular support in favour of the Water 
Bill, it is suprising to learn that it was destined to a similar 
fate as the original 1859 bill. When the new water bill was 
(128) Those present at the meeting included J.Stein(MLC); J.M 
Louw(MLA); C.Manuel(MLA)i· E.J.M. Syfret; M. Twentyman; P.J. 
van der Bijli· T.A. Andse ; A. Zeederberg and Reverend T. 
Lightfoot. A 1 were representative of Cape Town's 
commercial and professional classes. Thomas Lightfoot was a 
leading cleric in Cape Town, later to become Archdeacon. 
(129) Cape Argus, 7 March 1861. 
(130) W.Blore. See Appendix for Select Biographies. 
(131) Cape Argus, 7 March 1861. 
(132) ibid. 
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presented to the select committee the acting commissioners 
charged that the meeting had been unofficial and had no legal 
standing.ci33 > Realising that the bill might be blocked for a 
third time, the reform committee agreed to a compromise. Another 
reason for this was the 1840 municipal act had since expired and 
the town was without a legally constituted municipal 
government.ci34 > As a result the Water Bill was withdrawn and 
the Municipal Bill as amended by the Assembly in 1860, containing 
the free water clause was accepted in its place.<i 3~> 
The inclusion of the water clauses in the 1861 Municipal Act in 
effect represents a compromise between those amongst the 
commercial classes wanting water, and the large property owners 
who would have to pay for it. It was an unequal compromise, for 
the provisions of the 1861 Municipal Act left the power of the 
large property owners intact. Furthermore no adequate provision 
made for municipal borrowing which was necessary to finance 
improvements. Consequently little was done to implement the 
provisions of the water clauses over the next twenty years. 
The new Municipal Bill represented only a minor improvement. 
Indeed the 1861 Municipal Bill was barely an advancement from the 
original 1840 municipal ordinance, as the structure of the Board 
of Commissioners and Wardmasters was left intact.< 130 > Only in 
1867 did the Commissioners succeed in their original intention of 
abolishing the office of Wardmasters with the introduction of a 
revised Municipal Bill in that year.<i37 > 
(133) A.2-1861, op.cit. pp.3-6. 
(134) ibid., p.7. The 1840 municipal ordinance expired at the 
beginning of 1861. The mun~cipality's leg~l status was 
tenuous particularly regarding the collection of rates and 
fines. 
(135) ibid., p.7. 
(136) Act 1 of 1861. For example; the questionable system of two 
municipal boards, continued to operate until the Act was 
again amended in 1867. (Act 1 of 1867) 
(137) Act 1 1867. 
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Given the defeat of Solomon in the struggle for an adequate water 
supply through the reform of municipality between 1859 and 1861, 
it must be asked what is the significance of this period. In 
remainder of this chapter it will be shown that the conflict over 
water supply and sanitation between 1859 and 1861 represents the 
initial stage of a process of reform that was only to reach 
fruition by the 1880's and the 1890's. 
The real significance of the conflict was that it determined the 
direction in which the municipality was to develop. In 
retrospect Act 1 of 1861 represents an important point in Cape 
Town's municipal history; for if Solomon had succeeded in 
enacting the Water Bill, this would have effectively stripped the 
municipality of a significant part of its authority and potential 
revenue. It is possible that this may have initiated a process 
where municipal authority may have been fragmented amongst a 
variety of independant boards or under government 
authority.< 1 ~9 > Indeed it will be seen that the maintainance of 
municipal control over water supply was to prove vital, for in 
the early twentieth century Cape Town needed to assert its 
control over all major sources of water supply, in order to 
exercise political and economic dominance over the Cape 
Peninsula. 
The conflict surrounding the problems of water supply, sanitation 
and municipal reform during this period are also important in 
that they represent the foundation of what was to become a 
prolonged struggle for control over the municipality between the 
emerging commercial class and the old rentier class. While the 
attempt to remove water supply away from municipal control was a 
consequence of the fact that the merchant interest was 
(138) The fragmentation of Cape Town's already limited municipal 
authority was a very real possibility during the 1860's. 
Apart from the attempt to remove the waterworks, the Table 
Bay Harbour Board was established in 1860, (Act 6 1860) 
giving merchants a greater influence over the development 
and functioning of the port facilities. 
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politically too weak to compete for control over the Town House, 
by the 1870's the balance of power was to shift in their favour, 
allowing them to launch a direct political assault to break the 
rentier class's dominance of municipal government. 
THE TOWN COUNCIL AND WATER SUPPLY 1861-1882 
Although the 1861 and 1867 Municipal Acts may be regarded as 
important turning points, in so far as they represented an 
acceleration of the process towards a fully fledged municipal 
government,c 13~> the reconstituted municipality was unable to 
make any significant headway in improving Cape Town's squalid 
state by augmenting its water supply or developing a proper 
sanitation system. Although the Number Two reservoir below 
Oranjezicht had been completed in 1860, this provided no more 
than a breathing space for the town. While the onset of an 
economic depression during the 1860's prevented any further 
development, a more important reason for the lack of progress was 
that the Board of Commissioners and Wardmasters, and after 1867 
the Town Council, continued to be dominated by the rentier 
classes and householders who were resistant to any suggestion of 
major social and economic reform of the municipality. Even after 
1867, when the Board was abolished and replaced by an 18 member 
town council with increased powers, including authority to raise 
limited loans to finance public works,c 140 > the same attitude of 
economy continued to prevail over those of reform and 
improvement. 
(139) 
(140) 
Act 1 of 1861. A municipal board was created and the 
municipality was divided into six districts each of which 
elected three members. Standing Committees were created 
for public works, general purposes, waterworks 1 finance, fire brigade, office establishment(municipal s~aff) and 
markets. All springs were placed in charge of a 
superintendent of waterworks. The position of Wardmaster 
was retained. See also J.Shorten, Cape Town~ The Golden 
Jubilee of the Greater CitE, (Cape Town), I 63, p.132. 
Act I of 1867. Municipalorrowing powers were limited to 
£ 20 000, and the ratepayers consent. 
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As far as water supply was concerned, the same objectives of 
economising on consumption and consolidating existing sources of 
water supply remained the dominant policy. Indeed a significant 
amount of money spent on augmenting water supply in the 1860's 
and 1870's continued to be directed towards acquiring the rights 
of springs and streams in Table Valley. 
As a result of council's conservative policy towards 
improvements, by the 1870's the position of Cape Town's water 
supply had, in real terms, deteriorated from that of the 1840's. 
While the municipality managed to increase the town's supply from 
a daily average minimum of 230 000 gallons in 1840 to 360 000 
gallons in 1879, the population had doubled from approximately 20 
000 to nearly 40 000 in the same period, which effectively 
reduced water consumption from 11.5 to 9 gallons per head.<i 4 i> 
Once again it was the underclass was worst affected, which, as 
always, bore the real cost of the unsanitary state of the town in 
terms of their high mortality rates. Descriptions of the effects 
of the water shortages echoed those of the 1850's. Most of the 
town, and especially the poor were still dependent on the public 
fountains for water. District Six was still largely reliant on 
well water which was often contaminated,<i42 > while areas of the 
town lying above the reservoirs, which included portions of 
Districts Two, Three and Four were without water as a lack of 
pumping equipment meant that pipes could not supply the higher 
levels.<i 4~> During periods of drought or in the dry summer 
months, water was shut off at night,<i 44 > and sometimes the 
public water pumps were chained up during the day.<i 4 e> During 
one particularly dry spell the effects of the water 
(141) A.15-1879, p.59. 
(142) A.9-1888, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select 
committee on Cape Town sanitation, p.2. 
(143) ibid., p.35. 
(144) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1, Appendix A, p.4. 
(145) Cape Times, 28 January 1881. 
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restrictions on the city's poor was vividly described in one 
report, which bears a remarkable similarity to the situation in 
the 1850's: 
" ... the suffering from want of water is intense among 
the poorer class of people ... when the pump handles are 
free so fierce is the competition for the use of them 
that weak folks have no chance in the struggle, and 
are compel led to go away empty." c 14"'» 
While the municipality's inaction was partly to blame for the 
deterioration in water supply, this must be seen against the 
background of an acceleration in the growth of the town's 
population from the mid-1870's, as a response to the discovery of 
diamonds near the Orange River in 1869. Indeed, the 1870's 
represent an important turning point in Cape Town's history, for 
the impact of rapid economic and physical growth was to provide a 
catalyst for a transformation of the municipality, as the 
existing civic institutions, as well as the men whose economic 
interests they served, were unable to meet the social and 
political demands being brought about by change. 
The single biggest challenge facing the town was the increased 
demand for water, which continued to place an enormous strain on 
municipal government and its financial resources. Apart from 
supplying drinking water for the town itself, the municipality 
had to provide water for shippi~g, street watering, the fire 
service as well as for the cleaning of the shambles and fish 
market. The municipality did not possess the financial resources 
nor could it afford to employ the engineering skills needed to go 
beyond the Table Valley area for a long term solution for water 
supply. 
The Town Council was not unsympathetic to the problems caused 
through insufficient water supply, yet it continued to baulk at 
undertaking any comprehensive scheme capable of providing a long 
(146) Cape Times, 28 January 1881. 
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term solution to the impending crisis. In 1872 a Special 
Committee had been appointed by the Town Council to investigate 
the whole question of water supply.<i47 > Although the Committee 
recommended that another much larger storage reservoir was 
needed, and went as far as to suggest a site at Breda's Field 
above the existing reservoirs,<i 4 ei the Town Council was 
reluctant to commit itself to this expenditure. Indeed, the 
problems brought about by water shortages, as well as the 
Council's inadequate reaction, brought about a crisis in 
municipal government in the late 1870's similar to that 
experienced the 1850's. 
As in the 1850's, water shortages once again placed severe 
constraints on commerce and industry. By 1879 the town's 
industry drew almost 20/. of the daily average water supply 
yet this was barely adequate.<i 4 •> The city engineer was to 
report that merchants were "very much distressed for the want of 
water'' and frequently came to the Town House to complain. ci~o> 
It will be argued however that the response of the merchant and 
business interests differed in that some began to assume the 
responsibility of playing an active role in municipal politics in 
order to bring about reform. 
The municipality's intransigence over this issue was broken in 
1876, with the succession of Charles Lewis as mayor, who was one 
of a handful of reform-minded men had been elected on the council 
during the course of the 1870's. Lewis, (who was also to be 
(147) 
(148) 
(149) 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1, Appendix A, p.4. 
A.4-1877, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select 
committee appointed to consider and report on the Cape town 
reservoir, p.l-3. 
A.15-1879, Appendix M. Of the daily average supplr, of 
360 000 gallons~ industry drew 72 859 9allons (201.); 84 000 
galllons were distributed thrqugh public fountains (23%); 
while the remainder was used by shipping (201.)· the 
corporation; the colonial and imperial authorities; and 
private households. 
(150) A.15-1879, p.81. 
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elected onto the Legislative Assembly), represents one of the 
first major reformers within the council. His ascendancy points 
to a growing acceptance on the part of the town's merchants to 
involve themselves in local government, if their interests were 
to be served. Lewis's business as a ship chandler placed him 
amongst the town's merchant elite whose interests he 
reflected, many of whom were personally affected by the water 
shortages. c 1 ei' 
Soon after his election Lewis criticised the shoddy manner in 
which the old reservoirs had been built and took a bold stand on 
the development of the future water supply. He chastised 
councillors opposed to the building of new reservoir, describing 
them and their supporters as: 
"The cautious and economical citizens who dread 
incurring a debt [and who] will vote for making the 
most of our present appliances, tinkering up the old 
reservoir, changing lead for iron pipes by degrees, 
and trying to keep the drains flushed by utterly 
inadequate means". c1e2i 
Lewis went on to suggest the way forward: 
"Men of larger minds will advocate a substantial loan. 
Money spent in endeavouring to make a bad job good is 
simply thrown away. At best our existing reservoir, 
even if it would hold water, is incapable of holding 
water enough. " c 1 e::!:' 
Lewis's stand represents an important landmark in the history of 
the municipality, for unlike the challenge in the early 1860's, 
when the merchant interest outside of the council had attempted 
to weaken the municipality's authority, the mid-1870's signify 
the real beginning of the struggle for municipal reform which was 
to come from within the Town House itself. As the reform-minded 
businessmen's perception of local government as demeaning 
gradually gave way, leading merchants not only participated in 
(151) For example John Woodhead~ whose iron foundry was effected 
by water shorta~es, sough~ election onto the town council 
with the specific purpose of dealing with the water 
problem. 
(152) Cape Times, 17 August 1876. 
(153) ibid. 
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Town House politics, but began to fight for political control 
over Cape Town's administration. 
As Lewis had suggested, the first obstacle in the way of 
augmenting Cape Town's water supply was that the municipality 
lacked the authority to raise a substantial loan. This had long 
been resisted by the landlords as well as small property owners 
who feared increased taxation would result from municipal 
borrowing. However, the experience of the municipal corporations 
in Britain from the 1870's proved the opposite, as imp~ovements 
financed by large loans in turn generated income for the 
municipal coffers, a fact that was not lost on local businessmen. 
Leading the campaign for the approval of a loan for a third 
reservoir was the recently established Cape Times, which was to 
play a central role in mobilising middle class opinion for the 
reform of the municipality by calling for the ousting of what it 
called the 'dirty party' controlling the Town House. 
Apart from the attacks made on the town council by the Cape Times 
as well as the Cape Argus, further criticism came from the 
Governor of the Cape, Sir Bartle Frere, who chastised the 
municipality for the unsanitary state of the town.cie 4 > By 1877, 
as a result of growing criticism, it had become generally 
accepted by the town council that the building of a third storage 
reservoir could no lo~ger be avoided or delayed. As municipal 
borrowing powers were limited to a total of £20 000, the approval 
of parliament was necessary for the raising of a special loan for 
the sum of £46 813, which was the estimated cost to build a new 
reservoir.ciee> Nevertheless, the so called 'dirty party' in 
the council continued to obstruct the efforts of the reformers, 
and resolved to build the reservoir in the cheapest possible way, 
resulting in the tender for its construction being awarded to a 
(154) Cape Times, 17 August 1876. 
(155) A.4-1877, p.1. 
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contractor of dubious ability. Indeed the entire episode 
involving the construction of what was to become known as the 
Molteno Reservoir, developed into an embarrassment for the 
municipality, and was to play a significant part in the downfall 
of the 'dirty party' in the 1880's. 
From the onset of the decision to build a new reservoir, the 
scheme was to be plagued by controversy. The site selected at 
'Breda's field' was itself questionable as it represented an 
extension of the ongoing practice of consolidating the finite 
water supplies from existing sources within Table Valley rather 
than tapping larger supplies elsewhere in the Cape 
Peninsula. ci=-e> Once again this proved to be expensive for the 
municipality as water rights had to be purchased along with the 
land which would lose its agricultural value without water. The 
owner of the Oranjezicht estate, G.H. van Breda, possessed water 
rights to seven springs, of which the municipality agreed to 
purchase the right for the use of two, along with a portion of 
the estate as a site for the reservoir, which was to be located 
above the existing No.1 and No.2 reservoirs.< 1 =- 7 > Once the 
municipality bought the land and had begun constructing the 
reservoir, it was discovered that the water from the two springs 
was insufficient, and an attempt was made to gain access to the 
remaining five springs; an effort which was resisted by van 
Breda. ci~e> This was to spark a dispute within the Town House as 
(156) 
(157) 
J.G Gamble Report of the water su~ply of Cape Town, (Cape 
Town), 187S, pp.l-16. In his repor Gamble had recommended 
Table Mountain as the best source for a long term water 
supply. As the sources of water supply in Table Valley were 
being rapidly depleted, so the cost of purchasing water 
rights escalated. Although other sources of abundant water 
supply were known of elsewhere in the Cape Peninsula, the 
initial investment required to bring it to Cape Town, far 
outweighed the cost of purchasing Table Valley springs, 
even at inflated prices. 
A.15-1879, op.cit., pp.2-3. The site had been recommended 
by John Gamble~ the Hydraulic Engineer for the Colony, due 
to its proximity to the existing mains and distributing 
reservoir, as well as to the source of water supply from 
the Orangezicht Estate and the Platteklip stream. 
(158) ibid., Appendix A, Petition of Gerrit H.endrik van Breda. 
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the reformist councilors controlling the waterworks committee 
were determined to go ahead with the scheme, regardless of the 
increased cost, and recommended that the municipality offer to 
purchase the entire Orangezicht Estate for a sum of £10 000.< 1 ~~> 
This was strongly resisted by the leading 'dirty party' 
councillors P.J. Stigant and D.C. De Waa1.cibo> 
The conflict surrounding the purchase of the Orangezicht Estate 
brought a deadlock in the council' 101 > between reformists and 
anti-reformists. In addition to its cost, it would require an 
Act of Parliament, as the land was entailed.< 102 > Ultimately the 
dispute was to go before parliament, where, after drawn out 
investigation and litigation, the entailment was removed, making 
its water accessible for the Molteno reservoir. Yet the debacle 
surrounding the Orangezicht reservoir had only started, and was 
to lead to resistance by ratepayers to the council's inept 
handling of the town's affairs, although growing disillusionment 
had long been reflected in the miniscule polls at elections. 
A further major cause of public disatisfaction was the discovery 
that the construction costs had been underestimated by a massive 
Even more startling had been the admission made by the 
Town Engineer that it was not known how the reservoir would be 
filled,< 104 > as well as the suggestion that the municipality 
(159) A.15-1879, p.8. 
(160) ibid., Appendix B6. The petition of Councillors P.J. 
Stigant and D.C. De Waal 1 who ar9ued that the price of the Estate was out of proportion to its value, and would 
represent an extreme burden on ratepayers. ( The municipal 
valuation was £4 800) 
(161) 3/CT 1/1/1/30, Cape Town Municipal Record Books, Council 
Minutes, 29 January 1879. Councillors voting against the 
purchase: Bam; Stigant; Hofmeyer; Pentz; Ashley. Those 
voting in favour of the purchase: Piton; Juritz; Townsend; 
Lauw; and the mayor Kotzee with a casting vote. 
(162) A.15-1879, op.cit., Appendix A. 
(163) Cape Times, 19 February 1880. 
(164) ibid. 
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start "casting about for some new source of supply". cioe> 
Apart from revealing the unprofessional manner in which the 
municipality was run, the real significance of the Orangezicht 
dispute was that it crystallised the formation of two distinct 
rival parties within the council by the late 1870's, representing 
reformists and the anti-reformists, or the Clean Party and the 
Dirty Party as they were labeled by the press.cioo> 
Although the problem of water supply as well as relaked issues 
such as sanitation and disease were the underlying cause of the 
emerging conflict in with the Town House during the 1870's and 
1880's, this must be seen within the context of the broader 
social and political changes taking place within Cape Town at 
this time. During this period, as had been the case twenty years 
earlier, the campaign for municipal reform centered around the 
interrelated issues of the town's water supply and sanitation. 
While in the 1850's reformers had attempted only to remove the 
municipality's control over water supply, by the 1880's reformers 
were to attempt to gain control over the municipality itself. 
Although there are many similarities with the attempt to reform 
the municipality in the 1850's, the growth in the power of the 
town's commercial classes by the 1880's was to place them in a 
position, if not by necessity, to exert political control over 
the Town House. 
(165) Cape Times, 19 February 1880. 
(lb~) The 'clean' and 'dirty' party divisions were first 
described in the 1850's. The connection between these 
~roupings in the 1850's and 1880's is consistent. The 
dirty party' was largely representative of the anti-
reformists, who were substantial property owners and mainly 
Dutch speaking, while the 'clean party' represented the 
reformists, who were drawn from the commercial classes. For 
further background of municipal politics in the 1880's see 
V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, Class and Ethnicity in Cape 
Town, 1875-1902", unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of 
Cambridge), 1988, pp.129-144, and E.8. van Heynin~en, 
"Public Health and Society in'Cape Town 1880-1910 , 
op.cit., p.120. 
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While a handful of reform-minded councilors like Lewis had 
succeeded in being elected during the 1870's, the majority of 
town councillors were still representative of Cape Town's older 
property owning families. In contrast, the supporters of reform, 
tended to be drawn from the ranks of the town's leading 
retailers, professional classes and civil servants. Although the 
reformists' call for water and sanitation reforms was grounded in 
concerns over health and trade, the philanthropic attitude over 
the effect on the town's underclass which had been so apparent in 
the 1850's, was almost entirely absent by the 1870's and lBBO's. 
Indeed, the underclass, which in effect meant the majority of 
Cape Town's people of colour, were now seen as a major obstacle 
to reform, as it was perceived that it was they who underpinned 
rentier class control of the Town House. The issue of race and 
class thus became important factors in the battle for control 
over the Town House for the implementation of water and 
sanitation reforms necessary for sustained economic growth. 
The reasons given for the failure of the commercial classes to 
gain influence over the Town House were examined in reports in 
the English-language newspapers throughout the 1870's. The Cape 
Times for example, provides us not only with an insight into this 
problem, but, perhaps more important, a window into the mind of 
reformers themselves. 
The Cape Times had identified several reasons for the lack of 
progress in the development the town's water supply and 
sanitation. The first of these related to the apathy of 
ratepayers. It asked its readers: 
" ... how many ratepayers took the trouble to record 
their votes on that occasion? (1876 municipal 
elections] In one district ... one candidate polled 9 
votes, and three others seven-a-piece .•. municipal 
affairs must be in a very bad state indeed when 
ratepayers are so utterly hopeless that they will 
neither induce intelligent and liberal men to contest 
the election nor raise a finger in support of one, 
rather than of the other incapabilities who have some 
reason for accepting candidature .•. 11 ci 07 > 
(167) Cape Times, 17 August 1877. 
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In further articles the Cape Times identified Cape Town's 
municipal system which made it necessary for ratepayer consent 
for improvement schemes requiring municipal borrowing, and 
restrictive legislation which prevented the raising of adequate 
finance, as a major reason for the town's condition. It 
complained: 
"There is no systematic plan agreed upon to deal with 
the city as a whole, no funds provided for a general 
cure of patent and glaring defects. The fact that 
until the law is amended as Council's resources are so 
limited that they can undertake no important work 
without the express sanction of the ratepayers." cibei 
Apart from voter apathy and a defective municipal ordinance, the 
Cape Times saw the greatest threat to reform being the symbiotic 
political relationship that existed between the representatives 
of property, the 'Dirty Party', and their working class tenants. 
The linkage of water supply with racial interests became a 
dominant theme in the call for water and sanitation reform. It 
was suggested that while landlords did not want to augment water 
supply because of the impact it would have on property rates, the 
coloured working class did not need it. 
rhetorically: 
The Cape Times inquired 
"How moderate must be the requirements of Abdel, whose 
washings are chiefly of a ceremonial kind, and whose 
house is guiltless of the trace of the scrubbing 
brush. There are thousands of inhabitants in this city 
who could put up, without any sense of discomfort or 
want, with considerably less quantity of water than 
the present supply, and we may be sure that their 
voices will be heard ... why should they be taxed for a 
commodity which they have never felt the need, and 
which they would not ... use more freely than the 
present time?" cibori 
During the annual elections to the town council, the Cape Times 
took every opportunity to draw the connection between the 
interests of the large property owners and the working class 
tenants, constantly accusing the former of intimidation, deceit 
and corruption. In the 1880 elections the Cape Times accused 
(168) Cape Times, 12 August 1878. 
(169) Cape Times, 29 September 1876. 
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the 'Dirty Party' of being the source of rumours that were: 
"industriously being circulated that reform and 
taxation go hand in hand, and that a sweetened city 
involves a shilling rate ... 11 <17 •:>> 
Furthermore, the Cape Times had called upon "those who resent the 
degrading position of holding their comfort, health, and very 
lives at the will of the Malay element, to agitate for bold 
reform".< 171 > The Cape Times attack on the representatives of 
the Dirty Party similarly contained 'ethnic' or sectionalist 
overtones; it complained that: 
"The idea of a reforming council has been derided, with 
vulgar ridicule by the meaner sort of existing 
councillors in strong and uncouth dialects .... " <172 > 
The focus of the attack on Cape Muslims and to a lesser extent 
those of Dutch descent, represents what Bickford-Smith describes 
as "English ethnic mobilisation, which grew by distinguishing 
itself from the 'otherness' in the rest of Cape Town's 
population".< 173 > This in turn was fuelled by the perception of 
a link between the "Malay" community and regular outbreaks of 
disease and epidemics such as smallpox.< 174 > Thus Bickford-Smith 
argues that "Malays" "became stereotyped as 'Dirty' and 
obstructionist",' 17 ~> while "sanitation rhetoric became 
inextricably mixed with the rhetoric of British Imperialism in 
the ideology of Englishness".< 170 > The dirty party's apparent 
unwillingness to address issues such as the augmentation of water 
supply and sanitation reforms was seen as further evidence of an 
alliance of interests between the representatives of the large 
property owners and their tenants who kept them in power. For 
(170) Cape Times, 10 August, 1880. 
(171) Cape Times, 21 September 1876. 
(172) Cape Times, 10 August 1880. 
(173) V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, Class and Ethnicity",p.161. 
(174) E.B. van Heyningen, "Public Health and Society", pp.151-
160. 
(175) V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, Class and Ethnicity", p.123. 
(176) ibid., p.124. 
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the English-speaking elite, gaining control over the municipality 
meant "removing the control of property owners over the Town 
Council "which "went hand in hand .•. with ending foreign, un-
English, if not anti-British contro1. 11 c177 > The perception of 
the Town Council as un-English, at least in its attitude, is 
reinforced by a cartoon appearing in the Lantern,c 17e> which 
portrays it in terms of a Dutch ox-wagon unable to come to terms 
with effective municipal government. (see cartoon 1 opposite) The 
two main issues, sanitation and water supply are symbolised by 
the coffin and water pump. 
The dirty party's dominance of the Town House.was viewed with a 
degree of despondency by reformers, as the existing municipal 
system was perceived to entrench their interests. The dirty 
party's political power was not however based on a mass turnout 
of working class supporters, but rather on the besieging of the 
Town House during elections, as depicted in a Lantern cartoon of 
1880,c 17~> in a scene resembling the British hustings.(see 
cartoon overleaf) This not only acted as a deterrent to middle 
class ratepayers, but also confirmed the perception of municipal 
politics as undignified. Low polls at municipal elections were a 
reflection not only of ratepayer's apathy and disillusionment 
with municipal politics, but also of their perception of it as a 
demeaning exercise. 
(177) V.Bickford-Smith, "Commerce Class and Ethnicity", p.124. 
(178) The Lantern, 30 July 1881. 
(179) The Lantern, 9 August 1880. While the Lantern cartoon is a 
caricature of events, it echoes similar perceptions, 
particularly in reports in the Cape Times. The degree to 
which reports and experiences acted as a deterrent to 
middle class voters is uncertain. At the very least it 
must have reinforced the general perception of Municipal 
politics as being something demeaning or distasteful. The 
amendments to the municipal ordinance in 1882, which 
abolished the system of a single polling station at the 
Town House, to allow polling stations in each district, 
were a result of these fears. 
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By the beginning of the 1880's reformers and their press 
despaired of gaining control over the Town House, but this was 
soon to change. By the summer of 1881, water shortages reached a 
critical level with water supply for shipping being threatened, 
while water for brickmaking, building and woolwashing was stopped 
entirely.< ie•:>i The Cape Times reported in sensational detail the 
effects of the diminishing water supply claiming that "occasions 
have been known when not one bucketful could be obtained to 
prepare a corpse for burial".cieii Attempts by reformers to 
confront the council met with failure, and a public meeting 
organised by 'respectable citizen's' to protest against the water 
crisis had been overwhelmed by the supporters of the dirty party. 
The Cape Times complained bitterly that: 
"under the guidance of one of the pugnacious 
councillors, the unwashed inhabitants were successful 
in crying down a modest taxing measure for the more 
adequate supply to the town ... "cie::::i 
It went on to suggest that: 
"The public meeting did not represent the intelligence 
or property of the city, but it may never the less 
represented the preponderance of the voting 
power, ... the moment the appeal is made to the mob 
outside, obstructiveness asserts its sway, and the 
reformers might as well go whistle to the wind as 
endeavour to persuade the unwashed rabble that it can 
conduce to their moral and physical well being to have 
copious water, sweet air, and comely streets ... "cie~> 
Yet despite the perception of the control wielded by the Dirty 
Party, a number of reformers had been elected onto the council 
in 1880, including prominent merchants and businessmen such as 
(180) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/811, Appendix A, p.5. 
(181) Cape Times, 28 January 1881. 
(182) Cape Times, 11 March 1881. 
( 183) ibid. 
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W.Fleming, A.R. McKenzie, W.Farmer; H.Bolus and J.L. Brown.cie 4 J 
Indeed it was realised by reformers within the town council that 
the 'Dirty Party' would remain entrenched in the Town House for 
as long as the existing political system remained. Consequently 
the reformers turned their attention to the municipality itself, 
to weaken the 'dirty party', as a prelude to far reaching social 
and economic reforms. 
Outside the municipality, efforts to augment Cape Town's water 
supply focused on a report made by John Gamble, the Hydraulic 
Engineer for the Cape Colony who had been commissioned by the 
Waterworks Committee in 1880 to investigate various sources 
available to the town.ciee> Gamble's report, issued in 1881, 
recommended the top of Table Mountain for the best and nearest 
source for a long term water supply.ciee> This report was not 
favourably received by the council, which pinned its hopes on the 
uncompleted Molteno Reservoir. Reformers saw Gamble's Table 
Mountain proposal as a viable basis for the establishment of an 
independent water board as had been proposed in the 1850's. 
Another proposal was that a private water company be established 
to develop Table Mountain's water resources to supply the entire 
Cape Peninsula, including the villages which were dependant on 
well water. Many of the town's businessmen, were aware that 
water companies and water boards were an accepted part of 
(184) V.Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, Class and Ethnicity in Cape 
Town",1. op.cit.~pp.129-130; and V.Bickford-Smith, "'Keeping 
Your uwn Council': The struggle between houseowners and 
merchants for control of the Cape Town Municipal Council in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century", in Studies 
in the HistorT of Caije Townl Volume 5, C.Saunders et.al. (eds.), Cape own, I 84, p. 99. W.Fleming and A.R. Mc 
Kenzie were prominent merchants, the latter a chief 
landing agent at the docks. W. Farmer was a merchant and 
investor in the City Steam Laundry, in which he had a 
partnership with H. Bolus, a stockbroker. J.L. Brown was a 
director and chairman of ~he Equitable Fire Assurance and 
Trust Company. It is perhaps no coincidence that all these 
men had a direct or passing concern,1. through there business 
interests, for the augmentation of Lape Town's water 
supply. 
(185) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/811, Appendix A, p.5. 
(186) ibid. 
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municipal government and some South African town's, such as 
Kimberley and Port Elizabeth were successfully served by 
them.<ie 7 > 
Disappointed at the results of the attempts to reform the 
municipality from within, the Cape Times now campaigned to divest 
the council of its control over water supply.<iee> 
appea 1: 
It made the 
"The duty now lies with the leading citizens, upon men 
who hold a large stake in the city and perceive the 
urgency of the situation, to meet together and concert 
plans for a water scheme over which the Town Council 
shall have no powers what so ever. Private enterprise 
may be awakened in the matter the concessions 
necessary being secured by Act of Parliament ... "<l.e•> 
It warned that: 
"We cannot ... command capitalists to come to our 
rescue, ... A water scheme for Cape Town and its suburbs 
would involve an outlay of a quarter of a million 
sterling. For reasonable concessions men would be 
found to without difficulty to undertake this 
expenditure, and ... with the certainty of securing a 
handsome profit to themselves on terms advantageous to 
the ratepayers."<i•0 > 
Alternatively it was argued, if private water companies could not 
be attracted, water supply could be managed by an independent 
board with greater powers capable of developing a scheme for the 
city and suburbs "of larger dimensions and a wider scope than a 
town council could legitimately entertain."<i.,.i> 
The appeals made by the Cape Times did not go unheeded. In 1882 
two leading reformers and businessmen represented on the town 
council and in parliament, William Fleming and William Farmer, 
(187) B.Roberts, Civic Century. The first one hundred years of 
the Kimberley municipality, 1978, p.25. 
(188) see Cape Times , Leading articles for 14 February; 11 
March; 18 March; 25 Mar-ch 1881. 
(189) CaQe Times, 11 March 1881. 
(190) CaQe Times, 14 February 1881. 
(191) Cage Times, 18 March 1881. 
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..,. 
and several others,c 19=' joined together as provisional directors 
of the Table Mountain Water Supply Company, with the intention to 
raise capital for a company to supply Cape Town and the suburbs 
with water. c 1 9 :::?:' Although Parliament enacted a bill giving the 
company a concession to use water from the Table Mountain 
catchment area,c 194' the venture failed to get off the ground 
due to widespread opposition to the company's proposal to impose 
a water rate on householders.c 19 ~> While Cape Town rejected the 
concept of a water company, these were to flourish at a later 
period with the emergence of the suburban municipal authorities. 
While reformist businessmen made little headway in establishing a 
water company, an opportunity for reforming the municipality 
arose after the 1880 election, which saw the representatives of 
the Clean Party climb to six out of the eighteen town 
councillors.c 196 ' Soon after the election, a number of reform-
minded councillors were appointed onto a special committee which 
was formed to examine various Municipal Acts and their amendments 
with the object of reporting any improvements that may be 
desirable.c 197 ' This provided the reformers with an opportunity 
to address the structural imbalances within the municipality that 
determined the predominance of the dirty party, and its 
obstruction of improvements to the town's water supply and 
sanitation system. 
(192) A.25-1882, Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of select 
committee a~pointed to consider and re~ort on the Table 
Mountain Wa er SupplR Bill, p.I. Apar from 
W.Farmer(M.L.A.), ot ers amon9st the provisional directors 
included A. Ebden(M.L.C), L.Wiener (a leading member of the 
Cape Town Chamber of Commerce), a~d other businessmen; 
J.Mudie; W.G. Anderson and W.W. Dickson. 
(193) ibid., p.1. 
(194) Act 47 of 1882. 
(195) A.9-1887, Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Report of the select 
committee on Wvnberq and Cape Town Water Supply Bills, 
p.46. 
(196) see footnote (184) 
(197) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping Your Own Council", p.196. 
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Amongst the recommendations made by the committee was the 
modification of a clause in the 1861 Municipal Act which 
determined that the municipality supply a minimum of 50 gallons 
of water daily to each dwelling house free of charge.(i•e) It 
will be remembered that this had been a concession won by Solomon 
in the conflict between the reformers and the dirty party twenty 
years earlier. Its intention had been to alleviate the suffering 
of the poor by forcing the municipality to augment water 
supplies, but this had never been achieved.(i••) While this 
measure had been vigorously opposed by the dirty party in the 
1850's, reformers now saw the free water clause as a drain on 
municipal resources and an obstacle to making the waterworks self 
financing,( 200 ' and thus sought to charge property owners for all 
water supply. Ironically, large property owners and their 
representatives were to fight for the retention of the clause, as 
it had only been partly observed, to the benefit of landlords, 
while the working classes benefited least of al1.c 2 oi' 
Apart from the proposed changes to the water clause, the report 
of the special committee issued in early 1881, contained other 
recommendations clearly aimed at weakening the Dirty Party's 
domination of the Town House. One of the most important of these 
was the recommendation that voting at municipal elections no 
longer be carried out exclusively at the Town House but that 
separate polling booths be established in each of the town's six 
(198) Act 1 of 1861, Clause 15. 
(199) A13-1881, Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the select 
committee ae~ointed to consider and re~ort on the Cape Town 
Municipal Bi l,p.60. Only about half o Cape Town's 
households were supplied by water leadings. 
(200) Under Act 1 of 1861, the municipality was not allowed to 
make a profit out of water rates and expenditure was to 
balance revenue. 
(201) A.13-1881, p.60. As only one charge was made for a 
connection to the water mains, ,landlords owning rows of 
hirehouses could benefit from the free water clause for 
each household while only making a single payment. 
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districts< 202 > to encourage the participation of middle class 
ratepayers in municipal elections. 
A further recommendation of the special committee was that the 
municipality's borrowing powers be raised from £20 000 to 
£150 000, 1203 > and for an increase in the municipal rate. 1204 > 
Not surprisingly the final report were opposed by the full 
council, which attempted to suppress its more controversial 
a spec ts. 1 2 •:>~ > However, with public support, reformers were able 
to bring these amendments in the form of a draft bill before a 
parliamentary select committee. 120~> 
As was to be expected, these recommendations were strenuously 
opposed by the dirty party and the town's large property owners. 
In the evidence given before the parliamentary select committee 
it is apparent that the rentier classes rejected the concept that 
the municipality should be obliged to supply water to individual 
houses. Thus, R.H. Arderne, who owned '15 or 16 small 
houses' 1207 > objected because: 
"I believe the cause of a great source of nuisance to 
Cape Town is the free supply of water to every little 
hut and hovel. I believe dry dirt is comparatively 
innocuous, and I believe it is the waste of water in 
all these little lanes and alleys that has been a 
source of more annoyance and nuisance than anything 
else could possibly be. When these people had to go to 
the pumps they did not waste the water. 11 1 2019 > 
(202) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping Your Own Council", p.197. 
(203) A.13-1881, pp104-105, Appendix I clause 7. 
(204) ibid., Appendix I clause 6 
(205) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping Your Own Council", p.197. 
(206) A13-1881, Cape of Good Hope (Colony),Report of the select 
committee ae~ointed to consider •and report on the Cape Town 
Municipal Bi I. 
(207) ibid., p.69. 
(208) ibid., p.68. 
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Another large property owner, L.P.Cauvin warned that if every 
dwelling had to pay for a minimum of 10 gallons a day "a landlord 
may have to pay more than he gets for the rent of his 
house". ' 2 '=' 9 > One dirty party member of the town council, G.A. 
Ashley, who owned 11 houses,c 2 io> complained the new regulation 
would cost him £9 a year for each house.c 2 ii> 
Despite these objections, the select committee approved the 
proposed amendments to the municipal ordinance, and parliament 
went on to pass the Cape Town Municipal Bill in 1882.' 2 i 2 > The 
dirty party's defeat demonstrates the declining influence of the 
the old landed and mercantile families upon both the local and 
colonial government. Whereas in the 1850's and 1860's, these 
interests had been protected by their political allies in the 
Legislative Council,c 2 i~> since 1872, when the Cape had been 
granted responsible government, parliament increasingly came to 
reflect the concerns of the industrial and mining capital and the 
expansion of British domination in Southern Africa. The old 
dirty Cape Town which had been tolerated by the authorities was 
now rapidly becoming incompatible with the its development as the 
colony's political and economic capital. The outbreak of a 
smallpox epidemic in January 1882 drew attention to the 
inadequacies of Cape Town's local government, and from the 1880's 
onwards the central government became increasing responsive to 
(209) A.13-1881, p.68. 
(210) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping Your Own Council", p.198. 
(211) A.13-1881, p.50. 
(212) Act 44 of 1882. 
(213) J.D. Omer-Cooper~ History of Southern Africa, 1987, p.92. 
Also S. Trapido, 'The Origins of the Cape franchise 
qualifications of 1853", in Journal of African History, 
Volume 5, no.1, (1964), pp.37-54. The high economic 
franchise would have disqualified a large number of the 
coloured and Dutch speakin9 population, leaving government 
dominated by English-speaking merchants. Dutch speakers 
thus joined a strange alliance with humanitarian and 
progressive groups. 
CARTOON 3 
LANTERN, JULY l, 1882. 
HOR RI DA MORS. 
Page 81 
the need for reform through its support of amendments to the 
municipal ordinance.c2i 4 > 
The outbreak of the smallpox epidemic in 1882 brought the issue 
of reform to the forefront. The gravity of the situation was 
reflected in a cartoon, 'Horrida Mors', which appeared in the 
Lantern of July 1882. The grim reaper representing smallpox, 
typhoid and cholerea visits Cape Town in response to the Dirty 
Party's failure to attend to the sanitation crisis.(see cartoon 
3 opposite) As a consequence of this, and with the ~id of the 
amended municipal ordinance, the elections of August 1882 (see 
cartoon page 82) saw the clean party finally defeat the dirty 
party by gaining control over ten of the town council's eighteen 
seats. c 2 i 15 > 
Barely two weeks after the victory of the clean party " was s true k 
by a disaster, with the bursting of the Molteno Reservoir, which 
had only been completed in the previous year.c 2 i•> Although 
parts of the town were flooded, no lives were lost, but it did 
(214) E.B. van Heyningen, "Public Health and Society in Cape Town 
1880-1910", op.cit.,pp.234-35. Van Heynin9en argues that 
before the 1880's there was little initiative for reform 
from central government. Parliament was more concerned with 
the interests of the farming sector. The kind of social 
legislation being enacted ·in Britain had made virtually no 
impact on the Cape. Chan9es from the 1880's are seen to be 
due to the influx of immigrants and the knowledge they 
brought with them. But improvements still continued to be 
haphazard and responsiv~ to crisis and public demand. 
(215) Cace Time'! 15 August 1882. The Cape Times broke down the 
new counc1 into the following categories: 
Clean 
Fleming 
Woodhead 
Lewis 
Farmer 
Maxwell 
Miller 
Smart 
Brown 
Dirty 
Ashley 
Hofmeyer(JC) 
White 
Louw 
Graaf f 
Hof meyer 
N'utral o Reilly 
Stigant 
Tennant 
My burgh 
Graaff and Stigant began to identify more closely with the 
clean party after the election. 
(216) J.Lison, "A short tragic history of the Molteno reservoir", 
~' Volume 2, no.l, 1978. 
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mean a further prolongation of the water crisis. In a sense the 
bursting of the Molteno Reservoir symbolised the end of an era in 
Cape Town's municipal government. The long controversy 
surrounding the construction of the Table Valley reservoirs 
epitomised the amateurism and inefficiency of the municipality. 
It also underlined the futility of its parsimonious and short 
sighted attempt to squeeze every drop from the Table Mountain 
springs, instead of investing in long term sources of water 
supply beyond Table Valley. With the repair of the Molteno 
reservoir estimated to cost an additional £20 000, the Cape Times 
warned the new "clean" council that it would be "ine)<cusable if 
they undertake the expenditure of money on public works except on 
the advice of men of approved professional knowledge and 
experience".< 217 > Indeed, 1882 marks the beginning of the 
establishment of professional local government, which, in time 
was prove its capability in resolving Cape Town's endemic 
sanitation and water problems. 
The 1882 Municipal Act represents not only a turning point in 
Cape Town's municipal history, but is also the elimination of a 
process that had its roots in the 1859 conflict between the 
reformers and the rentier classes. As in the 1850's, critical 
water shortages pre-empted a political struggle over the role of 
the municipality. In the 1850's, when reformers were far less 
influential, their attempt to reform the municipality was 
directed at subverting its co~trol over water supply. By the 
1880's, th• concept of establishing an independent water board or 
even a private water company was still considered a viable 
proposition by some businessmen as the town's water supply was 
considered too important to be left in the incapable hand~ of the 
municipality. Thus in the lBBO's Cape Town had a choice between 
seeking reform to extend the municipality's power to enable it to 
undertake important improvements, or to divide its authority 
between independent boards and private companies who would take 
(217) Cace Times, 13 September 1882. 
Page 84 
control of the water supply and other potentially profitable 
municipal services. Ironically, the future of Cape Town's 
government was being bought into question at a time when its 
British counterparts were moving towards the highest stages of 
municipal socialism. But with the acquiescence of the colonial 
government, reformers within the council were able to undermine 
the basis of the dirty party's power through the 1882 Municipal 
Ac: t. With this accomplished, in the following decade the 
dominant merchant and business interest sought to marginalise the 
rentier class and the underclass within municipal politics, to 
ensure that there was no opposition to improvement.c21e> 
From the mid 1880's reformers within the town council sought to 
emulate the municipal governments of British towns and cities. 
The Victorian ideal characteristics of councillors, as identified 
by E.P.Hennock,c 21 •> as men of respectability, wealth and 
education, were criteria which replaced the perception of and 
municipal government as demeaning and self serving. In reality, 
the Town House had been captured to serve new interests. 
Cape Times saw it: 
As the 
"Municipal jobbery .•• and dirt ••. these two have· gone 
hand in hand, a brace of unwholesome, unlovely twins, 
en~endered of Cape Town slime, and nourished by the 
tainted atmosphere of the Town House. These 
excrescences, indeed! we would sweep away altogether, 
but not the municica institutions which they deform 
and dishonour 11 .c220> 
Instead, it was believed that the town should be administered 
along the lines of business principles. It was an age in which 
the virtues of businessmen became the necessary qualifications of 
a town councillor.< 221 > Yet despite high expectations, the 
improvement of Cape Town, and particularly its water supply were 
far from being solved. 
(218) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping Your Own Council", pp.201-202. 
(219) E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proser Persons, Ideal and Reality in 
Nineteenth Centyry Orbanovernment, (London), 1973, p.317. 
(220) Cace Times, 18 March 1881. 
(221) E.P. Hannock, Fit and Proper Persons, p.317. 
THE REFORMED MUNICIPALITY AND WATER SUPPLY: 1882-1900 
Between 1882 and 1900 Cape Town finally turned its attention to 
the mountains of the Cape Peninsula for a long term solution to 
its water problem. Despite the reformers intention of addressing 
the issue of sanitation and water supply, little real progress 
was made until the 1890's. The underlying cause for this delay 
may be ascribed to the fact that the economic boom that Cape Town 
had been e~periencing since 1875, came to a sudden end in 
1882,< 222 > coinciding with the ascendancy of the clean 
party.< 223 > It has been argued by Bickford-Smith that the Clean 
Party of 1882 was supplanted by a more coherent and determined 
Clean Party in the 1890's.< 224 > This group, it is suggested, had 
at its nucleus a new generation of businessmen who were attuned 
to the rapidly changing commercial and technological environment, 
and who gradually replaced the old merchant classes, who were 
weakened by the economic depression.< 22~> Another development 
was that the reformers, who were largely of British origin, were 
joined by a "new group of politically influencial and 
economically ambitious town Afrikaaners 11 ,< 22•> which included men 
such as D.P. Graaff and D.C. De Waa1.czz 7 > This mirrored the 
broader political realignments that had taken place in the Cape 
(222).V.Bic:kford-Smith, "Commerce, Class and Ethnicity", p.25. 
(223) ibid.' p.141. 
(224) 
(225) 
V.Bic:kford-Smith "Cape Town's Dominant Class and the 
Search for Order~, Paper presented to the Western Cape 
Roots and Realities Conference, University of Cape Town, 
1986' p .10. 
ibid., pp.9-10. It is argued that a business revolution 
took place which was underpinned by technologies of 
improved transportation and communication; of which the new 
class of businessmen used to their advantage. 
(226) ibid., p.11. The words of J.X. Merriman. 
(227) D.P. Graaff and D.C De Waal were both prominent merchants 
and members of the Le9islative Assembly. Included amongst 
the English-speaking cleans' in the 1890's were: J. 
Garlick (retailer and importer); J. Attwell (merchant); 
A.R. McKenzie (shipping and landing agent); G.Smart (builder); E.8. Fuller (physician and MLA, later MOH 
medical officer for Cape Town >i W. Hay (MLA) and F.Y St 
Leger (Proprietor of the Cape Times). 
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Parliament. It was this new Clean Party of the 1890's, Bickford-
Smith argues, that used local government to effect a material 
transformation of Cape Town in line with its commercial 
va 1 ues. < =:=:e > 
The failure of the old Clean Party to address the water problem 
cannot be blamed on the economic depression alone. Indeed the 
period between 1882 and the early 1890's represents a period in 
which the way was prepared for the municipality to undertake 
reform. In addition to this, at about the time that Cape Town's 
attention had turned to developing Table Mountain's water supply, 
newly established municipalities in the Peninsula had also begun 
to consider this as a source for their needs. Thus, during the 
1880's, much of the city's energy was directed at establishing 
control over the Table Mountain watershed and excluding the 
suburbs from this source. 
Having gained control of the Town House in the 1880's, the 
reformers' first priority was to secure their position. Thus in 
addition to seeking to extend the city's control over Cape 
Peninsula's water resources, much attention was given to 
improving the municipality's functioning, particularly areas 
which were seen as obstacles to further municipal reform and 
which prevented its undertaking of improvements. In this regard 
during the 1880's and early 1890's the reformers sought to 
increase municipal borrowing powers as well to narrow the 
municipal franchise by excluding the working class, which was 
perceived as hostile to reform. 
A series of three municipal amendment acts passed in 1885, 1890 
and 1893 restricted the municipal franchise by narrowing the 
(228) V. Bickford-Smith, "Cape Town's Dominant Class and the 
Search for Order", p.9-10. 
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1 
definition of occupiers who were liable for rates,c22~> by 
raising the property qualification for the franchise,<230> and by 
introducing a system of plural voting designed to favour 
businessmen and property owners.<23i> Similarly, municipal 
borrowing powers which had been increased from £20 000 to 
£150 000 in 1882, were raised to £662 000 in 1893< 232 > and again 
to £719 000 in 1894.<233> While these amendments to the 
municipal ordinance were to provide a solid basis for the Council 
to undertake substantial improvements, the provision making it 
necessary for the consent of ratepayers to approve municipal 
loans, remained an anomaly, and was used in the 1890's and 
beyond as a device to constrain overzealous reformers. While 
conflicting interests over augmenting water supply was soon to 
emerge again, for the remainder of the 1880's Cape Town's 
attention was directed towards the developments taking place in 
the suburban municipalities. 
Cape Town had at first welcomed the establishment of village 
management boards in Rondebosch, Wynberg, Claremont and Mowbray 
between 1881 and 1882.< 234 > In comparison to Cape Town the 
(229) Act 28 of 1885. For franchise purposes the term 'occupier' 
was limited to those liable for the tennant's rate. 
(230) Act 26 of 1890. (Clause 5) The occupier or tenants property 
had to exceed £100 to qualify for the muncipal vote. 
Bickford-Smith has estimated that this effectively 
disenfranchised about 20/. of ratepayers. 
(231) Act 24 of 1893. Those owning property valued between £500 
and £999 qualified for two votes, while owners of property 
with a value of more than £1000 qualified for a maximum of 
3 votes. Merchants who owned property in the city but lived 
in the suburbs, possessed up to 3 votes, while the working 
classes living in Cape Town often had no vote at all. 
(232) Act 24 of 1893. 
(233) Act 9 of 1894. 
(234) In the period 1881-1882, Claremont, Mowbray, Rondebosch and 
Wynberg had all acquired village management boards. These 
formed a single municipality, the Liesbeeck Municipality, 
which was created by government proclamation 97 of 1883. 
Under proclamation 115 of 1886~ this was altered to create 
Wynberg Municipality. The remaining wards of the old 
Liesbeeck authority also became independent municipalities, 
with the former Mowbray Management Board being incorporated 
into the Municipality of Rondebosch until 1990, when it too 
became a separate municipality. 
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suburban villages had no reservoirs or piped water, and were 
entirely dependent on wells and springs.<2~~> Even the older 
established Woodstock Municipality had no water resources and was 
almost entirely dependant on Cape Town.< 2~~> During their 
formative period these authorities posed no threat to Cape Town's 
ambitions in the Peninsula as they had no ability to address 
their sanitation and water problems by themselves due to their 
limited financial power. Even the Cape Times took upon itself 
the task of warning these management boards to avoid the pitfalls 
that Cape Town's reformers had encountered: 
"The suburbs, though having a comparatively large 
proportion of wealthy and intelligent inhabitants, 
abound at the time in residents of the dirtier sort 
and, unless these folks are restrained in time, foul 
conditions will .•• become hard to cope with as ~hey are 
in Cape Town". c :z 3 7 > 
The establishment of the Liesbeek Municipality in 1884, 
comprising the four former management boards, was to lead to the 
first suburban attempt at developing an independent water supply. 
This was however destined to failure, as the ratable income of 
the fledgling municipality amounted to only £4 777 per annum, 
compared to Cape Town's income of £60 091,< 23•> which was 
insufficient for the suburbs to finance a viable project.< 23•> 
Nevertheless, in 1886 the Liesbeek Municipality approached 
Parliament with the intention of taking over the water rights of 
(235) A.9-1888, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select 
committee on Cape Town sanitation, p.25. 
(236) ibid., pp.50-53. 
(237) 
(238) 
(239) 
1882. 
Cape of Good Hope (Colony) House of Assembl~ Debates (Hansard) 8 June 1886, p.376. Mr. Gamble, t e Hydraulic 
Engineer had admitted to A.Ebden (MLA) that the Table 
Mountain scheme was too big for any municipality to 
undertake. 
Page 89 
the stillborn Table Mountain Water Supply Company. Unexpectantly, 
the proposed Liesbeek Municipality Water Supply Bill was opposed 
for financial reasons by a handful of its own representatives 
from the Rondebosch and Newlands wards, who objected to paying 
for a water scheme, when these areas were adequately supplied 
with water from the Albion and Kommetjie Springs.<240> This 
conflict was the direct cause of the disintegration of the 
Liesbeek authority later in the same year, leading to the 
formation of four separate municipalities; Rondebosch, Claremont, 
Wynberg, and later Mowbray. The breakup of the Liesbeek 
authority did not leave the way open for Cape Town to assert its 
authority over the Table Mountain catchment areas, for the newly 
established Wynberg municipality was itself to attempt to take 
over the abandoned water bill of the Table Mountain Water Supply 
Company.< 241 > 
Wynberg's objective, once it had gained control over the water 
rights of Table Mountain catchment area, was to develop a water 
scheme which it hoped to finance by selling water to the suburbs. 
This came as a shock to Cape Town, which responded swiftly by 
producing a private bill of it own in which it laid claim to all 
the water rights of Table Mountain.< 242 > As Parliament was 
confronted with two rival water bills, the matter was referred to 
a select committee for arbitration. 
The Wynberg and Cape Town Water Supply Bills represent an 
important stage in the history of the Cape Peninsula's water 
supply, as the outcome of this conflict was to determine the 
relationship between the city and the suburbs for the next 
quarter of a century. In effect, whoever controlled the Table 
(240) A.10-1886, p.4, p.24. Evidence of Councillors J.Wrench; Or. 
J.M. Hiddingh; A. Manson and H. Thompson. 
(241) A.9-1~87, pp.11-12. 
(242) ibid., p.18. 
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Mountain catchment would be given the capacity for the economic 
and political domination of the Peninsula. Water was not only a 
scarce and expensive resource, but also had the potential to 
become the source of substantial income for whichever 
municipality monopolised the Peninsula's water supply. 
Cape Town's claim to this water outweighed those made by Wynberg, 
for, in addition to its own requirements, the city had the 
responsibility of supplying shipping, the railways, the Colonial 
Government and the municipality of Sea Point with water. For 
this reason Cape Town was granted control over almost the entire 
mountain. Parliament was also to award Wynberg Municipality a 
minor section of the catchment area sufficient for its own 
requirements,'~43 > which had the effect of isolating the 
municipality from an impending water crisis that was to have a 
serious impact on the rest of the suburbs. 
As the Wynberg and Cape Town Water Supply Act cut off Rondebosch, 
Claremont, Mowbray and Woodstock Municipalities from the Table 
Mountain catchment area, these suburbs were to become dependent 
on the Albion and Kommetjie springs situated at Rondebosch and 
Newlands for most of their water supply. These springs were 
taken over by the Cape Town District Waterworks Company in 
1889.C244) It was later to become the basis of the Suburban 
Municipal Water Board, which was to attempt to break the city's 
monopoly of the Peninsula's water supply in the 1900's. 
The assertion of Cape Town's authority over most of the 
Peninsula's water supply was thus completed by the late 1880's, 
(243) 
(244) 
J.D. Linnegar, "From Village to Municipality, a history of 
Wynberg", BA Hons dissertation, University of Cape Town, 
1975, pp.75-76. ' 
SMW 4/17, The Secretary Suburban Municipal Water Works 
Committee, p.3. 
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coinciding with a revival of the Cape's economy in 1889,c24~> 
which at last placed the reformists in a position to address the 
question of augmenting the city's water supply. 
The 1890's represent a decade of tremendous progress in the 
development of Cape Town's water supply, as well as in many other 
areas of municipal improvement such as the building of a drainage 
and sewerage system and the development of a electricity 
system.c24o> The rapid progress made during this period was not 
without cost, for the upsurge in municipal expenditure; after 
decades of frugality, was to bring the city to the brink of a 
political and financial crisis. Schemes to exploit Table 
Mountain water resources, as well as plans to construct a main 
drainage system encountered numerous obstacles giving rise to 
massive expenditure over and above original estimates and 
resulting in resistance from ratepayers, which almost toppled the 
Clean Party's control of the Town House. 
After the reconstruction of the Molteno reservoir had been 
completed in 1886, ( see photograph 1 opposite ) bringing its 
total cost to £111 135,< 247 > the council began to consider 
various .ways of exploiting the Table Mountain catchment area. A 
severe drought in 1887, which resulted in ships being turned away 
from the harbour without water, 'provided a stimulus for the 
municipality to consider new ways of augmenting water supply. The 
driving force behind this was John Woodhead, one of the 
supporters of the Clean Party who had been elected to Council in 
1882. 
(245) 
(246) 
Woodhead had a personal interest in the city's water 
V.Bickford-Smith, "Class, Commerce and Ethnicity", p.25. 
see J.Carruthers, "G.H. Swingler and the Supply of 
Electricity to Cape Town", in Studies in the History of 
C!fe Town, volume 5 C.Saunders et.al. eds., 1984, pp.208-2 . For detail on the development of the sanitation system 
see E.B. van Heyningen,"Public Health and Society in Cape 
Town", pp.273-281. 
(247) A.9-1887, Appendix O. 
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roblems, because as the owner of an ironworks, the water crisis 
of the early 1880's had threatened to close his business. 
According to one report, it was as a result of this he entered 
Council and "devoted himself at once to water 11 <249 > As a one 
time marine engineer, Woodhead soon became Chairman of the 
Waterworks Committee, and made a major contribution to the 
development of the Table Mountain water scheme, one of the 
largest projects of its kind at the time.< 24•i Indeed, the 
1890's, which twice saw his mayoralty, was referred to as the 
"Woodhead era" by the contemporary press in recognition of his 
dedication to solving the problem of water supply. 
The first project commenced under Woodhead was plagued by 
controversy. This involved the construction of a tunnel and 
pipeline from the upper reaches of the Disa stream to divert 
water into the Molteno reservoir. It was a~ ambitious project 
comprising 5 miles of pipeline as well as a 700 yard long tunnel 
through the mountain to the top of Slangolie Ravine, (see map 4 
overleaf) at an estimated cost of £25 000.< 2 ~0 > Although the 
scheme's completion was expected to take no more than eighteen 
months, it took over three years and its final cost reached £40 
000.< 2 ~ 1 > Further~ore, when the tunnel was finally opened in 
1891, only a "mere trickle" was to flow into the Molteno 
reservoir as a result of a severe drought,< 2~2 > which brought the 
viability of the scheme into question. These fears proved 
unfounded as the first winter rains flowed through the Woodhead 
tunnel, as it was called, to fill the Molteno Reservoir to 
capacity. 
(248) !:;ag!! T;i.m!!S, 24 September 1896. 
(249) ibid. 
(250) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/811, Appendix A, p.6. 
(251) Cag§l T ;i.mg~, 24 September 1896. 
(252) ibid. 
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Yet even with the increased water supply brought by the Woodhead 
tunnel, it soon became apparent that a further catchment 
reservoir was needed in order to meet the growing need of the 
city. Thus by late 1891, the decision was made to construct a 
reservoir on the top of Table Mountain at an estimated cost of 
£50 000. The finance of this project, it was argued, would be 
borne by revenues received from the increased sales of water. It 
was hoped that the profits generated from the Waterworks through 
the water rate and water charges would go towards the relief of 
rates and subsidise non-renumerative works such as the drainage 
What was not anticipated was the escalation in the 
rate of municipal expenditure on further projects, even before 
revenue could be produced from this source. For example, before 
the completion of the Woodhead reservoir, a further storage 
reservoir (The Macke Reservoir) was built at Kloof Nek, as well 
as a small service reservoir at Sea Point at a combined cost of 
£4 360.c2e4> A further problem was the vast discrepancy between 
the estimated and actual costs of these projects. The decision 
to raise the wall of the Woodhead dam increased its cost from an 
estimated £50 000 to reach £156 000 on its completion in 
1997.c2ee> Even before its completion, Thomas Stewart, the 
engineer who was responsible for its construction, suggested that 
the dam was not sufficient to meet the soaring demand for water, 
and recommended that the construction of a second catchment 
reservoir be considered.c 2 e=> (see map 4 opposite) 
Apart from the large amounts of money that were spent on 
augmenting water supply, the municipality had also intended to 
invest a considerable sum on a drainage and sewerage scheme, for 
(253) Cape Times, 8 August 1896. 
(254) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/6/1, Memoranda: Cape Town Water Works, 
Appendix B, p.12. 
(255) 3/CT 1/4/4/4/811, Appendix A, p.6. 
(256) Minute of the Mayor, 1897. 
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which ratepayers had sanctioned a loan for £162 000 in 1892.<=e?i 
An ongoing controversy developed over the main drainage scheme in 
the late 1880's equalling the issue of water supply, and was to 
contribute to growing dissatisfaction with the process of 
municipal reform.c2ee> 
Despite the unprecedented expenditure on augmenting water supply 
ratepayers were exasperated to find that the city once again was 
to suffer from severe water shortages in 1894,< 2e•> with no end 
in sight to municipal spending. By this time ratepayers had 
sanctioned loans for a total of £719 000 for various 
projects,< 2 • 0 > many of which exceeded the original estimates. 
Even the ever-loyal Cape Times had become impatient with the lack 
of progress and warned that another £500 000 would be needed to 
redeem old loans and to complete improvement schemes.< 2 • 1 > The 
Colonial Department of the London Stock Exchange had issued a 
warning regarding the redemption of municipal loans, and hinted 
at the possible removal of Cape Town from the official list of 
the Stock Exchange, which would effectively cut the city off from 
overseas finance.< 2 • 2 > 
(257) Cape Times, 25 January 1895. 
(258) 
(259) 
(260) 
The first serious attempt to develop Cape Town's sanitation 
system began in 1888 with the issuing of the Pritchard 
report, which recommended a sewage outlet directly into the 
sea, in contrast to the council's plan for an intercepting 
sewer. This controversy culminated in the Dunscombe report 
which essentially confirmed the principles set out by 
Pritchard. Problems over the siting of the outlet and its 
finance resulted in the delay of the scheme until 1895. For 
detail see E.8. van Her,ningen 1 "Public Health and Society in Cape Town 1880-1910', pp.207-281. 
C~pe Times, 10 February; 16 February and· 22 February 1895. 
f e water shortages reached a critical point where the 
waterworks committee was considering entering into an 
agreement with the Suburban District Water Works Company. 
this was avoided with the timely arrival of rain. 
Caae Times, 15 August 1896. These included £162 000 for a 
main draina9e scheme• £50 000 for a city halli £60 000 for 
an electricity installation; £20 000 for public baths and a 
sea promenade; and £8 000 for a new fish market. 
(261) Cape Times, 13 March 1894. 
(262) ibid. 
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By the mid 1890's the municipality found itself with insufficient 
capital to proceed with the water and sanitation projects and a 
growing reluctance on the part of ratepayers to sanction further 
loans, or by the Cape Town's creditors to extend the city's 
finance, as payments on loans already consumed a third of the 
total annual municipal income.<~~~> The maximum property rate of 
4d in the £ meant that the municipality could not directly 
increase revenue from this source without further alienating 
ratepayers. In 1896 the municipality attempted to increase rates 
indirectly by raising property valuations by an average. 25%. '~~4 > 
This was vehemently opposed by ratepayers who were now becoming 
alarmed at the extent of the municipality's indebtedness. As the 
Town Council could not substantially increase its income from 
municipal sources it was forced to seek another loan in order to 
complete the water and drainage schemes. The Cape Times 
disparagingly summed up the predicament which faced the 
municipality: 
"For several years past Cape Town has been 
congratulating itself that although things had been 
bad with them municipally ..• we were gradually putting 
matters to rights - that we had the men, we had the 
scheme, and we had the money too. There has however, 
come a rude awakening. The improvement scheme, to 
which we looked as the means of civic salvation, is a 
long way from completion, but the Council has come to 
the end of its financial tether, and proposes to 
ask ratepayers for another loan of upwards of a third 
of a million sterling. The fact is we do not seem to 
have quite got the knack of handling our big communal 
concerns. Tnere is nobody in the Council who seems to 
have made a special study of the science of 
finance". < 2•~> 
While it had been anticipated that income generated from water 
would service the municipal debt, in reality, the badly 
underestimated cost of the water scheme, as well as the fact that 
new water supplies were being overtaken by demand, meant that 
the water scheme itself now represented a burden on Cape Town's 
finance. 
(263) Cage Times, 15 August 1896. 
(264) Cage Times, 10 February 1896. 
(265) Cace Times, 28 August 1896. 
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By January 1897 the new Woodhead reservoir was finally in 
use,<~oo) (see photograph 3 opposite) yet this was hardly a time 
for celebration, for the municipality announced that it was to 
seek ratepayers' approval to raise a loan for £500 000, which 
included an amount of £112 000 for a second Table Mountain 
reservoir. <~o7) This was rejected at a ratepayers meeting which 
refused to sanction further loans or expenditure on improvements, 
and demanded a poll on the issue.<~oe> The growing 
dissatisfaction on the part of ratepayers was to give rise to the 
reemergence of the supporters of the former 'dirty party', in 
what was to develop into a major struggle between reformists and 
anti-reformists for control over the Town House. 
The dissension that arose in 1897 in some aspects echoed the 
earlier conflicts of 1861 and 1882, in as much as it represented 
a division of interests between the reformist businessmen who now 
dominated the council, and the old rentier classes and their 
tenants. The influence of this latter group had diminished 
considerably since the 1880's, not only due to changes to the 
municipal franchise, but also because of their declining economic 
position due to the fundamental changes that were taking place 
within the city's economy. The increasing importance of commerce 
in the economy and the growth of the suburbs saw a relative 
decline of investment in cheap housing and rent based income. 
Nevertheless, those opposed to further municipal expenditure 
continued to draw on the support of the working classes and small 
householders who perceived these reforms as serving the interests 
of the city's .dominant class. Indeed charges of municipal 
corruption also formed a large part in the mobilisation of 
(266) The Woodhead reservoir represented a remarkable feat of 
engineering at the time. The site necessitated the 
construction of an aerial cableway and tramway for the 
transportation of 'material and labour. The masonary dam had 
a capacity of 225 million gallons. 
(267) Cape Times, 16 January 1897. 
(268) ibid. 
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ratepayers against the Council. c2e~> Similarly, reformists 
continued to label their opponents as 'dirty· and used racial 
criteria to explain the conflict, which was used to mobilise the 
English-speaking middle classes to bolster their control of the 
Town House. 
The campaign against the sanctioning of further municipal loans 
saw the re-emergence of leaders of the Dirty Party such as 
J.C.Hofmeyer and C.Kinsley. Hofmeyer in particular was 
successful in drawing attention to the unprofessional financial 
planning of the reformers, contributing to a surprise defeat of 
the municipal loan at a poll of ratepayers. The Cape Times which 
had itself criticised aspects of municipal government was shocked 
and disillusioned by the resurgence of popular opinion against 
reform, and labeled the results of the poll a fiasco. c270 > Within 
days of the poll five reformist councillors resigned, including 
J. Garlick, T.J. O'Reilly, W. Hay, F.Y. St Leger and the mayor 
J.W. Attwel1.c 27 i> 
In its analysis of the poll the Cape Times was reluctant to 
ascribe the defeat to popular objection to more water but rather 
to the manner in which the Table Mountain schemes had been 
carried out< 272 > as well as to rumours of corruption.< 27~> The 
most damaging criticism centered on the gross underestimates of 
the cost of the water schemes, as well as the perception that 
while the council was spending more and more on water projects, 
water supply had actually deteriorated. The ability of Thomas 
(269) Cape Times, 13 February 1897. 
(270) Cape Times, 11 February 1897. 
(271) Although T.J. O'Reilly (a broker and agent at law) had been 
identified as a reformer 1 he is representative of a small 9roup of councillors ou~side of the 'Adderley Street 
interest' who stood for economy, and who cannot be linked 
too strongly to any of the em~rgent parties. see Chapter 
Two. 
(272) Cape Times, 11 February 1897. 
(273) ibid. 
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Stewart, the council's hydraulic engineer was brought into 
question. In coming to the defence of Stewart and the Council, 
the Cape Times brushed off these allegations and cast aspersions 
on the motives of those opposed to the loan: 
"There is alw~ys a c:;heap sneer to be had at our one and 
only hydraulic engineer ... ,but after all in such 
matters_ the opinion o! a tr~ined engi~eer does carry 
more weight with the intelligent portion of mankind 
than the hasty and heady judgment of the men in the 
street. We employ experts because it is the custom of 
the civilized world to do so and to trust them in 
their own business. It may seem a better course to the 
critical persons who have now scored their victory to 
get our engineering done by scavengers .•. and 
shoeblacks. "<=:74 > 
As it became apparent that the Council's defeat at the poll had 
brought the future of municipal reform into question and 
threatened their control over the Town House, reaction against 
the anti-reformists sharpened. Once again calls were made to 
remove financial decision-making from the hands of ratepayers and 
place it under parliamentary control.' 27 ~' 
It soon became obvious to the remaining councillors that the 
defeat threatened not only the continuation of the water and 
drainage schemes, but the very functioning of the municipality 
itself. In a calculated gamble a mayoral statement signed by ten 
councillors threatened their mass resignation unless the 
ratepayers reversed the decision not to approve further 
expenditure on the water and drainage schemes: 
"Council ••. cannot see their way to remain longer in 
office unless provision be made for these two 
important public works [water and drainage] on which 
they have taken their stand. They therefore place 
their resignations in your hands ••• except in the event 
of ratepayers authorising the taking of steps to 
reverse the refusal of tfle two works ••. "' 270 ' 
The gamble paid off. As a result of the mayoral statement a 
public meeting was organised on the 6 May 1897, to call for a 
(274) Cape Times, il February 1897. 
(275) Cape Times, 13 February 1897. 
(276) Cape Times, 24 March 1897. 
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vote of confidence in the Council. The Cape Times urged 
businessmen to attend as it was concerned that the "bounder 
element" would once again demand a poll and attempt to "turn 
progressive councillors out".<:;?77 > These fears were to be 
realised and once again a poll was demanded at the ratepayer's 
meeting. 
In the second poll held in July 1897, the reformers managed to 
gain ratepayer support for the municipal loan. The Council had 
been uncertain of victory, and fears of revival of the anti-
reformists dominated in the weeks before the poll. Those 
opposing the loan were seen to resemble the Dirty Party of the 
1850's and 1880's, although now dubbed the "wreckers" by the 
press. < 279 > The 'clean party' or the 'progressives' as they were 
sometimes called, were perceived by their opponents to represent 
the interests of the city's businessmen with Council being a 
clique, "the members of which make things comfortable for one 
another".< 27~> The 'wreckers' on the other hand were a disparate 
group of householders, large property owners and the working 
classes, united by the issue of municipal debt, who questioned 
the necessity of a further reservoir, who feared a rise in 
property rates, and were concerned about allegations of municipal 
corruption. The Cape Times had feared that this combination had 
the p·otentia 1 to defeat the reformers, particu 1ar1 y the "voting 
Malay's" which it continued to stereotype as a: 
"large class of small householders and occupiers which 
loves filth and cannot be expected to pay willingly 
for cleanliness". <2 •0> 
Furthermore the working class householders were seen to be 
(277) Cape Times, 6 May 1897. 
(278) Cape Timey 29 July 1897. Prominent candidates amongst this 
group inc uded J.C. Hofmeyer; Dr. Van Oppel; and Mr. 
Mc Machlan, who were supporters of the ratepayers 
association. 
(279) Cape Times, 29 January 1897. 
(280) Cace Times, 21 July 1897. 
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deceived and influenced by the 'wreckers': 
" ... the language habitually used by Mr Hofmeyer and 
those who sort* with him is calculated to convey to 
those small property owners, slum owners many of them, 
that a raising of the rates is really at issue; and 
the waving of that red flag suffices to send them 
headlong to the poll to vote "Nay" to anything and 
every thing .... "< 2ei > 
While it was asserted that : 
" ... the men who have the biggest pull municipally are 
those who, like the two or three conspicuous leaders 
of the present wrecker p,art~, are agents for a great 
deal of house property.' <2 19 -> 
Despite the fears that had been voiced, the poll resulted in a 
substantial majority in favour of the loan. While t~e victory 
may have been enhanced by the new system of multiple or plural 
voting which benefited the middle classes, c::;;:e~> in effect the 
usually apathetic middle classes had been mobilised to reverse 
the position of the reformists. 
The significance of the re-emergence of divisions within the 
municipality in the mid-1890's over the issue of water supply and 
municipal reform must be seen in the context of the earlier 
conflicts that took place in the 1850's and the 1880's. A theme 
common to each of these periods is that of the issue of water 
supply. That it should occupy a central position amongst social 
reforms is due to its enormous cost. The fact that the issue not 
only coincided with but was central to the major political 
conflicts that periodically arose within the town council, cannot 
be ascribed simply to its cost alone. Indeed it represents far 
more than a conflict between those who needed water and those who 
would have to pay for it. 
Water supply was a political issue, and as such became bound up 
with the racial, class and economic conflicts of this period. 
(281) Cape Times, 21 July 1897. *sort: archaic term meaning 'to 
agree with 
(282) ibid. 
(283) V.Bickford-Smith, "Keeping your own Council", p.202. The 
plural voted benefited businessmen who lived in the suburbs 
but owned property in the city. 
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During the 1850's the failed attempt to remove the authority of 
water supply from the municipality revealed that the town's 
commercial classes did not have the power to win control over the 
Town House, and sought to divide and weaken its authority. But by 
the 1880's, fundamental shifts that were taking place in Cape 
Town's economy and society enabled commercial interests and the 
middle classes to make a direct bid for control of the Town-
House. 
It has been suggested that the commercial interests had been 
successfully kept from gaining control of the town council due to 
an alliance of large property owners, Dutch-speaking 
householders, and the underclasses. The former resisted major 
reforms such as water and sanitation projects, because they 
realised they would have to pay for them; the latter group 
rejected water schemes because they feared a subsequent increase 
in rents, and similarly saw water schemes to be in the benefit of 
the merchant and commercial interests. 
While in the 1850's reformists such as Solomon had argued for the 
augmentation of water supply, both on humanitarian and commercial 
grounds, by the 1880's, reformists saw the underclass as an 
obstacle to developing water supply, and sought to isolate and 
exclude them in political and social terms. In this they were 
successful, and the 1880's saw the unhinging of the alliance of 
interests which had held together the so-called dirty party. The 
declining position of the large property owners within Cape 
To~n's economy would inevitably have given way to the ascendancy 
of the commercial classes, and probably much earlier, if it were 
not for the support of the working class. 
The reaction against reform in the 1890's, particularly against 
the augmentation of water supply, has its roots in these earlier 
conflicts. Although the 'wreckers' were related to the 'dirty 
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party' interests, they should more properly be seen as the 
beginning of the emergence of the smaller working and middle 
class ratepayers interest groups, which were soon to crystallise 
into ratepayers associations. The Cape Times had expressed the 
need for a civic association, but one that was "sympathetic and 
constructive" and having: 
"a definite set of principles classified as 
progressive, and its primary task would be to bring 
together the small minority of ratepayers who take 
enough interest in the subject to have consciously 
arrived at these viewsi to enable this minority to 
exert some sort of inf uence on the vast inert mass of 
their f e 1 1 ows .•. " c 2e4 > 
Ratepayers' Associations were to arise in the following decade, 
but not of the sort the Cape Times envisaged. 
By the end of the nineteenth century the issue of water supply 
had begun to move beyond the informal alliance of large property 
owners and working class tenants and householders. Instead the 
mid-1890's saw the development of a new meaning to reform amongst 
small householders which placed an emphasis on economy and 
efficiency in the government of the city. 
The period from the 1850's through to the 1890's was one in which 
municipal politics and water supply were thoroughly intertwined. 
Most important, the issues of class and race which had become 
bound up with the augmentation of water supply were to have a 
detrimental effect in the next century, as water was increasingly 
seen as a class interest, and became a political as well as a 
social issue, eventually to the city's detriment, and ultimately 
to affect the form of its spatial development. 
(284) Cape Times, 16 September 1897. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
11 If Moses Came To Cape Town 11 < 1 ' 
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CITY AND SUBURB FOR CONTROL OVER 
THE WATER RESOURCES OF THE HINTERLAND: 1900-1913. 
In contrast to the 1890's, which saw the completion of the 
Woodhead Dam and the start of construction of the Hely Hutchinson 
Dam, no new water schemes were undertaken during the period 
between 1900 and 1913.<~> This was not the result of an 
overabundance of water supply, for by the end of this period Cape 
Town and the suburban municipalities of the Cape Peninsula, were 
to experience one of the severest water shortages in their 
history. While a massive water scheme in the hinterland had been 
proposed as a long term solution to the Cape Peninsula's water 
problem, the scale of such a project was such that no single 
municipality could attempt it alone. Despite the benefits of a 
single large hinterland scheme, the city and suburbs were unable 
to cooperate with one another to make this a reality. The 
consequences of this were far reaching, ultimately precipitating 
a political crisis that was to re-shape the face of the Cape 
Peninsula's local government. 
A fundamental question that recurs throughout the period covered 
by this chapter is why no progress was made in augmenting water 
supply? Two basic reasons may be put forward. Firstly water 
supply became strongly linked to the issue of municipal 
( 1 ) Ca~e Times, 11 October 1906. The Li erman used a biblical metaphor 
use of Table Mountain as the only 
water supply. 
Mayor of Cape Town~ Hyman 
to justify the con~inued 
source for the city's 
(2) Although construction of the Hely Hutchinson dam was 
started in 1899, water was only supplied in 1904 when it 
was completed. 
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unification between Cape Town and the suburbs. The fact that the 
municipalities were unable to reach agreement over unification, 
had a detrimental impact on their ability to cooperate to develop 
a joint hinterland scheme. The process of amalgamation started 
by the Peninsula Commission of 1902 was only concluded in 1913 
when critical water shortages finally forced the city and suburbs 
to cooperate. 
A second reason for the delay in augmenting water supplies is to 
be found within the dynamics of political conflict operating 
within the city of Cape Town. Indeed, the ascendance of a 
grouping within the council hostile to the development of any 
further water schemes, or cooperation with the suburbs, is 
fundamental to explaining this lack of progress. 
It is therefore argued that on one level the conflict over water 
supply represents a struggle between the city and suburbs for 
control over water resources of the hinterland. This was 
overshadowed by a struggle taking place within the city council 
arising out of class and economic interests. These divisions 
arose in reaction to excessive municipal expenditure but also 
echoed the earlier conflicts involving social and class divisions 
over sanitation, reform and water supply in the nineteenth 
century. 
Three distinct periods may be determined in which these inter-
municipal and intra-municipal conflicts overlap. The first 
period from 1900 to 1904, represents a period of considerable 
fluidity where the various municipalities debated how best to 
address the issue of water supply, as many were not convinced 
that municipal unification was the best solution to the 
peninsula's problem. 
Between 1904 and 1906, attempts at cooperation between city and 
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suburb were dashed by the ascendancy of an anti-water party 
within Cape Town. This period forms the focus of this chapter, 
as it represents a re-emergence of the earlier political 
conflicts of the nineteenth century, upon which hinges the 
culmination of the water conflict after 1913, following 
unification. 
In the final section of this chapter which covers the period 
after 1906, independent attempts to develop a water scheme were 
to collapse. It is argued that the failure to solve the water 
crisis was ultimately to place pressure on the suburbs to 
amalgamate with the city; a development which is traced in 
Chapter Three. 
THE PENINSULA COMMISSION AND WATER SUPPLY 1900-1904 
At the beginning of this period the Cape Peninsula seemed set to 
encounter a severe and prolonged water shortage. Even the Hely 
Hutchinson dam which was under construction [see photograph 5 
opposite] was not considered sufficient to meet the demand as 
water consumption rose by some 83% between 1896 and 1902.< 3 > The 
outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 had resulted in large 
numbers of refugees and soldiers flooding into Cape Town which 
placed enormous strains on the city's social and civic fabric. 
Increased demand had also arisen as a result of an economic boom 
brought about by the war. Water shortages severely tested Cape 
Town's sanitation system, while overcrowded and unhealthy living 
conditions contributed to high mortality rates, and eventually to 
( 3) Minute of the Maeor of Cape Town, Annual reports of the 
City Engineer: I 96-1902 
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the outbreak of bubonic plague in 1901.< 4 > With no sign of water 
consumption subsiding, and the Table Mountain catchment area 
utilised to its full potential, the city council was compelled to 
consider the hinterland as a source for a new water supply 
scheme. A cartoon in The Owl, a weekly satirical magazine, 
captures the concern felt during this period, as it seemed that 
the parish pump was about to run dry. (see cartoon 5 facing page) 
Given the distance of the nearest source of water supply outside 
the Cape Peninsula, it was considered that such a scheme would be 
beyond the means of most municipalities. For this reason Cape 
Town was to call on the colonial government to undertake an 
investigation into the means by which a hinterland scheme could 
best be established.ce> Similarly the Cape Times warned of the 
economic consequences for the city if the water crisis was not 
acted on: 
" .•. it must be prepared for stagnation, commercially 
and industrially. Unless Cape Town can supply 
shipping with all the water it requires, the Harbour 
Board might just as well stay its hand in the matter 
of dock development, and allow trade to flow through 
other channels. The interests of the whole community 
demand that the shipping be afforded all the water 
that it requires."<~» 
The colonial authorities were deeply concerned about the 
dete~iorating situation, particularly after the outbreak of 
bubonic plague, and with unsanitary conditions increasing the 
likelihood of further outbreaks of contagious disease. It was a 
combination of these factors that moved the Colonial Government 
( 4) 
( 5 ) 
( 6) 
E.8. van Heyningen; "Cape Town and the Plague of 1901", 
in C. Saunders et.al. (editors), Studies in the History of 
Cape Town, volume 4, University of Cape Town, 1984. 
J. Parker ; Unification: some of its aspects, Cape 
Town, 1910, p.2. 
Cape Times; 20 January 1902. 
I H 
l.O 
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w 
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.., 
to appoint a parliamentary commission in 1902, to investigate the 
water and sanitation crisis affecting the Peninsula 
Municipalities,< 7 ' and to report on possible solutions. 
The report of the Peninsula Commission was to be comprehensive 
and far reaching, having a profound impact on the course of the 
development of the Cape Peninsula's water supply, and represents 
a major turning point in its history. 
While the formation of the Peninsula Commission was a direct 
response to the Cape Peninsula's water crisis, it soon became 
apparent that its investigations were to be far wider than 
originally anticipated, with its scope broadened to include other 
aspects of water-related problems facing local government, such 
as the provision of drainage and sewage systems as well as the 
form that municipal government should take. The investigations 
of the commission were extensive, being conducted over a period 
of ten months and its findings filling three volumes. Despite 
this thoroughness, its recommendations were controversial, partly 
due to the fact that it trivialised the sectionalist attitudes of 
councillors from the peninsula municipalities and imposed the 
concept of unification as a panacea for their problems. While 
the Peninsula Commission's proposals were interpreted by the 
press as the new broom to sweep municipal government clean, (see 
cartoon 7 facing page) 
municipal unification. 
it failed to achieve its objective of 
The report was nevertheless to dominate 
municipal thinking for the next decade, and prepared the way for 
unification which eventually took place 1913. 
( 7) G.21-1903; Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of a 
Commission appointed to en~uire into and report u~on 
certain matters affectin8ape Peninsula municipa ities 
and the Cape Divisional ouncil, 3 volumes. See also E.B 
van Heyningen; "The 'small Greek cities' of the Cape 
Peninsula" Contree, no.10, July 1981, pp.5-B;for an 
analysis of the Commission and its findings. 
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The Commission had correctly perceived that the Peninsula's water 
and sanitation problems were exacerbated by the proliferation of 
independent municipal authorities.<e) The Commission began with 
the premise that the problem was an administrative as much as a 
practical one, and suggested that the various Peninsula 
municipalities unite to form a single authority to avoid 
duplication of services.(~) Less emphasis was given to an 
alternative suggestion for the establishment of a joint central 
board that could oversee the operation of common water and sewage 
schemes. While it recognised that the Cape Peninsula's water 
supply problem could only be addressed effectively by a joint 
authority, the commission's promotion of a single municipality as 
the only solution' 10 ' was a major reason for the rejection of 
its report by a number of the municipalities. 
While the main emphasis of the Commission's final report was on 
municipal unification as a solution to the Cape Peninsula's water 
crisis, equally important were its guidelines and suggestions 
concerning the direction in which future development of water 
supplies should be conducted. It was within the parameters of 
these recommendations that the protracted debate over the 
Peninsula's future water supply were to take place. 
One of the most significant recommendations of the Commission 
concerned the specifications which it laid down for any future 
water scheme. Most important, it established beyond all doubt 
( 8) 
( 9) 
( 10) 
The break up of the Liesbeeck municipality in the 1880's 
was held up as a reason why a unified peninsula 
municipality could not work. See J.D Linnegar; "From 
Village to Municipality: A History of Wynberg to 1903", 
Hons., University of Cape Town, 1975. 
G.21-1903, op.cit .. The Report of the Commission was 
accompanied by a dissenting minority report. 
G.21-1903, op.cit., Volume 3, pp.3-27. The minority 
BA 
report of Dr. A.J. Gregory, medical officer of health for 
the Cape Colony, argued that' two smaller municipalities 
should be created instead of one single large 
municipality. 
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that no further sources of water supply could be economically 
exploited within the Cape Peninsula and that future supplies 
would have to be drawn from the hinterland. It also recommended 
that a hinterland scheme should be capable of supplying 10 
million gallons per day; that it have a minimum storage capacity 
of 2000 million gallons; and that local authorities be empowered 
to raise up to £1 500 000 for its construction.< 11 ' The 
envisaged scheme would dwarf Cape Town's largest existing 
reservoir, the Woodhead dam, whose 210 million gallon capacity 
represented only a tenth of that of the proposed scheme. As the 
cost of a hinterland scheme would far exceed that of the Table 
Mountain reservoirs, considerable opposition was anticipated from 
ratepayers if it were to be attempted by individual 
municipalities. 
While all the municipalities agreed that a hinterland water 
scheme would eventually be needed, few were convinced that 
municipal unification was the way to achieve it. Indeed the 
Commission's recommendations sharply contradicted the opinions 
expressed by the majority of witnesses.< 1 ~' Of the seven 
peninsula municipalities, Rondebosch, Mowbray and Claremont were 
the most amenable to amalgamation, while Cape Town, Woodstock, 
Wynberg and Sea Point preferred to retain their independence. 
Amongst the suburban municipalities, it was Woodstock which most 
resisted unification, motivated by its civic pride which was 
inflated by the fact that it was at the height of an economic 
boom. As the third largest town in the Cape Colony, it boasted a 
rapidly growing population, newly established industries,a low 
( 1 1 ) 
( 12) 
G.21-1903, Volume 1, pp.11-20. 
J. Parker and Dr. L.A.W. Beck; The future water suppl~ of 
Cape Town and the Cape peninsula, Cape Town, 1904, p .. 
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municipal rate and public debt.ci~> [see table 1 below] 
TABLE ONE 
COMPARATIVE RATEABLE INCOME· PROPERTY RATE AND PUBLIC DEBT OF THE PENINSULA MUNICIPALITIES c.1900 
£ £ d./£ £ £ MUNICIPAL RATEABLE PROPERTY/ PUBLIC DEBT PER 
INCOME VALUE TENANT RATE DEBT HEAD 
CAPE TOWN 245 119 9 020 210 2.0 651 850 13.6 
WOODSTOCK 35 007 1 426 105 2.0 13 500 2.3 
GRN POINT 13 401 1 109 650 2.25 12 017 4. 1 
MOWBRAY 10 706 614 500 1.25 14 126 4.5 
CLAREMONT 13 741 995 000 1.25/8.0 17 035 2.7 
WYNBERG 12 374 1 023 816 1.5/8.0 38 247 7.7 
RNDBOSCH 7 479 695 246 1.25/8.0 6 400 1. 9 
SOURCE: G.21-1903, Volume 1 ' pp.5;8;9;10. The Argus Annual and South African Directory.(various) 
As a result of its confidence in its future growth as an 
industrial centre, Woodstock came to see itself as the leader of 
the suburban municipalities, and envisaged itself initiating an 
independent water scheme to supply the peninsula. Woodstock's 
ambitions came to represent a political obstacle to municipal 
unification as its geographic situation acted as a physical 
barrier between the city and the rest of the suburbs. 
Cape Town was also opposed to amalgamation, but for different 
reasons. Unlike the suburbs, by the turn of the century the 
city already had an established drainage and sewage system.<i 4 > 
(13) J. Parker; Unification, op.cit., p.35. 
(14) The municipality of Green Point and Sea Point was the only 
other municipality that had a drainage and sewage system 
at this time. See J. Parker; Unification, op.cit., p.12. 
Also see N.Kagan· The Growth and Development of the 
Municipality of Green Point and Sea Point, BA Hons., 
University of Cape Town, 1975. 
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For Cape Town, unification would have meant the expenditure of 
large amounts of money outside its boundaries to extend and 
integrate its infrastructure with the suburbs. Cape Town 
therefore wanted to limit its cooperation to the development of 
water supply. Instead of unification it considered that the 
establishment of a Peninsula Water Board with the limited 
responsibility of procuring and distributing water as best and 
least expensive solution for its needs. 
The concept of a central water authority was attractive to Cape 
Town because such an organization would ultimately be controlled 
by the city on a proportional basis, as its financial power was 
far greater than that of the combined suburban 
municipalities.ci~> A further reason why Cape Town favoured a 
single Peninsula Water authority was that its waterworks 
department already operated in the manner of a water board in 
that it had for years been selling water to Sea Point and 
Maitland as well as the Table Bay Harbour Board(TBHB) and also 
more recently to Woodstock Municipality. Indeed the sale of 
water brought considerable income for the city coffersci~> as may 
be seen in Table 2A and 2B below. 
TABLE 2A 
VALUE OF WATER BOUGHT BY CAPE TOWN'S MAJOR CONSUMERS ( £) 
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 
TBHB 22,751 33,621 30,642 29,438 32,377 31,672 
CAPE TOWN(!) 24,871 27,036 25,835 26,525 25,802 26' 182 
SEA POINT 4,492 4,959 ~,410 5,923 6,221 6,482 
CAPE TOWN(2) 894 1,869 2,091 3,261 1,845 2,227 
OTHER(3) 11,697 12,005 5,218 3,396 3,870 4,877 
TOTAL 64,490 79,490 69' 196 68,543 70' 115 71,490 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayor, 1900-1907. 
J. Parker, Unification, p.34. (15) 
(16) J. Parker and Dr. L.A.W. Beck, The future water supply of 
Cape Town, p.3. 
TBHB 
CAPE 
SEA 
CAPE 
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TABLE 28 
INCOME AS A PERCENTAGE DERIVED FROM THE SALE OF WATER TO 
CAPE TOWN'S MAJOR CONSUMERS 
1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 
351. 421. 441. 431. 461. 441. 
TOWN(1) 391. 341. 371. 391. 37'%. 37/. 
POINT 71. 61. 8/. 91. 9/. 9'%. 
TOWN(2) 1'%. 2'%. 3/. 5'%. 3'%. 31. 
OTHER(3) 181. 151. 8'%. 5'%. 61. 71. 
( 1 ) Householder, business and government consumption. ( 2) Cape Town corporation consumption. ( 3) includes Woodstock and Maitland. 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayor 1901-1906 
Woodstock on the other hand was against a water board, at least 
if it were to fall under the authority of Cape Town, for it would 
deprive the municipality of a large potential income and would 
bring it under the city's political contro1.c 17 > Another reason 
for Woodstock's di~missal of a central water board arose as a 
result of its involvement in the recently established Suburban 
Municipal Water Board [SMWBJ. 
The SMWB had emerged out of the Cape Town District Water Works 
Company which had been sold to several suburban municipalities in 
1899 at a cost of £210 000 cie>. The SMWB, which was jointly 
managed by the municipalities of Rondebosch, Mowbray, Claremont 
and Woodstock, was seen by Woodstock as a basis for developing an 
alternative Water Board which could be capable of developing its 
own hinterland scheme controlled by the suburbs and independent 
of the city's authority. More optimistically it was hoped that a 
suburban scheme would be self financing by selling water at a 
(17) 
(18) 
E.B. van Heyningen, "The 'small Greek cities'", p.6. 
G.21-1903,Volume 1, pp.13-14. For an overview of the SMWB 
history see SMW 4/17, Secretary: Suburban Municipal 
Waterworks Committee, 1890-1914, p.1-8. 
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profit to Cape Town, the Colonial Government and other peninsula 
municipalities such as Wynberg. ci~i Thus for Cape Town and 
Woodstock and its suburban partners, the whole issue of a water 
board became one not only of how additional water supply was to 
be obtained, but who would have control over it. 
It is for these reasons that the municipal response to the 
commission's recommendation for unification was largely negative. 
This must be measured against the background of structural 
economic problems facing the various municipalities. While these 
were to prevent the municipalities from working together in the 
short term, in the longer term they were destined to force city 
and suburb to cooperate. 
So far it has been suggested that the rapid growth of the 
population of the Cape Peninsula had been the underlying cause of 
the water and sanitation crisis confronting both city and suburb. 
This growth was geographically uneven however, creating different 
problems for Cape Town and the suburban municipalities. The 
rapid growth of Cape Town's population around the turn of the 
century as a result of the Anglo-Boer War had been largely of a 
temporary nature.< 20 > This growth also had the effect of masking 
a secondary and more permanent outflow of the middle classes to 
the suburbs which had been underway since the late 1880's. Thus 
in the decade between 1891 anq 1902 Cape Town's permanent 
population grew by 33/. compared to the 176/. of Wynberg; 165/. of 
(20) 
( 21) 
For example the population had swelled due to an influx of 
refugees, prisoners of war, soldiers and an increase in 
shi~ping. The Peninsula Commission put the number at 
11 371. 
G.21-1903, op.cit., Volume 1~ p.5. 
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Mowbray; 1581. of Sea Point and 1101. growth of Claremont.<~i) [see 
table 3 below J A similar shift in working class movement from 
Cape rown to the suburbs is evident from the massive 330/. 
increase in the population of Woodstock in the same decade.<==) 
TABLE 3 
TABLE SHOWING POPULATION INCREASE FOR EACH MUNICIPALITY: 
POPULATION AND THE PERCENTAGE INCREASE BETWEEN 1891 AND 1902 
MUNICIPALITY POPULATION 1891 POPULATION 1902 I. INCREASE 
CAPE TOWN 47 955 64 171 33/. 
WOODSTOCK 5 815 25 032 330/. 
SEA POINT 2 926 7 567 158/. 
MOWBRAY 3 098 8 237 165/. 
RONDE BOSCH 3 378 5 791 71/. 
CLAREMONT 6 252 13 166 110/. 
WYNBERG 4 952 13 697 1761. 
Source: G.21-1902, Volume One,p.5. 
As the growth rate of Cape Town took place at a slower rate than 
that of the suburbs, the proportion of the population living in 
the city compared to the remainder of the Peninsula dropped from 
63/. to 451. between 1891 and 1902 <=~' In contrast to its 
propo~tionally shrinking population Cape Town had a growing 
municipal debt calculated at £15 per head compared to the 
significantly lower £8 per head owed by the combined suburban 
municipalities.< 24 > Coupled to this was the fact that the 
suburban municipalities had a much lower ratable valuation, 
partly due to the absence of commerce and industry.[see Table One 
above] While the suburbs had a proportionally smaller debt, 
(21) G.21-1903, Volume 1, p.5. 
(22) ibid. 
(23) This figure is derived from census returns for the 
population of the city and the suburbs in 1891 and 1902. 
see G.21-1903, p.5. 
(24) J. Parker, Unification, pp.60-61. 
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their rateable income averaged only £1 2s. per head compared to 
that of £2 4s. for Cape Town. < 2 ~i In other words Cape Town's 
proportionally rising municipal debt and high rate of taxation 
was to undermine its ability to finance a hinterland water scheme 
on its own. Conversely the suburbs were unable to raise large 
enough loans because of their limited sources of revenue and 
narrow rateable tax base. <20 > 
The city and suburbs also had divergent problems with regard to 
their water supply. For Cape Town the problem was not only one 
of sufficient water for industry and shipping; or for flushing 
drains and sewers or watering streets, but was also an issue that 
affected the city's finance, as water represented an important 
source of municipal income. Cape Town's largest and most 
profitable client which purchased water for shipping was the 
Table Bay Harbour Board,[TBHBJ which not only consumed large 
amounts of water but also paid a disproportionate amount for the 
quantity it received.< 27 > For example, in 1903 the TBHB consumed 
35/. of the total metered water supply of Cape Town yet 
contributed to 44/. of the water works department's total 
income,< 2 e> paying six times more than the general metered 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
J. Parker, Unification, pp.60-61. 
Apart from Woodstock, the suburbs had a relatively little 
industry against which rates could be levied. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1912 (Cape Town); Appendix 9, p.viii, 
Statement showing the amount of Rates levied, together 
with the net charges in respect of Water Supply ... in Cape 
Town during the years 1903 to 1912. In 1903 the Table Bay 
Harbour Board paid a rate of 10 shillings per 1000 gallons 
(2 shillin9s per 200 gallons) compared to the metered rate 
of 1 shilling and 6 pence per 1000 gallons for 
householders. The cost of this was passed on to shipping. 
Due to 9overnment pressure the rate was eventually lowered 
to 1 shilling per 1000 gallons in 1911. See also A.7-1880, 
Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select committee 
on the Table Bay Harbour Board. Also see Table 2A above. 
Minute of the Mayor, (Cape Town) 1907~ Appendix No.8, p.x. 
This figure is derived from dividing Lhe income from the 
Table Bay Harbour Board by the total income of the 
waterworks department. If sources of income other than 
the sale of water are excluded, (eg. meter charges) the 
percentage is even higher; approximately 501.. 
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rate.<~~> tSee Table 4 below] The income derived from the TBHB, 
as well as from the sale of water to Sea Point, Maitland 
TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF CAPE TOWN'S METERED WATER SUPPLY DELIVERED TO ITS MAJOR CONSUMERS: 1900-1912 
YEAR TBHB COLONIAL IMPERIAL CAPE TOWN WOODSTK OTHER GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT CORPORATION 
1900 501. 51. 20% 6% 18% 1901 43% 51. 281. 5% 3/. 16% 1902 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1903 35/. B'l. 1 O'l. 9% 7'l. 30% 1904 30/. 13/. 5% 11% 91. 32/. 
1905 28/. 15'% 4 I. 12'% 11% 31/. 
1906 271. 17/. 4% 8% 91. 36/. 
1907 181. 20'% 31. 51. 91.. 45i'. 
1908 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1909 151.. 131.. 2% 71. 91.. 55% 
1910 141. 151.. 21. 71. 8% 55% 
1911 141. 271.. 21. 61. 52% 
1912 141. 30/. 11. 61. 49% 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayer, 1900-1912. 
as well as to Woodstock was largely responsible fer the City's 
Waterworks Department shewing a surplus of up to £50 000 in some 
years.c~o) Fer this reason Cape Town was cautious cf handing 
ever its profitable Waterworks to a Water Beard over which it 
might only have limited control. 
The s~burbs.on the ether hand faced a different set of problems 
concerning their water supply. The Suburban Municipal 
Waterwcrk's main source cf supply was at the Albion Springs at 
Rondebcsch, which together with ether miner springs cc~ld only 
provide an average of 1 million gallons of water a day compared 
to the 3 million gallons supplied daily by Cape Town's 
reservoirs.< 31 > Although the actual yield of the Albion Springs 
(29) 
(30) 
Minute of the Mayor, 1912, Appendix 9. 
Cace Times, S September 1906. Also see Minute of the Mayor, 
Appendix 8, p.(x), Annual income of waterworks for the years 
1897-1906. 
(31) G.21-1903, Volume 1, pp.13-14. 
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was 1 375 000 million gallons per day, 500 000 gallons of this 
had to flow into the Liesbeeck River as part of the legal share 
of riparian owners.c 3~> In addition to this a further 175 000 
gallons of the springs yield formed part of the 'Ohlsson 
Servitude'. (33> This originated from an agreement made upon the 
transfer of the Cape Town District Company to the SMWB in 1898, 
when the brewer, Ohlsson, who was also a major shareholder in the 
water company, received guarantees that he would receive 175 000 
gallons of water per day free of charge for his brewery. c34 > It 
is of interest to note that this agreement also stipulated that 
the SMWB would not supply water to any other brewing company, 
thus forcing the large brewery in Woodstock to get its water from 
Cape Town.c 3 ~> The remaining 700 000 gallons from the springs 
was then divided between the four municipal partners of the SMWB; 
Claremont, Mowbray and Woodstock each receiving 200 000 gallons 
daily, while Rondebosch took 100 000 gallons.c 3 •> In practice 
this meant that Woodstock with a population of 25 000 received 
the same amount of water as Mowbray which only had a population 
of 8000.c 37 > The equal distribution of water between the 
members of the SMWB was to place intense pressure on Woodstock, 
and had the result of increasing its dependence on Cape Town. 
WoodstQck's insecure position was demonstrated during 1902 when, 
in the midst of a severe drought, Cape Town threatened to cut off 
the municipality's daily supply of 100 000 gallons.c 3 •> Because 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
G.21-1903, Volume 1, p.14. 
Cape Times, 16 April 1903. 
ibid. In monetary terms this represented a loss of about 
£3000 p.a. for the Suburban Municipal Water Board. 
The South African Breweries in Woodstock received its 
water from the pipeline with which Cape Town supplied the 
Uitvlugt Native Location. 
G.21-1903, op.cit., Volume 1, pp.13-14. 
ibid. 
Cape Times, 20 January 1902. At this time Cape Town was 
supplying Woodstock with 100 000 gallons daily 1 or a third 
of its total supply. In 1904 Woodstock's supply of water 
from Cape Town peaked at an average daily supply of 
101 930 gallons per day. (See appendix,· Table 8) Figures 
compiled from Minute of the Mayor, Ann~al reports of city 
engineer or water engineer. 
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of Woodstock was to become instrumental in steering the suburban 
municipalities towards developing a hinterland water scheme to 
make the suburbs less dependent on Cape Town. 
When the Report of the Peninsula Commission was finally published 
in 1903, it received an icy reception from the various 
municipalities. This was fuelled by the continuing economic boom 
which had the effect of buoying the peninsula municipalities 
confidence in their ability to solve their problems by 
themselves. While it has been argued that Cape Town and 
Woodstock would have found it difficult to undertake an extensive 
water project by themselves because of the structural constraints 
affecting their ability to raise finance, the idea of 
constructing an independent hinterland water scheme began to look 
increasingly attractive despite its high costs and the 
anticipated opposition of ratepayers. Even before the report of 
the commission was issued in March 1903, both the concepts of 
municipal unification and a joint water authority had lost 
considerable ground, and secret investigations in the hinterland 
were being undertaken by Woodstock and Cape Town. The 
reminiscences of one Cape Town councillor illustrates the 
atmosphere of hostility and suspicion that existed between the 
two municipalities at this time. 
" I remember going .•• to inspect the Berg River Hoek 
site, and after doing· so ••• [we went toJ have a look at 
Wemmershoeki not so many miles distant. We arrived to 
find severa of the councillors of Woodstock on the 
site and our reception was chill~ in the extreme. We 
seem to be regarded as spies. 11 <'3 > 
The period following the release of the Peninsula Commission's 
report in 1903 up until the middle of 1904 represents a phase of 
considerable fluidity in the approaches of Cape Town and 
Woodstock to the development of a hinterland scheme. While the 
report failed to take cognizance of the full extent of the 
(39) W. Duncan-Baxter 1 Turn Back the Pages: Sixty-Eight Years 
at the Cace, 195~, p.38. 
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traditional rivalries, jealousies and power play between the 
various municipalities, it did confront them with two options; 
that of creating a single municipal authority or of establishing 
a central board of works for the administration of water supply. 
The two rival municipalities found it difficult to accept these 
options but they could not reject them entirely as there were 
doubts over their ability to attempt independant schemes. Cape 
Town was coming under increasing. financial pressure due to its 
mounting municipal debt and decelerating growth rate. The low 
rateable income of the suburban municipalities on the other hand 
would make it difficult for them to float an estimated £1~ 
million loan on the London money market, needed for a separate 
hinterland scheme.c 4 o> As a result of this uncertainty the 
relationship between the two municipalities oscillated between 
cooperation and outright hostility over the next few years. 
Attempts at cooperation were determined by their recognition that 
neither municipality could be certain that it would be capable of 
developing a hinterland scheme on its own, and for this reason 
the idea of forming a joint water board was never completely 
abandoned. On the other hand, attempts at cooperation were 
marred by the fact that both had an interest in being the 
dominant partner in any water board, for whichever municipality 
controll~d it would control the hinterland water supply, and 
would in effect determine the direction of the Peninsula's 
development. 
A further obstacle which blocked possible cooperation between 
Cape Town and Woodstock concerned the choice of a site for a 
hinterland scheme. As each had financial investments in 
different areas, both municipalities were determined that their 
own sites should be selected if a water board were to be 
established. Woodstock's involvement in the hinterland began in 
1900 when the municipality purchased land at Oliphants Hoek in 
the Wemmershoek Valley ( see map 6 opposite ) at a cost of 
(40) Cape Timesi 9 April 1902. The SMWB attempted to raise a 
loan for £~00 000 but it was only half subscribed. 
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£25 OOO.c 4 i> Cape Town had a similar interest at Berg River Hoek 
near Fransch Hoek.' 42 ' (see map 6 page 119) 
During the investigations of the Peninsula Commission both 
Woodstock and Cape Town had been secretly conducting surveys in 
these catchment areas in the belief that they would be able to 
gain government approval for water schemes on these sites. 
Woodstock hoped that confirmation of its Oliphantshoek site would 
entrench its standing in a water board constituted by the 
government and result in financial compensation for its 
investment. Woodstock was to suffer a setback when the 
commission pronounced this scheme as 'hastily considered' and 
'poorly investigated' .' 4~> 
The Oliphantshoek and Berg River Hoek were not the only schemes 
that had been considered, as the Rondebosch and Mowbray 
municipalities had purchased land and options in the Steenbras 
River valley in 1899.' 44 > Other potential sites which had 
earlier been considered by Cape Town included the Witte River 
which had been rejected in 1892' 4 ~> and a site at Du Toits Kloof 
which had been investigated in 1902.c 4 •> Several other sites had 
also been suggested, but had associated problems. For example a 
scheme on the Palmiet River would have submerged the village of 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
(46) 
G.21-1903, op.cit., Volume 1, p.18. The Wemmershoek 
valley had several tributaries with potential for damming, 
the Oliphant's Hoek area being in the upper reaches of the 
valley above the present Wemmershoek Dam. 
Minute of the Ma5or (Cape Town) 1903; Report of R.O. 
Wynne-Roberts su mitted to the Electric, Water Works, and 
Fire Brigade Committee (15 June 1903), pp.1-16. 
G.21-1903, op.cit., Volume 1, p.18. 
N. Kagan; 'Growth and Development of Green Point', p.91. 
J. Burman; The Ca~e of Good Intent, Cape Town 1969 
p.110. Also Capeimesi 17 January 1898; and G.21-1903, 
op.cit., Volume I, p.!1. 
Minute of the Ma5or (Cape Town) 1903; pp.73-75; and Report 
of R.O. Wynne-Ro erts submitted to the Electric Water 
Works, and Fire Brigade Committee (15 June 1903J, pp.1-16. 
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Grabouw, while a scheme at Twenty Four Rivers was considered too 
distant to be viable.< 47 > Others sites included Zacharias Hoek 
in the Wemmershoek Valley and Banghoek, a tributary of the Berg 
River.< 4 e> 
Despite the intense rivalry that existed between Cape Town and 
Woodstock, a number of circumstances were to bring the two 
municipalities closer together to reconsider the formation of a 
joint water board by the end of 1903. In July of that year a 
report that the government railway and harbour authorities 
intended developing its own water scheme along the Klip River, 
[see mapb] caught both by surprise and effectively tipped the 
scales in the direction of cooperation between the two 
municipalities.< 4~> This had come about as a result of the lack 
of progress of the peninsula municipalities as well as the 
railway and harbour authority's resistance to the high water 
tarriffs charged by the Cape Town. The proposed scheme threatened 
to remove the custom of the Harbour Board from the municipalty 
and reduce its ability to finance the Berg River Hoek scheme. 
Woodstock's proposed Oliphantshoek scheme had made little 
progress since the criticism by the Peninsula Commission and the 
report of the Klip River scheme now brought into question its 
financial viability. 
Cape Town reacted swiftly in persuading the railway and harbour 
authorities to abandon its Klip River scheme.ceo> In return Cape 
Town undertook to begin its own scheme within three years.cei> 
A bill would be prepared to place before parliament, guaranteeing 
(47) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
J. Burman; The Cape of Good Intent, op.cit., p.110. 
ibid. 
Minute of the Mayor (Cape Town) 1903; pp.73-75 
Cape Times, 3 August 1903. 
ibid. 
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a water supply for government consumption. Woodstock, now 
fearing isolation due to the government authority's backing for 
Cape Town's scheme, offered to join the city in the formation of 
a Peninsula Water Board.<e~> By October 1903, the municipalities 
of Cape Town, Green Point and Sea Point as well as the four 
municipalities of the SMWB had formed a Joint Water Committee 
with the objective of identifying a potential site for a 
hinterland water supply scheme for the Cape Peninsula.ce3> By the 
end of the year it appeared that the question of the Peninsula's 
water supply was to be finally settled through the establishment 
of a single peninsula water authority. 
In a remarkably short space of time it was agreed that the 
function of the proposed water board would be limited to 
developing and maintaining a hinterland scheme, and that the 
various municipalities would retain control over their own water 
works. This had the effect of averting a potential power 
struggle for control of the board. Apart from determining the 
structure of the Water Board, one of the main tasks of the Joint 
Water Committee [JWCJ was to commission a detailed engineer's 
report on ten potential water schemes within and outside the 
peninsula.<e4 > Despite this apparent progress, in reality, the 
committee had little real authority, and was soon to fall prey to 
internal political developments. taking place within various 
municipalities. Within a year of its establishment, it virtually 
existed in name only. 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
Minute of the Mayor (Cape Town) 1904; p.43. 
3/CT 9/5 Minutes of Joint Water Committee. The committee 
comprised of Cape Town's Electricity, Waterworks and Fire 
Bri~ade Committee and a Committee of the Suburban 
Municipal Waterworks. The Joint Water Committee was to 
continue to function until 15 November 1905. It was later 
reconstituted as the Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee, which excluded the municipality of Cape Town. 
3/CT 9/5, Rafe Report: Cape Peninsula Water Supply, Report 
presented to the Joint Water Committee, 1905. 
Page 123 
The onset of an economic depression from about the end of 1903 
formed a catalyst for a reversal in the attitude of the Cape Town 
city council towards the joint water scheme. Over the next few 
years a distinct interest group within the city council charted 
Cape Town on a course of economic austerity and political 
isolation from the suburbs. Furthermore Cape Town's water 
consumption slowed down and even decreased between 1904 and 1912 
(see table 5 below) due to the onset of an economic depression 
which undermined the urgency of the proposed hinterland scheme 
TABLE 5 
CAPE TOWN's WATER CONSUMPTION 1900-1912 
Million 
Gallons 
1000 
950 
900 
850 
800 
750 
700 
650 
(GALLONS) 
YEAR 1900 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 
ENDING 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayor 1900-1918 
See Appendix A for full statistics 
for Cape Town. In addition the period of drought that had been 
experienced since 1902 was at last broken and coincided with the 
long awaited completion of the Hely Hutchinson Dam in 1904 which 
brought an additional supply to the city. This rapid reversal in 
Cape Town's circumstances were soon to have a dramatic impact on 
the work of the Joint Water Committee. 
The change in the economic environment had a polarising effect on 
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the politics of the city hall. By late 1903, leading proponents 
of cooperation with the suburbs, which included councillors such 
as John Parker, the mayor William Thorne and Frederick St Leger, 
the Managing Director of the Cape Times, anticipated opposition 
to a joint water scheme from within the town council, and urged 
that an enabling bill be placed before parliament for the 1904 
session, even before the investigation and report of the Joint 
Water Committee's were complete.cee> 
Opposition to the water scheme had meanwhile been emerging within 
the Council's Finance and Lands Committee under the leadership of 
Hyman Liberman, a city merchant.<eo> The first tangible sign of 
opposition from the Finance Committee came in March 1904, when a 
preliminary report of the Joint Water Committee on the financing 
of the water scheme was rejected by the Finance Committee, which 
suggested that a more 'equitable apportioning of the cost' be 
borne by the Peninsula municipalities.ce 7 > This was a reflection 
of Liberman's openly stated view that Cape Town was sacrificing 
its own interests by embarking on a costly water scheme with the 
suburbs.cee> After a division, the Finance Committee 
recommended, with Liberman's casting vote, that the proposed 
water bill which was ready to go before parliament, be 
withdrawn.<e•> Although the latter recommendation was rejected 
by the mayor, William Thorne, the damage to Cape Town's relations 
with the suburbs had been done. 
Even before the Cape Peninsula Water Supply bill reached 
parliament, unexpected opposition had emerged in the form of 
(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
Minute of the Mayor (Cape Town) 1904; pp.43-44. 
Cape Times, 24 March 1904. 
Minute of the Mayor (Cape Town) 1904; pp.43-44. 
Cape Times, 29 January 1904. 
Minute of the Mator (Cape Town) 1904; pp.43-44. Also Cape 
Times, 24 March 904. 
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petitions from ratepayers' associations and councillors from the 
municipalities of Woodstock and Cape Town< 6 '-» as well as Green 
Point and Sea Point.< 61 ' The criticisms contained within a 
petition from 'Town Councillors and Ratepayers of Cape Town' 
reveal the extent of the divisions within city hall and between 
city and suburb. The Cape Town petition may be summarised as 
follows. Firstly it was argued that the powers to be given the 
proposed water board were too wide, particularly in terms of 
taxation. It would: 
"largely increase the cost of living of the mass of the 
population, as ... landlords will be compelled to make 
their tenants pay for the rates and taxes for 
water".< 62 ' 
Secondly the approval of ratepayers had not been obtained from 
any of the municipalities concerned, and thirdly sufficient 
investigations had not been undertaken for the selection of a 
suitable scheme.< 63 ' These were mainly economic grievances, in 
contrast to the petitions from the suburban municipalities which 
objected to the arbitrary manner in which the city council had 
drawn up a water bill before the completion of the Joint Water 
Committee's report. 
One of the strongest suburban objections to the Cape Peninsula 
Water Supply Bill was the petition of William Hare, the mayor of 
Woodstock.< 64 ' Woodstock's main objection to the bill lay in its 
concern that it violated the principle proposed by the JWC that 
the water board would be not be monopolised by either the city or 
(60) 
(61) 
(62) 
(63) 
(64) 
A.7-1904, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the 
committee on the Cape Peninsula Water Suppl0 Bill. Petition from Charles Mathews and Fourteenthers, 
Appendix C; Petition of William Hare the Mayor of 
Woodstock, Appendix F. 
select 
ibid. Petition of the Mayor of the Municipality of Green 
Point and Sea Point, Appendix B. 
A.7-1904, Appendix C, clause 3. 
A.7-1904, Appendix C, clauses 1, 8, 9, 10. 
A.7-1904, Appendix F. 
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suburban municipalities.cee> More specifically Woodstock 
objected to the haste with which Cape Town was trying to force 
through the bill, which it described as wholly inconsistent with 
the preliminary report of the Joint Water Committeecee> Hare 
claimed that a thorough and exhaustive investigation had not been 
made of the various schemes, in particular the Oliphantshoek 
scheme, in which Woodstock had a vested interest. 
Woodstock's real concern regarding the water bill may be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, it feared that the Oliphantshoek 
scheme, in which it had already invested £20 000, would be 
rejected in preference to Cape Town's Berg Hoek scheme, and 
secondly, its interests would be overridden on the proposed 
water board. The question arises of why Cape Town should deviate 
from the principles laid down by the Joint Water Committee? 
Aside from the financial interest in Berg River Hoek, the most 
important reason is to be found in the deterioration in the 
position of the pro-water councillors within the city council. 
Leading proponents of the hinterland scheme, such as John Parker, 
were anxious to force through a bill establishing the city's 
hegemony over the suburbs before the growing number of 'anti-
water' councillors achieved control over city hall. 
Due to the strong opposition being mobilised against the Cape 
Peninsula Water Supply Bill by the suburbs, which probably would 
have resulted in its rejection by parliament, it was decided that 
the bill had best be postponed until the 1905 parliamentary 
session, in order to carry out further investigations in the 
hinterland to overcome the objections of Woodstock.ce 7 > By the 
latter half of 1904 the position of the supporters of the water 
scheme within city hall deteriorated to such an extent that the 
bill was eventually abandoned altogether. 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
A.7-1904, Appendix F, clause 17. 
A.7-1904, Appendix F, clause 4. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1904, p.44. 
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In June in 1904, three anti-water councillors, William Irwin, 
Hyman Liberman and W.S. Woodheadcbe> were appointed as 
representatives to the Joint Water Committee<b~>, giving 
substance to fears that those supporting the water scheme had 
lost control of the council. The annual municipal elections due 
in September of that year threatened to become the arena for a 
battle for the control of the city hall between what was to 
become known as the water and anti-water parties within the 
council. 
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE COUNCIL: 1904-1906 
The issue of water sup~ly which dominated the municipal elections 
of September 1904, was to become intertwined with a wide spectrum 
of social, economic and political issues. Underlying Cape Town's 
municipal politics was the deteriorating economic climate which 
impacted on the creeping municipal debt. It was this situation 
that had led the city's ratepayers, in July 1904, to reject a 
loan of £ 2 000 000 for street paving, an infectious diseases 
hospital and for industrial dwellings.< 70 > The likelihood of 
ratepayers approving another loan of up to £2 000 000 for a new 
water scheme seemed increasingly unlikely. The issue of a joint 
hinterland scheme had also become caught up in a complex debate 
over the desirability of political unification between the Cape 
Town and the suburban municipalities. Central to this was the 
attempt made by certain councillors to link the issue of water 
supply with the proponents of municipal unification, as part of a 
plot devised by wealthy suburban merchants to saddle the 
(68) 
(69) 
(70) 
3/CT 9/5, Minutes of the Joint Water Committee, 26 May, 
1904 
ibid. 
Cape Times, 8 July 1904. 
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householders and working class of Cape Town with the cost of 
suburban civic improvement. 
Cape Town's involvement with the Joint Water Committee and the 
hinterland scheme was brought into question during the municipal 
elections held in September 1904, by which time the city council 
had polarised into pro-water and anti-water factions. It is at 
this juncture that social, economic and political divisions over 
the issue of municipal reform and water supply that had operated 
during the nineteenth century were to be rekindled. 
It will be remembered that during the late 1850's and early 
1880's the issues of water supply, sanitation and municipal 
reform were at the heart of a struggle between the 'dirty' and 
'clean' parties. The conflict was described as a clash of 
economic and class interests between householders and the 
landlord or rentier class against the merchants and middle 
classes over municipal reform and the cost of improvements to the 
town's sanitation system and water supply. Although the 
reformers gained control over the town council in 1882, by 1896 
municipal indebtedness and the cost of the Table Mountain 
reservoirs had given rise to a confrontation between the remnants 
of the dirty party known as the wreckers and the clean party 
or reformers. While this latter conflict resembled the earlier 
clashes between the clean and dirty parties in the 1880's, it 
also marked the beginning of a new alignment, which was to 
develop out of the old racial and ethnic alliances into groupings 
with divergent economic interests. The results of this process 
of realignment along social and economic lines was to culminate 
in the defeat of the old merchant class in the 1904 municipal 
election. 
In Chapter One it was argued that by the 1890's the political 
power of the rentier classes had been broken by a combination of 
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their relative decline within Cape Town's economy and the 
introduction of discriminatory municipal ordinances which 
narrowed the municipal franchise. The alliance of interest 
between working class tenants, small householders and landlords, 
was gradually transformed and replaced with the emergence of 
ratepayer's associations which shared a common concern of keeping 
municipal rates to a minimum. The ratepayers' association that 
emerged at the turn of the century coincided more closely with 
class lines rather than the ethnic basis of the clean and dirty 
parties. The ratepayers' association included sections of the 
middle and professional classes as well as a number of smaller 
businessmen. The merchant interest associated with the clean 
party in the 1880's was superseded by a rising class of 
businessmen who controlled the council by the turn of the 
century. The ratepayer's association, in common with the dirty 
party of the 1880's, drew on the support of the city's working 
classes, particularly where the issue of water supply was 
concerned, as the water schemes had become to be perceived as the 
prerogative of the business interest. 
The emergence of this type division within the city government is 
not unique to Cape Town. E.P. Hennock argues that divisions 
within town councils in Britain in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century were not so much based on class conflict, but 
on a division amongst the dominant classes over which type of 
business attitude should be dominant; that of caution or 
enterprise.< 71 > Hennock argues that a central issue in municipal 
government was the one that took place between improvers and 
economists.< 72 > The latter, Hennock argues, rose to prominence 
during periods of depression, and were often supported by 
ignorant electors who worked against reform.< 7~> In Cape Town a 
(71) 
(72) 
(73) 
E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons, p.317. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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similar process may be discerned but is complicated by the 
existence of racial divisions. 
That the issue of augmenting water supply became the focus of a 
conflict between improvers and economists was also not unique to 
Cape Town. The conflict over Liverpool's Rivington Pike 
Scheme,c 74 > which was discussed in the introductory chapter,c 7 ~' 
represented a division between "wealthy merchants and 
professional men" against "shopkeepers and tradesmen" on the 
basis that it would result in an increase in rates.c 7 e> A 
familiar pattern of conflict was to occur in Cape Town, although 
the divisions along class lines within the council were not as 
pronounced. 
The ascendancy of men in the town council who were opposed to 
excessive expenditure on civic improvements, and even more so to 
municipal debt, is apparent from the municipal elections from 
1897 onwards, which saw a minority of candidates calling for 
"efficiency and economy", "no fresh taxation" c77 > and for 
"reform and reorganization in the town house".c 7 e> 
pleas were made for: 
Similarly 
"ratepayers to be cognizant of all the business matters 
and expenditure, [and for] the finances of the city, 
loans and otherwise, to be carefully controlled, and 
no squandering of ratepayer's money." c7 -P> 
The election of a handful of proponents of efficiency and 
economy at the turn of the century, led by Hyman Liberman,ceo> 
(74) D.Fraser, 
p.33. 
Power and Author-ity in the Victorian City, 1979, 
(75) See Introduction, pp.18-19. 
(76) D. Fr-aser, Power- and Authority, p.35. 
(77) Cage Times, 13 September- 1897. 
(78) Ca1;2e Times, 10 September- 1897. 
(79) ibid. 
(80) See biography, Appendix A. 
Th.e Hely 
PHOTOGRAPH 7 
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and including; G.Pittman; G.Cunningham, T.Harris, and 
A.Hilliardcei> were to capitalise further on the popular 
perception of the business classes serving their own interests on 
the council. ce:z> In particular the perception of the city 
council's incessant preoccupation with a hinterland water scheme 
resulted in it being at the centre of the focus of general public 
resentment against municipal improvement. 
The divisions that were to develop in the council were not 
absolute, as alliances shifted from time to time.ca~> Even 
amongst the anti-water party there were differences of emphasis. 
One group maintained that there was no necessity for an increase 
in water supply at a11,ce 4 > a second smaller group argued that 
Table Mountain would be an adequate source for all future needs, 
while a third section represented by Liberman argued that Cape 
Town would sacrifice its own economic interests by cooperating 
with the suburbs. cae> 
The opening of the Hely Hutchinson dam in 1904, (see photograph 7 
facing page) slow down in Cape Town's water consumption and the 
ending of the drought, combined with the ending of the economic 
boom and municipality's massive debt, provided an ideal 
opportunity for a challenge against the established municipal 
order in the elections of that year. 
(81) 
(82) 
(83) 
(84) 
(85) 
Geor9e Cunningham was a baker and confectioner; Alfred 
Hilliard was a draper; T.Harris was an auctioneer and 
broker. 
V. Bickford-Smith; " Keeping Your Own Council", pp.201-204. 
A.R McKenzie; W.Thorne~ and Garlick are given as examples 
of councilors serving their own interests. 
T.J O'Reilly; G. Cunningham• and C. Mathews are three 
examples of councillors that were to shift their position 
on the water issue, for expedience or change of conviction. 
Some merchants like R. Stuttaford and Sir Frederick Smith 
tended to keep a low profile on the issue of water supply. 
Cape Times, 29 January 1904. 
ibid. 
Kin·_1_te of t;·,P 
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The September election saw twelve candidates competing for six 
vacancies within the city council. Of these, six candidates 
stood on a water ticket against five on an anti-water ticket. The 
former was headed by John Parker,<eo) who was a prominent 
supporter of municipal unification, as well as a council 
representative of the Joint Water Committee and a leading 
supporter of the hinterland water scheme. (see photograph 6 
facing page) Parker had wide experience and contact with the 
peninsula municipalities, having been previously elected as a 
councillor in Mowbray municipality in 1898.<e7i This background 
was to lead to accusations that he was representative of the 
suburban interest. The remaining members of the ticket were all 
city businessmen: William Baxter; James Clunie; Andrew McKenzie; 
James Wyllie and David Robertson.<eei 
By comparison the five members of the anti-water ticket tended to 
be drawn from the ranks of the smaller shopkeepers and 
businessmen as well as members of the professional classes. 
These included Charles Friedlander, an attorney: two drapers, 
Alfred Hilliard and Edward von Witt;<e~i Samual Impey, a medical 
doctor and District Six landlord'~0 i; and Edward Mellish, a 
An independent candidate, Dr. Abdullah 
Abdurahman also supported the stand of the anti-water ticket. The 
fact that two medical doctors took an anti-water stance is a 
(86) 
( 87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
(91) 
See Appendix for biography. 
Dictionary of South African Biography, Volume 5, 1987. 
Minute of the MaTor (Cape Town) 1905 and Langlands Cape 
Town and Peninsu a OirectorR, 1903. William Duncan-Baxter 
was one of the leading mere ants in the city and founder 
member of the South African Political Association; James 
Clunie (Captain) was a shipping merchant; Andrew McKenzie 
was a forwarding agent; James Wyllie was a sanitary 
engineer and hardware importer. 
Minute of the Mayor, (Cape Town) 1905. 
South African News, 9 September 1904. Impey describes 
himself as 11 a large property owner in District Six". 
Minute of the Mayor, (Cape Town) 1905 
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reflection of the nature of the conflict. Unlike the earlier 
conflicts of the 1850's and lBBO's in which the dominant issue 
was sanitation and reform, the municipal elections between 1904 
and 1906 concerned economic issues. The conflict within the city 
council centred on Cape Town's relationship with the suburban 
municipalities, of which the issue of a hinterland water scheme 
was the linchpin. Larger businessmen wanted Cape Town to play a 
dominant role in the development of the peninsula's 
infrastructure, while smaller businessmen and householders were 
unwilling to pay its cost, and felt that the city should detach 
itself from the suburban water and sanitation problem. 
A better understanding of the nature of the divisions that 
emerged within the dominant class may be determined from the 
difference in the backgrounds and occupations of the candidates 
from the two water tickets. Although significant distinctions 
cannot be made from the 1904 election alone, when compared to the 
representatives and candidates of similar water tickets in the 
1905 and 1906 elections, a clear pattern emerges.(see table 6 
page 134) While the supporters of water party tended to be 
identified with the business elite, labelled the "Adderley Street 
interest 11 ,c•~> because of their activity in the central city, the 
majority of these men actually lived in the southern 
suburbs.(531.) The anti-water party by contrast, tended to be 
represented by smaller businessmen and the professional classes, 
the overwhelming majority of whom resided within Cape Town and 
Green Point's municipal boundaries.(941.) (see table 6 overleaf) 
This difference gave substance to accusations made against the 
water party that it represented the suburbs, and seriously 
undermined its strength in the city council. 
Further distinctions may be made between the two parties on the 
basis of the composition of their supporters. The support for 
(93) Most large business was situated on Adderley Street. 
Sometimes refered to as the Adderley and St.GeorgesStreet 
clique. 
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TABLE 6 
COMPARISON OF THE PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND OCCUPATIONS OF 
CANDIDATES OF THE WATER-PARTY AND ANTI-WATER PARTY IN MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS FROM 1904-1906. 
NAME 
Abdurahaman, Abdullah 
Alexander, Morris 
Allan, Robert 
Black, William 
Cunningham, George 
Dunn, Joseph 
Forsyth, Robert 
Friedlander, Charles 
Harris, Thomas 
Hilliard, Alfred 
Impey, Samuel 
Irwin, William 
Jones, James 
Kinsley, Charles 
Liberman, Hyman 
Mellish, Edward 
Palmer, Thomas 
Smith, Frederick B. 
Von Witt, Edward 
Ball Thomas 
Bartiett, John 
Baxter, William Duncan 
Bosman, Petrus 
Bullen, William 
Clunie, James 
Drake, John 
Mathews, Charles 
McKenzie, Andrew 
O'Reiilyj T.J. 
Parker, ohn 
Sedgwick, Charles 
St Leger 2 Frederick Thorne, ::;ir William 
Walshe, Albert 
Wyllie, James 
ANTI-WATER PARTY 
PLACE OF RESIDENCE 
Cape Town 
? 
Wyn berg 
Green Point 
Cape Town 
Sea Point 
Sea Point 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Sea Point 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Sea Point 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
WATER PARTY 
Rondebosch 
Cape Town 
Wyn berg 
Cape Town 
Rondebosch 
Cape Town 
Rosebank 
Green Point 
Cape Town 
Cape Town 
Rose bank 
Rondebosch 
Claremont 
Rondebosch 
? 
Cape Town 
OCCUPATION 
medical doctor 
barrister 
merchant 
architect 
baker 
merchant 
medical doctor 
attorney 
auctioneer 
draper 
medical doctor 
importer 
chemist 
law agent 
merchant 
shipping agent 
importer 
builder 
draper 
property owner 
builder 
merchant 
wine merchant 
insurance agent 
merchant 
builder 
property owner 
merchant 
agent at law 
architect 
merchant 
M.D. Cape Times 
merchant 
chemist 
YEAR 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1906 
1904 
1905 
1905 
1904 
1904 
1904 
1904 
1906 
1905 
1905 
1906 
1904 
1906 
1906 
1904 
1906 
1904 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1904 
1905 
1905/6 
1904 
1904 
1904/5 
1906 
1906 
1905 
1906 
1904 merchant/ 
sanitary engineer 
NO CLEAR ALLEGIANCE TO EITHER PARTY 
Smith, Frederick(sir) 
Stuttaford, Richard 
Cape Town 
Kenilworth 
merchant 
merchant 
SOURCES: Minute of the Mayor 1904-1906; The Cape Times; The 
Owl; The Cape Argus. 
1905 
1905 
Page 135 
1 
the two tickets was generally drawn from different groups of 
ratepayers. Support for the water ticket tended to come from 
businessmen and professional classes, broadly coinciding with the 
upper and middle class ratepayers, while the following of the 
anti-water ticket was strongest amongst middle and lower middle 
class householder~, artisans and the working class. It was this 
latter group that had been hardest hit by the growing municipal 
debt through the consequent increase in rates and rents. Although 
the representatives of the anti-water ticket were hardly typical 
of the working class, they attracted the latters support with 
their accusations of municipal extravagance and rhetoric 
denouncing corruption and self interest. 
Impey reminded ratepayers that: 
For example Samuel 
"The councillors had always been mainly elected from 
the neighbourhood of Adderley Street. [and that] He 
was a large property owner in District 6 and would 
work for the benefit of the district." '~ 4 ' 
Much of the anti-water party's campaign was popularist in 
character, particularly with regard to water supply, and as 
such,the Berg River Scheme represented a convenient symbol of 
municipal extravagance. The working classes needed little 
reminding, as their negative perception of the water supply issue 
was embedded in their consciousness; they had been casualities of 
the rivalry between landlords and merchants over sanitation and 
municipal reform during the nineteenth century. The Cape Times 
was to remind supporters of the water party not to allow Cape 
Town to "r-evert to the state of things which existed in the 
seventies and the eighties, when the dirty people had the 
contr-olling voice in municipal affair-s"<~~> Fur-ther-mor-e the Cape 
Times made an attempt to r-evive the old ethnic and r-acial 
divisions which had oper-ated around the issue of municipal r-efor-m 
with the accusation of an "alliance of sectionalism" which it 
(94) 
(95) 
Cape Times, 9 September- 1904. 
Cape Times, 28 March 1904. 
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leveled at the anti-water party. It complained bitterly that the 
city voted against any water scheme because "Mr. Liberman and Dr. 
Abdurahman gave the word", and as a result the "coloured vote as 
he bids them".< 9 => Liberman's response was to these attacks were 
blunt: 
"Nothing could be more undesirable than that the 
conduct of civic affairs should fall into the hands of 
a faction swayed by nothing so much as a determination 
to secure power by any means, and to retain it at all 
costs."<"' 7 ' 
For the anti-water party the issue of water supply was a 
manifestation of a seemingly unstoppable municipal expenditure 
and debt. This perception is best illustrated by a cartoon 
appearing in the satirical journal, The Owl (see cartoon 7 facing 
page) in which the water ticket is shown to be afloat on a sea of 
indebtedess. 
The September poll resulted in an decisive defeat of the water 
ticket and even the "water prophet" John Parker, who bore the 
brunt of the attack, was rejected by the ratepayers. Only 
William Duncan Baxter and Andrew McKenzie narrowly managed to be 
returned to the city hall.<"' 9 ' The Cape Times lamented: 
"we had hoped that the municipal elections would result 
in a triumph for water. As a matter of fact, the poll 
is, ••• a victory for mud."<"'"'> 
The victory of the anti-water ticket held serious implications 
for the reformers within city hall as the balance of power 
shifted decisively in favour of the anti-water party led by Hymen 
Liberman. Liberman himself had been elected on to the council in 
1903, and as a wealthy merchant was conspicuous amongst the 
smaller businessmen and shopkeepers of the anti-water party. The 
(96) Cape Timest 8 September 1904. Also see W.Duncan-Baxter, 
Turn Bae!<: he Pages, pp.40-41. 
(97) Cape Times, 23 September 1904. 
(98) Cape Times, 13 September 1904. 
(99) Cage Times, 14 September 1904. 
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party's control over the town council was reinforced with 
Liberman's election as mayor after the poll; an office he was to 
hold for three years. While Parker was to stand for re-election 
in 1905, his attention turned to what he considered to be the 
key to the Cape Peninsula's water problem: the need for the 
political unification of the city and suburban 
municipalities.cioo> 
The anti-water party quickly stamped its authority on the town 
council. Within a week of the election, in a motion carried by 
ten votes against seven, it overturned a previous decision to 
grant £5000 to the Joint Water Committee to undertake further 
investigation of sites in the hinterland. cioi> A cartoon in The 
Owl which depicted Liberman as the new "King of the Castle" made 
it clear that this decision was a major step in ridding Cape Town 
of the burden of debt. ( see cartoon 7 facing page ) Cape Town's 
independent investigations being conducted by the British 
Engineer John Rofe,cio 2 > were however allowed to continue. 
The council's rejection of all further expenditure on a 
hinterland scheme had a devastating impact on the city's 
relationship with the suburbs, and signaled Cape Town's retreat 
into a period of political isolation. In reaction to the 
withdrawal of Cape Town's funding of the Joint water Committee, 
the suburban municipalities reciprocated by demanding that the 
city transfer to them the rights, title and interest in the Berg 
River Scheme at cost price.cio~> This was refused by Cape Town 
which also announced that it would no longer participate in any 
(100) This was to culminate in the formation of the Peninsula 
Unification Society which he founded in 1910. 
(101) Minute of the Mayor, 1905, p.87. 
(102) The report was completed in 1905 but ignored by the 
council. H.Rofe; Caee Peninsula Water Su~ij15: Report 
Presented to the Joint Water tomm1ttee, O . 
(103) Minute of the Mayor,(Cape Town), 1905, p.87. 
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joint scheme. Cape Town's rejection of further cooperation did 
not mean that the city had no future intention of developing a 
hinterland scheme, for the anti-water party's underlying 
objection to a joint scheme had been based on the uneven cost 
that Cape Town was expected to bear, at a time when the city's 
water requirements were declining. Despite this attitude, the 
party was not unaware of the enormous profit that the waterworks 
brought the city. For this reason it was not prepared to abandon 
its interests at Berg River Hoek which would open the way for an 
independent suburban scheme to break the lucrative monopoly which 
it held over the Peninsula's water catchment areas. 
While water consumption in Cape Town had been falling since 1904, 
the opposite was true in the suburbs. Woodstock in particular 
had been suffering from severe water shortages and had been 
purchasing up to 150 000 gallons per day from Cape Town.cio 4 > 
This figure excluded water supplied by Cape Town directly to the 
tanneries and breweries within the municipality.cio~> By 1905 
the situation in Woodstock had deteriorated to such an extent 
that it was forced to cart water to the hospital and other areas 
that could not be supplied due to low water pressure, at a cost 
of l~d. a gallon to its town counci1.cio•> Similarly, during the 
summer of 1905 the SMWB was forced to purchase 10 000 gallons a 
day f.rom Cape Town in order to make up a shortfall in its 
supply.<io 7 > For these reasons Woodstock once again began to 
consider seriously a hinterland scheme of its own, and in June 
1905 it began to prepare a bill to take before parliament for 
authority to initiate an independent scheme.cio•> The reaction 
(104) Minute of the Mayor,(Cape Town), 1905, p.91. 
(105) Minute of the MaAor,CCape Town), 1905, Annual report of the 
Water Engineer, ppendix 4. 
(106) A.7-1906, Cape of Good Hope (Colony), Report of the select 
committee on the Ca8e Peninsula Water suapld 8ill 1 p.3, Evidence of Andrew unningham.,(Mayor of oo stockJ 
(107) Minute of the Mayor,(Cape Town), 1905, p.91. 
(108) Cape Times, 5 June 1905. 
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of the other peninsula municipalities to Woodstock's revival of 
its Oliphantshoek scheme were at first somewhat muted, attempts 
were made to urge Cape Town to cooperate with the suburbs. 
In August 1905, T.A. Askew, the mayor of Claremont, approached 
Cape Town to persuade it to revive the joint hinterland scheme. 
Failing that, it was requested that the suburbs be allowed to 
take over Cape Town's interests in the scheme at cost.c 10~> 
Pressure was also put on the city council with the publication of 
the 'Rafe Report', which had been commissioned by the Joint Water 
Committee in 1904, which was to urge strongly the commencement of 
a combined hinterland scheme.c 110 > 
Despite the overtures being made by the suburbs, and the annual 
municipal elections due in September 1905, the water party made 
only a token attempt to persuade ratepayers of the need to 
cooperate with the Joint Water Committee. In the aftermath of 
its decisive defeat in 1904, the issue of water supply was given 
less prominence during the 1905 election, for fear of a further 
weakening of its position within the city council. Earlier in 
that year Parker had declined to stand in a by-election caused by 
the death of councillor Mellish, despite the urging of the Cape 
Times to do so.c 1 11> The anti-water party's opposition to the 
Berg River scheme had been symbolically vindicated by the 
flooding of the peninsula by violent storms and record rainfalls 
during June of that year. (se~ photograph 9 facing page) c 11 ~> 
Amongst the candidates nominated for the six vacancies in the 
1905 election only four supported the water party. Aside from 
(109) Minute of the Mayor, 1905, pp.87-88. 
(110) The Owl, 11 August 1905. 
(111) ibid. 
(112) L. Green, Grow Lovely, Growing Old, 1975, pp.167-68. 
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Parker, who was now prepared to stand< 11 ~' these included a 
leading merchant and former mayor, Sir William Thorne; another 
sitting councillor and property owner Petrus Bosman; and a 
builder John Drake, who had the backing of the Master Builders 
Association.< 114 ' Of the six candidates endorsed by the 
ratepayers association, four were linked with the anti-water 
party, including James Jones, a chemist; a medical doctor, Robert 
Forsyth; Charles Kinsley, a 'law agent'; and a shopkeeper, Joseph 
The remaining candidates, two merchants, Richard 
Stuttaford and Frederick Smith were unaligned, and received 
support from both parties.< 116 > The position taken by anti-water 
party supporters was that no further expenditure on the Berg 
River Scheme be permitted< 117 i and that the city sell otf its 
assets in the hinterland to the suburbs at cost price, on 
condition that Cape Town retained the right to rejoin the scheme 
at a future date.< 11ei Given the poor economic situation and 
lack of support for the Berg River scheme, Parker resisted being 
drawn into an emotive and potentially debilitating campaign, like 
that of 1904. 
The water party's low key approach had some limited success, and 
surprisingly, John Parker was elected with the third highest 
(113) Another reason Parker had declined to stand in the earlier 
by-election was that if he had been elected he would have 
to stand again in the following year due to the municipal 
system of three yearly rotational elections. By standing 
as part of a ticket annual elections, the chances of 
election were increased. 
(114) Minute of the Ma~or, 1906; and Cape Times, 1 
September 1905. 
(115) Minute of the Ma~or, 1906; and The Owl, 25 August 1905. 
(116) Cape Times, 9 September 1905. 
(117) Cape Times, 25 August 1905. 
(118) ibid. 
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number of votes. cii~> The only other water party supporter who 
was successful was the popular former mayor, Sir William 
Thorneci 2 o> who was re-elected. Parker's success may be largely 
attributed to his espousal of "socialist" reforms, ci=i> a 
strategy which earned him the wrath of The Ow1.ci:;;:::;;::> Parker's 
unexpected victory was explained as the result of a "large number 
of plumpers"ci 23 > and by a "series of tactical electioneering 
operations" which drew a combination of support from: 
"the pulpit, by the suburbanites who want a water 
scheme, ... by the Trades Hall, and by the injudicious, 
partisan organ, the Cape Times 11 .ci24 > 
The Owl went on to deny that his advocacy of the Berg River 
scheme had been approved by the ratepayers, and accused him of 
underhand methods of gaining the "labour vote"[working class] 
through his support of industrial dwellings for artisans.ci=~> 
The balance of power in the town council remained in favour of 
the anti-water party, with Forsyth and Jones being elected, along 
with the two unaligned candidates. ci 2 b> The influence of the 
water party was still felt through its domination of city 
(119) The Owl, 15 September 1905. Sir Frederick Smith came 
first, followed by Stuttaford and Parker. Dr. Forsyth was 
elected in fourth place, followed by Sir William Thorne and 
J.Jones. 
(120)· Cape Times, 9 September. 
(121) 
(122) 
The Owl, 15 September 1905. The biography of Parker 
contained in the Dictionary of South African Biography, 
op.cit., refers to him being re-elected in 1905 as a 
socialist, appealing to the working man. However Parker 
was not a socialist in the modern sense of the word, but 
rather a supporter of municipal socialism. It is however 
unlikely that he received significant support from workers, 
as it has been argued, most were drawn to the anti-water 
party. 
The Owl, 15 September 1905. It is of interest to note that 
The Owli which was strongly against the hinterland scheme, 
was pub ished by the Cape Times. This contradiction must 
be explained by strongly independent editorial control. 
(123) The Owl, 15 September 1905. 
(124) ibid. 
(125) ibid. 
(126) Cape Times, 11 September 1905. 
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council's Electric, Waterworks and Fire brigade Committee. The 
supporters of the anti-water party were concentrated in the 
Finance Committee, in which the real power of the council 
lay. ( see table 7 below) 
TABLE 7 
SUPPORTERS OF THE WATER-PARTY AND ANTI-WATER PARTY CONCENTRATION 
IN THE CITY COUNCIL'S WATERWORKS AND FINANCE COMMITTEES: 
1903-1906 
WATERWORKS COMMITTEE 
* W. Thorne (mayor) 
* P.J. Bosman 
• T. Harris 
* J. Parker 
* G. Cunningham 
* T.J. o· Reilly 
* D. Robertson 
• H. Liberman (mayor) 
* J. Bartlett 
• G. Cunningham 
• D. Me 11 i sh 
* W.D. Baxter 
• A. Hilliard 
* w. Thorne 
• H. Liberman (mayor) 
* W.D. Baxter 
* T.J. O' Reilly 
F.W. Smith 
• J. Jones 
* J. Parker 
* W. Thorne 
• H. Liberman 
• A. Abdurahman 
• R. A 11 an 
• M. Allexander 
• W. Irwin 
F.W. Smith 
• T. Palmer 
1903/04 
1904/1905 
1905/1906 
1906/1907 
KEY 
FINANCE COMMITTEE 
* W. Thorne (mayor) 
* P.J. Bosman 
• W. Irwin 
* F.L. St Leger 
Dr. Fuller 
• H. Liberman 
* W.S. Woodhead 
• H. Liberman (mayor) 
• W. Irwin 
* F. L. St Leger 
• C. Friedlander 
* C. Mathews 
* P.J. Bosman 
* W. Thorne 
• 
* • 
• 
* 
* 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
* 
H. Liberman (mayor) 
W.D. Baxter 
F.B. Smith 
R. Stuttaford 
C. Friedlander 
F.L. St Leger 
W. Thorne 
H. Liberman (mayor) 
R. A 11 an 
W. Irwin 
T. Palmer 
C. Friedlander 
F.B. Smith 
W. Thorne 
* Pro-water councillors 
• Anti-water councillors 
NOTE: F.W. Smith and R. Stuttaford held no clear allegiance to 
either party. G. Cunningham switched from supporting 
the water party to the anti-water party in 1904. 
SOURCES: Minute of the Mayor, 1904-1907; The Cape Times 
The Owl; The Cape Argus. 
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Although councillors who advocated economy and efficiency 
extended their control over the city council in the 1904 and 1905 
elections by directing public attention against the Berg River 
scheme, they proved to be reluctant to allow the suburbs to 
proceed with their own hinterland scheme. It has been argued 
that Liberman was not opposed to augmenting Cape Town's water 
supply, but to the fact that the city would have to bear the bulk 
of the cost in any joint scheme. The anti-water party suspected 
that the suburbs did not have the financial ability to proceed 
with a scheme alone, and were content to allow the suburbs to 
wait until such time as Cape Town was prepared to rejoin them on 
its own terms. This assumption was to be challenged in the 
period following the 1905 election, when it appeared as if 
Woodstock might just succeed in initiating a scheme and upsetting 
Cape Town's monopoly of water supply. 
The belief that the suburbs did not have the ability to finance 
an independent water scheme seemed to be vindicated with the 
dissolution of the Joint Water Committee in November 1905.ci=7 > 
Its chairman, John Parker, expressed the fear that the whole 
issue might soon be taken out of the hands of the local 
authorities. In his final report Parker warned of the: 
"danger of the whole question becoming so beset with 
local jealousies or interests, that the Government 
might be compelled to take the matter up, and create a 
board with full powers to carry out a scheme .... "<i=e> 
The breakup of the Joint Water Committee did not bring an 
end to the suburban effort. On the 14th of December 1905 a new 
body, the Suburban Joint Water and Drainage Committee,[SJWDCJ was 
formed, which was comprised solely of the four members of the 
Suburban Municipal Waterworks.< 12~> In February 1906 the 
(127) 3/CT 9/5~ Minutes of the Joint Water Committee 1 15 November 1905, p.L-4. Resume of proceedings of the Joint Water 
Committee. 
(128) ibid., p.3. 
(129) 3/CT 915, Re~ort of the Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee, 2 February 1907. 
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1 
municipalities of the SJWDC announced their intention to promote 
an enabling bill for a hinterland water scheme at 
Wemmershoek.<130> 
Woodstock was serious in its attempt to develop a scheme, but 
Rondebosch, Mowbray and Claremont never ceased to try to enlist 
the economic support of Cape Town for the SJWDC. If Cape Town 
refused to cooperate, Woodstock had made it clear that it would 
be forced to go it alone out of sheer necessity.< 131 > At a joint 
meeting held between Cape Town's combined Water and Finance 
Committee and the Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee,< 132 > the suburbs again made an attempt to persuade the 
the city either to participate directly or to purchase 600 000 
gallons of water per day at 1s.2d. per 1000 gallons as an 
indirect means of financing the project.< 1 ~3 > Due to ongoing 
conflict between the city council's Finance and Water Committees, 
Cape Town's response was equivocal as was its unwillingness to 
make any concessions until further investigation of sites were 
undertaken. At a second meeting held by the city and SJWDC, the 
patience of Woodstock was finally broken when its mayor, Andrew 
Cunningham, made it clear that his municipality was ready to 
proceed with Wemmershoek "at all costs" and was not prepared to 
cooperate in any other scheme.< 134 > 
Faced with the very real likelihood of a SJWDC scheme at 
Wemmershoek, Cape Town's combined Finance and Water Committee 
reached a compromise and in May 1906 they advised the city 
council that the principle of a joint scheme was the most 
effective way of meeting the city's long term water needs. The 
(130) A.7-1906, Cape of Good Hope(Colony), Report of the select 
committee on the Cape Peninsula Water Supply bill. 
(131) Minute of the Mayor, 1906, p.85. 
(132) Minute of the Mayor, 1906, p.84. 
(133) ibid. 
(134) ibid. ' p.85. 
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report noted that they considered the financial terms offered by 
the suburbs was in commensurate with the amount of water that 
Cape Town would receive from the scheme.<13el The combined 
committee also questioned the scale and cost of the Wemmershoek 
scheme. Given the unfavourable economic climate, it suggested 
that if Cape Town was to cooperate with the suburbs, further 
sites should be investigated and the final choice of a site 
should be decided by an independent arbiter. 1136 ' Furthermore, 
the committee recommended that Cape Town should bear no more than 
a quarter of the cost of a joint project, as this was equivalent 
to the amount of water that the city was estimated to need for 
the next twenty-five years. 1137 ' 
This apparent shift in the attitude of Cape Town following the 
1905 municipal election, towards one of conditional cooperation 
with the suburbs might have been based on Parker's influence on 
the city council's water committee, but in reality these harsh 
conditions reflected the anti-water party's control over the 
finance committee. In effect the anti-water party believed that 
if the suburbs could not bring themselves to accept conditions 
favourable to Cape Town, they probably could not procede on their 
own. 
Woodstock was in no mood for further negotiation over the site of 
a scheme or its finance, and on its own initiative proceeded to 
place before parliament its Cape Peninsula Water Supply Bill 
which provided for a smaller scheme at a cost of £1 000 ooo. 113el 
In its overhasty attempt to overcome the impasse created by Cape 
Town, Woodstock only succeeded in unleashing a storm of protest 
amongst the suburban municipalities. Cape Town also objected to 
(135) Minute of the Ma~or, 1906, pp.86-88. 
(136) Minute of the Ma~or, 1906, p.87. 
(137) ibid. 
(138) A.7-1906, p.1. 
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the bill, but the most devastating opposition came from 
ratepayers in Rondebosch, Claremont, Mowbray and even from 
Woodstock itself. By July 1906 Woodstock's Wemmershoek scheme lay 
in tatters. 
Cape Town's real objection to the Cape Peninsula Water Supply 
Bill was its concern that Woodstock had been attempting to raise 
alternative finance for its Wemmershoek scheme by offering a 
substantially reduced water tariff to the Table Bay Harbour 
Board. With Cape Town's 1903 agreement with the government due 
to lapse,<i 3~ 1 suspicions had arisen when Woodstock succeeded in 
persuading the railway and harbour authorities to abandon renewed 
investigations into constructing their own water scheme.<i 4 o1 
The most damaging opposition to the Cape Peninsula Water Supply 
Bill came from suburban ratepayers. This had arisen as a result 
of the undue haste with which Woodstock had unilaterally pushed 
for the Wemmershoek scheme in preference to other potentially 
superior schemes. It was done before the completion of an 
engineer's investigation which had been commissioned by the 
Suburban Joint Water and Drainage Committee.<i 4 i> The strongest 
suburban reaction came from Thomas Ba11ci 421 , the Mayor of 
Rondebosch, who protested that: 
"the [Wemmershoek] scheme has never been definitely 
approved by the [Suburban] Joint Committee. There has 
never been a report drawn up approving of that and 
submitted to our councils .... It has been forced 
through" 
Although Rondebosch had its own reasons for opposing the 
Wemmershoek site, because it owned land and options in the 
(139) Cape Times, 6 March 1905. 
(140) A.7-1906, p.13. 
(141) A.7-1906, p.314. 
(142) ibid. 
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Steenbras river valley, Ball's criticism echoed those of other 
municipalities who now suspected that Woodstock, like Cape Town 
in 1903, was attempting to create a monopoly of supply in the 
hinterland. 
A question that arises is why Woodstock should jeopardise its 
ambitions in the hinterland by antagonising Cape Town and 
its erstwhile suburban partners. Firstly, Woodstock rejected 
Cape Town's demand that it should only contribute a quarter of 
the costs of a scheme, which the former saw as a delaying tactic 
intended to buy time for a scheme of their own.< 143 > Secondly, 
the fact that the city's ratepayers had rejected the Berg River 
Scheme only two years previously, meant that there would be no 
guarantee that they would now approve a loan for a scheme 
perceived to be for the benefit of the suburbs. Thirdly, 
Woodstock had come to realise that without the support of Cape 
Town, the rest of the suburban municipalities would be reluctant 
to attempt a scheme on their own. A fourth reason was that 
amongst the suburbs, it was Woodstock that was under the greatest 
pressure to augment its water supply, and it was this which was 
to prompt it to attempt a smaller scheme in the hope that the 
suburbs would follow its lead. Finally, Woodstock owned large 
areas of land in the Wemmershoek valley and had undertaken 
extensive scientific and engineering investigations at its own 
expe~se.< 144 > But in its haste to occupy the vacuum caused by 
Cape Town's vacillation over its role in the hinterland, 
Woodstock had suddenly found itself isolated from the rest of the 
suburbs. As a result of this misjudgment, its ability to proceed 
on its own with a £1 000 000 water scheme was seriously 
questioned. Ultimately, the widespread opposition to Woodstock's 
Wemmershoek Bill was to cause it to be withdrawn. 
(143) A.7-1906, p.27. 
(144) A.7-1906, p.34. 
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~' W~ter, Water ·everywhere '"10r any drop to drink." 
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The Cape Peninsula Water Supply Bill also had repercussions 
within the city council. Cape Town's reconsideration of a joint 
hinterland scheme rekindled the conflict between the water and 
anti-water parties. These were to manifest themselves during 
the municipal elections of 1906, the third year in succession in 
which water supply had a central role. The water party saw the 
collapse of the initiative between the city and suburbs as an 
opportunity to go on the offensive against the anti-water party. 
The negotiations that had taken place between the city and the 
suburbs at the end of 1905 and early 1906 had raised Parker's 
hopes over the prospect of reviving a joint scheme. The collapse 
of Woodstock's Water Supply Bill in July 1906 drew attention to 
the need for a fresh initiative on the part of the pro-water city 
councillors by renewing negotiations and offering more equitable 
terms to the suburbs for a hinterland scheme but the election 
resulted in a major setback for the water party, and the 
abandonment of Cape Town's hinterland interests. 
For the ratepayers of Cape Town, the debate over water supply had 
by now become largely academic, as a hinterland scheme was not of 
immediate concern when the city's reservoirs were filled to 
capacity. Another Owl cartoon, "The Great Thirstland", makes 
this point with Parker trying to catch the rain while water is 
seen 'to flow to waste everywhere.( see cartoon 8 facing page ) 
Once again, the lines of conflict were drawn, with the ratepayers 
association backing Liberman's platform of economy and the water 
party fielding a strong candidate in William Duncan Baxter.< 14 ~' 
The latters concern lay in large scale civic improvement for the 
long term development of the city as well as close cooperation 
with the suburbs. 
(145) See biography, Appendix A. 
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After the progressive weakening of the Adderley street interest 
in the two previous municipal elections, businessmen such as 
Baxter began to regroup in order to wrest control of the council 
from the influence of Liberman, the anti-water party and the 
householder dominated ratepayers' association. A clear 
indication of a concerted mobilisation of businessmen is 
reflected in the formation of The Citizens' Guild in February 
1906. The Guild's primary objective was to re-assert and 
maintain the interests of the business in the city hall. The 
Guild, which was led by William Duncan Baxter,(see photograph 
10 opposite page) was supported by leading businessmen such as 
Richard Stuttaford; John Garlick and Cleghorn. ci 4 => Baxter was 
strongly supported by the recently appointed editor of the Cape 
Times, Maitland Park, ci 47 > who felt that a "new regime" was 
needed at the City Hall, and set about this objective in an 
aggressive manner.ci 4 e> Such was the response of Cape Town's 
leading citizens to its formation, that the Cape Times was led to 
remark optimistically: "if this tendency is carefully fostered, 
most of the defects of popular control of the affairs of the city 
may be expected to disappear 11 .ci 4 •> The stated aims of the Guild 
thinly disguised its real objectives. These were: 
" (a) To secure the systematic registration of all persons qualified to vote at municipal elections. (b) To induce suitable candidates to accept nomination 
for seats upon the council (c) To consider municipal policy and affairs and 
disseminate reliable information thereon. (d) Generally to create a greater interest in municipal 
affairs, ·and to assist in the furtherance of . 
projects that may be to the advantage of the city 
and its inhabitarits."cieo> 
(146) Cape Times, 18 July 1906. 
(147) G. Shaw, Some beginnings: The Cape Times 1876-1910, 1975, 
p.135. 
(148) ibid. 
(149) Cape Times, 18 July 1906. 
(150) Cape Times, 17 February 1906. 
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These points reflect the Guild's view of the decline of the 
merchant interest in the city hall since their defeat of the 
dirty party in 1882. The narrowing of the municipal franchise 
had not been sufficient to weaken the influence of working class 
ratepayers and householders. In addition the middle class's 
indifference to municipal politics left the representatives of 
the merchants vulnerable to the growing opposition of 
householders and smaller businessmen to the city council. The 
key to the problem was defined as one of voter apathy as well a 
dearth of "fit and proper persons"<i~ii willing to stand for 
council. The Guild saw the solution in mobilising middle class 
ratepayers to bolster the business interest in the council, for 
the general good of all. This view was echoed by the Cape Times 
which had observed that municipal politics had not been held up 
as a noble cause on the part of Cape Town's elite classes, and 
consequently, Cape Town was burdened with a populist council that 
threatened the long-term interests of the city. Central to the 
Citizen's Guild economic interest was a permanent solution to the 
city's water supply, which was linked to the question of 
municipal unification with the suburbs. The remedy to this 
problem lay in encouraging middle class involvement in municipal 
politics and educating ratepayers to the worth of civic 
improvement through organisations such as the Guild, the Cape 
Penin?ula Publicity Association and the press.<i~2 > 
Ratepayers were in no mood to .be persuaded to finance any further 
municipal undertakings, particularly those which were perceived 
to be in the interest of the city merchants. As with the 
elections of 1904 and 1905, water supply once again came to 
symbolise the wider issues of municipal indebtedness as well as 
inefficiency and corruption. One example was the "Nuttall 
contract", a major scandal of the day which involved the City 
(151) 
(152) 
E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons, p.308. 
K. Wall, "The unification of Cape Town:, 1910-1913", 
unpublished paper prepared for Contree, March 1988, p.5-15. 
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J 
Engineer, J.Cook, against whom accusations of preferential 
treatment of tenders for a contract for £200 000 to a British 
firm for street paving.(i~3 > Initially, it was the supporters 
of the water party who were most affected by the scandal in the 
wake of the popular perception of widespread corruption in the 
counci1.(i~4 > A cartoon in The Owl entitled "Blocking the Berg 
Riverites" clearly shows the popular perception of a linkage 
between the corruption scandal and the water interests.(see 
cartoon 9 opposite page) Additional factors such as the 
prevailing economic depression, the rising municipal debt, the 
imposition of tariffs such as the School Board rate, a landlord 
rate and a water rate, were prejudicial to the cause of those 
who advocated the hinterland scheme and cooperation with the 
suburbs. Once again an Owl makes this point by showing Parker 
trying recruit public opinion for a water scheme at a time of 
bankruptcy, retrenchment and depression.(see cartoon 10 overleaf) 
Parker's advocacy of a water scheme in these circumstances only 
served to enhance the position of popular councillors such as 
Hyman Liberman who wanted a reduction in the municipal rate, and 
Dr. Abdurahman who had long opposed any further involvement in a 
hinterland scheme because of its cost.<i~~> The facts that the 
city's water consumption had actually declined as a consequence 
of the recession, and the Table Mountain reservoirs were 
overflowing made a mockery of those who urged that the time was 
ripe for a joint water scheme with the suburbs for the long term 
interest of the city. 
The lines of conflict in the 1906 municipal election were clearly 
drawn, with twelve candidates competing for six positions in the 
council. The Citizens Guild, which came out strongly in favour 
of a joint water scheme with the suburbs, fielded six candidates 
(153) G. Shaw, Some beginnings, pp.135-136. 
(154) ibid. The full details and implications of the scandal 
were only revealed in 1907. 
(155) The municipal rate was dropped ~d to 2~d in 1906 but rose 
to a record high of 3d the following year. 
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as did the anti-water ratepayers association.(see cartoon 11 
overleaf) Included amongst the Citizens Guild candidates was the 
manager of the Cape Times, Frederick St Leger.< 1 ~0 > Other 
candidates standing on the water ticket, also called the Guild of 
Six, included Thomas Ball, Andrew Walshe, the vice president of 
the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce; William Bullen, a merchant and 
the brother of the new mayor of Rondebosch; and two merchants and 
former councillors, Charles Mathews and Charles Sedgwick.< 1 ~7 > 
The ratepayers association anti-water ticket included the current 
mayor Hyman Liberman; Thomas Palmer, a journalist; William 
Black, an architect; Frederick Smith, a builder and contractor; 
and two shopkeepers, William Irwin and Robert Allen.< 1 ~e> 
As with the 1904 and 1905 elections no conclusive distinction can 
be made between the two tickets on the basis of class, although 
the Citizens' Guild candidates tended to be more representative 
of the city's business elite than those of the Ratepayers 
Association who tended to come from the ranks of smaller 
businessmen. A more significant difference between the two 
tickets lay in the fact that at least four of the "Guild of Six" 
who owned businesses in the city actually resided in the 
suburbs.(see table 6 above) Only one of the anti-water ticket 
lived outside Cape Town in Wynberg municipality.< 1 ~~> This gave 
substance to the charge that the Citizens' Guild represented the 
suburban interest. The Guild of Six, also called the "blue 
[water] ticket" were seen to be unrepresentative of the interests 
(156) Cape Times, 6 September 1906. 
(157) ibid. 
(158) Minute of the Mayor, 1907, p.ii. 
(159) Robert Allan lived in Wynberg, which was considered neutral 
as it had its own independant water scheme. 
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of Cape Town and that of the average householder. In the popular 
press the Guild stood accused of: 
"workin9 for the benefit of the Adderley and St 
George s streets and the suburbs"< l.Q<::>> 
The South African News, which strongly supported Liberman, 
offered a blunt criticism of the Citizens' Guild on this matter 
"there was no room for the man with the tall hat and 
frock coat who lived in the country and wanted to 
squander the money of ratepayers of the 
metropolis". <i=i> 
Echoing the populist rhetoric, the manifesto of the Ratepayer's 
Association reveals a widespread reaction against the influence 
of business in general with its call for a fair wage clause in 
municipal contracts and for the resisting of monopolies. ci=~> An 
Owl cartoon shows the close relationship between Liberman and the 
Association. (see cartoon 12 facing page) In contrast to 
Liberman's dedication to economy and prudence, the Citizens' 
Guild stood accused of being committed to magnificence, of 
display, and of extravagance, ciQ 3 > a perception which was shared 
by many ratepayers. Once again popular reaction was vented 
against that familiar symbol of merchant interest, water supply. 
Despite these unfavourable conditions, the Guild of Six made the 
joint hinterland scheme a central plank of their election 
platform. In response to the anti-water stance of Liberman and 
the Ratepayers' Association, the Guild of Six argued that Cape 
Town should lead the suburbs in providing for a long term 
solution to a water problem which would ultimately affect the 
Given Woodstock's recent attempt to develop an 
(160) The South African News, 6 September 1906. (page 6) 
(161) ibid. 
(162) The South African News, 6 September 1906. (Leader) 
(163) The South African News, 12 September 1906. 
(164) Cape Times, 5 September 1906. 
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independent suburban scheme, the Guild warned that any future 
scheme attempted without Cape Town's participation would result 
in a considerable loss of revenue for the city. This warning was 
based on the knowledge that Woodstock had attempted to draw away 
the custom of the Table Bay Harbour Board earlier in that 
year,<ioei with the promise of a substantially lower water rate 
than that of the city monopoly. ciao> 
In response to this warning the anti-water party argued that Cape 
Town would lose little income, even if Woodstock was ,able to 
supply the TBHB. The amount of water consumed by the Harbour 
Board had dropped considerably since the end of the Anglo-Boer 
war, (see above table 5) or as Liberman put it; "so much so that 
it would not be long b~fore one would be able to carry all the 
water that was wanted down there in a bucket". ci~ 7 i Liberman 
went on to argue that Cape Town did not need the suburbs, if they 
needed water: 
"well let them have it, and let them pay for it. .. 
Cape Town [has] no need for water at the present ... and 
even if ... [more water was needed] there was a further 
supply on Table Mountain 11 .<i 0 ei 
The argument over whether Table Mountain was capable of providing 
more water for Cape Town's needs formed the basis of the counter 
attack of the Guild of Six, but with little effect given the 
abundance of water in the city's reservoirs. 
The colourful rhetoric which was so characteristic of Liberman 
frustrated the campaign of the Guild of Six. The Cape Times in 
(165) A.7-1906, Petition of Charles Sedgewick and seven other 
town councillors. 
(166) A.7-1906, p.131. 
(167) Cape Times, 5 September 1906. 
(168) ibid. 
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particular bitterly attacked Liberman as a "class leader", as it 
had done in 1904, and frequently compared his hold over the city 
hall to the era of the dirty party of the 1870's and 1880's. c1~•> 
"The circumstances of today are widely different from 
those of 1880; but the old fight has still to be 
fought for the sweetness and the wholesomeness won ~fter years of struggle, are to be secured if the city 
l~ t9 grow~ .. without w~ich it cannot expect to 
vindicate its metropolitan claims."' 17 •=» 
In spite of the strong support lent to the Guild of Six by the 
Cape Times , its candidates failed to win a single place on the 
city council. < 171> A few weeks after the election Liberman was 
elected for a third consecutive term as mayor. 
To the further dismay of the Citizen's Guild Liberman confirmed 
his standpoint that Table Mountain was the answer to Cape Town's 
future water needs and that the city did not have to look to the 
hinterland for water. 
proclaimed: 
At his inauguration as mayor he 
"As Moses struck the rock and obtained water for the 
people of Israel, so the rock of Table Mountain would 
be found sufficient for the needs of Cape Town". < 17 ~> 
This provided material for The Owl in a cartoon declaring 
"Another Peninsula Miracle". (see cartoon 13 opposite) 
Significantly this cartoon reveals the basis of Liberman's 
support with its inclusion of the onlooking working class of 
District Six.(see bottom left hand corner) The Cape Times, 
embittered by the Guild's defeat, retorted " If Moses came to 
Cape Town" he would have discovered two 'rocks', "one rock [Berg 
River Hoek] would yield five times the daily supply yielded by 
the other [Table Mountain] at less than half the cost".< 17~> 
(169) Cape Times, 18 July 1906. 
(170) ibid. 
(171) Cape Times, 11 September 1906. Results of poll: Anti-water 
party~ Liberman (6888)1 Irwin (6571); Alla~ ~598?>; B~ack (5884J; Smith (5240); ~almer (5100). The Citizens Guild: 
Mathews (3670); Sedgewick (3275); St Leger (3184); Ball (3053); Bullen (2550); Walsh (2440). 
(172) CaQe Times, 11 October 1906. (173) ibid. 
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The 1906 election marks the end of the city's attempt to develop 
a water scheme in the hinterland, until municipal unification in 
1913. The period between 1904 and 1906 represents the ascendancy 
of councillors supporting economy and efficiency over those who 
advocated a continuation of municipal improvement. A cartoon by 
The Owl, "The Last Sad Office", aptly depicts the death of Berg 
River Scheme as a literal burial. (see cartoon 14 opposite page) 
After the defeat of the Citizens' Guild's candidates in the 1906 
election, efforts to reassert the interest of business aver city 
hall tacitly avoided the emotive issue of water supply in order 
to avoid a further diminution of their representation within the 
city council but The Owl continued ta remind voters of Parker's 
purpose in subsequent elections. (see Cartoon 15 overleaf) 
Supporters of a hinterland water scheme, particularly Parker, 
concentrated their efforts outside the city council in an attempt 
to convince the citizens of Cape Town of the cause of municipal 
unification and water supply. 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE HINTERLAND SCHEME; 1907-1910. 
The defeat of the water party was to provide Woodstock with 
another opportunity to pursue its own hinterland scheme. This 
time there was no serious opposition, yet it ended in a total 
collapse within a couple of years. 
As a result of the water party's defeat in 1906, the Suburban 
Joint Water and Drainage Committee was reconstituted in November 
of that year in order to address the deteriorating position of 
water supply in the Peninsula. By late December the 
municipalities had held a meeting with the Co~missioner of Public 
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Works and the General Manager of the Railways and the Harbour 
Board to seek guarantees for the government's purchase of water 
which would enable the suburbs to finance their own scheme.<i74) 
This was agreed by the government on condition that a bill be 
introduced to parliament in the next session to enable the 
immediate start of a hinterland water scheme. ci 7 ~> After a 
further engineer's report was issued by the respected engineer 
Thomas Stewart, the suburban joint committee decided to adopt a 
modified scheme in the Wemmershoek valley.ci 76> The new scheme 
differed from Woodstock's 1906 water bill both in terms of its 
substantially reduced capacity and in the cost of the project. 
The agreement reached provoked an angry response from Cape Town. 
In fact it seems that the mayor of Cape Town, Hymen Liberman,~had 
been deliberately deceived by Woodstock. He was later to claim 
that an agreement had been made with Andrew Cunningham, the mayor 
of Woodstock, whereby Cape Town would not oppose the new suburban 
water bill on condition that Woodstock refrain from attempting to 
secure the custom of the Table Bay Harbour Board.ci 77 > Despite 
Liberman's dismissal of the importance of the TBHB during the 
1906 election, this agreement underlines the fact that income 
from this source was indeed an important, albeit declining, 
source of revenue for the city.ci 7 •> Woodstock on the other hand 
was very much aware that the financing of its hinterland scheme 
would be extremely difficult if water could not be sold to the 
large government consumers. Equally important for Woodstock to 
succeed was Cape Town's acquiescence, as the city's opposition to 
(174) 3/CT 915, Reijort of the Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee, I 07, p.3. 
(175) ibid. 
(176) ibid. 
(177) A.1-1907, Cape of Good Hope ~ColonQ) Re~ort of the select 
committee on the Southern Su urbsalerupply 8111, p.131. 
' 
' (178) A.1-1907, p.138. 
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the Southern Suburbs Water Supply Bill would again have 
jeapordised its safe passage through parliament. 
Despite Woodstock's apparent manipulation of the anti-water 
party, opposition to the Southern Suburbs Water Supply Bill arose 
from a broad spectrum of city councillors who concentrated their 
efforts on derailing the Wemmershoek scheme. ci 7 •> 
In September 1907 Woodstock's Southern Suburbs Water Supply Bill 
finally came before parliament. Cape Town's parliamentary 
representatives, J.W. Jagger and Sir William Thorne attacked the 
government's handling of the Wemmershoek scheme, accusing the 
government of "subterfuge" and of attempting to "take away the 
bread of Cape Town" by allowing the TBHB to enter into an 
agreement with Woodstock.cieo> It was argued that Cape Town had 
been obliged to supply the TBHB by government proclamation<ieii, 
and that the additional storage reservoirs on Table Mountain need 
never have been built if it were not for the demand for water 
made by shipping.cie2> Supporters of the Southern Suburbs Water 
Supply Bill in turn accused Cape Town of "blackmail" and of 
seriously threatening the interests of shipping by way of its 
excessive water tariffs.cie~> Cape Town was also accused of 
preventing the municipality of Green Point and Sea Point from 
obtaining cheaper water from the proposed Wemmershoek scheme by 
its refusal to allow water pipes to be laid within its municipal 
boundaries.ci 94 > Cape Town's aggressive stance gained it little 
sympathy within parliament, as the water-hungry suburbs were 
depicted as the victims of the city's avarice. With the passing 
(179) A.1-1907, pp.138-141. 
(180) House of Assembly Debates, September 1907, p.586. 
(181) ibid. 
(182) ibid. 
(183) House of Assembly Debates, September 1907,p.595. 
(184) ibid. 
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of the Southern Suburbs Water Supply Bill by fifty votes against 
eight, it appeared as if Cape Town's monopoly over the 
Peninsula's water supply had finally ended. cie~J 
While the Southern Suburbs Water Supply Act represented a defeat 
for the city, it was no more than a pyrrhic victory for 
Woodstock. Ironically, after five years of bitter struggle to 
gain acceptance of its interests at Wemmershoek, its powers were 
never put into effect. The ecomomic reality of the suburbs 
financial position, combined with the prevailing economic 
depression, resulted in their failure to gain a loan on the 
London Market.cieoJ The final blow delivered to the scheme came 
in 1908 when Woodstock became ensnared in an embarrassing 
f inane ia l scandal, dubtJed the "Wa 1 ter Steyn Affair", < ie37 > 
resulted in the indefinite delay of Wemmershoek scheme. 
which 
Walter Steyn was an alias for Septimus Smith, the brother of the 
town clerk of Woodstock who, in 1909, fraudulently sold a farm to 
the municipality in the Wemmershoek valley for a sum of £ 23 000. 
It was discovered that 'Steyn' had acquired the farm just a few 
hours previously for only £ 6000. ( l.119119·) "Steyn" was paid partly 
in the form of municipal debentures, which he promptly resold, 
laying the foundations of a complex legal wrangle.< 1 e•i The 
resulting litigation and publicity which was to last for almost 
three years proved to· be both a disaster and an embarrassment for 
(185) House of Assembly Debates, September 1907, p.586. 
(186) SMW, Volume 33, Papers received: Wemmershoek 1909-1913. 
Notes of the Proceedings of the committee of Management 
with the Administrator of the Cape, 12 February 1912, p.2. 
(187) South African Review. This paper gave the episode extensive 
and dramatised coverage of the scandal over a period of 
three years. 
(188) J.T.Wylde papers; Government Inquiry 
Land by Woodstock municipality for a 
and Minutes of Evidence, July/August 
Cape Town Archives (not cataloged) 
into the Purchase of 
Water Scheme, Report 
1908. University of 
(189) SMW, Volume 33, Letters Wemmershoek, Summary of Inscribed 
S toe k , 1909. 
Page 160 
Woodstock. ci~o1 By mid-1912, just before Woodstock's options 
over water rights in the Wemmershoek catchment area were due to 
expire, the municipality had virtually nothing to show for 
the £ 77 000 it had invested in the scheme over a period of ten 
years.ci~i> 
In Cape Town, Liberman and the anti-water party also suffered a 
reversal in their position. The ongoing scandal surrounding the 
Nuttall Contract was to reach its height in March 1907, when the 
Cape Times rejected the findings of an internal commission of 
inquiry which blamed city officials for irregularities rather 
than the councillors involved.ci~~> The relationship between the 
paper and the city council deteriorated to the point that the 
latter switched its advertising to competitors. ci~~) 
The scandal largely explains why William Duncan-Baxter succeeded 
Liberman as mayor after the elections of 1907. Water supply was 
to become less important in the city council over the next few 
years, as businessmen realised that the issue, would reduce their 
influence in the municipal government. Parker resigned from the 
council in 1908, and was later to form the Peninsula Unification 
Society as means of realising his objectives. 
After 1907 to 1912, no further serious attempts were made to 
develop water schemes in the hinterland. Ultimately the 
deterioration in the peninsula's water supply was to contribute 
to a shift in attitude towards unification, a development that 
will be examined in the following chapter. 
(190) Much to the embarressment of Woodstock Steyn escaped 
prosecution by fleeing to Australia. 
(191) SMW, Volume 33, Letters Wemmershoek: Volume 33, 
Papers received: Wemmershoek 1909-1913. Notes of the 
Proceedings of the Committee of Management with the 
Administrator of the Cape, 12 February 1912, p.4 
(192) G. Shaw, Some Beginnings, 
(193) ibid. 
pp.136-137. 
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE TO AUGMENT WATER SUPPLY. 
The period between the Peninsula Commission in 1902 and the end 
of the decade represents a transitional period for the city and 
suburban municipalities. The move towards unification in 1902 was 
perhaps premature, as municipal objectives were based almost 
entirely on the need to augment water supply, rather than on an 
acceptance of the peninsula's political and economic unity. When 
Cape Town's water supply improved from about 1904, its need for 
cooperation with the suburbs diminished correspondingly. 
Water was rejected not only because of increased supply, but 
because it was perceived to be in the interest of business. The 
fact that an increased water supply would have benefited the 
working classes seems to have escaped the attention of their 
representatives. Working class rejection of water was not 
irrational, but was as a consequence of their political isolation 
for supporting the dirty party in the nineteenth century. 
The link between municipal politics and water supply is again 
clearly illustrated in this period. These years represent the 
culmination of a process of reaction against the merchant 
interest in the council that had its origins in the late 1890's. 
To an extent, it afforded an alliance of interests between the 
ratepayers' association, certain businessmen and the working 
classes. The reaction against municipal extravagance and 
corruption was symbolised in the city council's perceived 
obsession with water. A hinterland water scheme costing some 
£2 000 000 was a natural target of those who called for economy. 
The perception of self-interest was cemented by the questions 
surrounding the relationship between the Adderley street and the 
suburban interests. The issue of water supply thus became linked 
with the question of municipal unification. As unification was 
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perceived to be in the interests of the suburbs and not the city, 
the issue of a joint water scheme was similarly overshadowed by 
doubts of whether it was in the city's interest. 
The failure to augment the Cape Peninsula's water supply during 
this period may then be attributed to various economic, social 
and political conflicts operating within Cape Town and between 
the city and the suburbs. The most important consequence of this 
was that it delayed municipal unification for a decade. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
" Gold vs. The People 11 < 1 > 
MUNICIPAL UNIFICATION AND THE 1917 WATER REFERENDUM. 
In the period between 1910 and 1921 Cape Town's long-standing 
problem of water supply was resolved for the time being. The 
era in which it had played a central role in municipal politics 
in the city and in the emergent peninsula municipalities came' to 
an end. 
The issue of water supply had assumed a central role in Cape 
Town's development, mainly because it coincided with a phase of 
dramatic growth and major economic transformation in the city's 
history. The " massive costs of extending supplies" in P.J. 
Waller's words, brought political turmoi1.c 2 > Reduced 
costs after the 1920's diminished its impact on the city's 
political and economic affairs. 
In this chapter, two interrelated events are focused upon. The 
first concerns the process of municipal unification around 1913, 
the second was an extraordinary municipal referendum which took 
place in 1917. 
( 1 ) Cape Times, 18 July 1917. The words of J.W. Mushet a city 
councillor. A remark made during a referendum in 1917, when 
ratepayers had to chose between two water schemes. The 
Steenbras scheme was perceived to be interest of the 
business classes, giving rise to the accusation of Gold 
versus the People. 
(2) P.J. Waller, Town, City, and Nation: England 1850-1914, 
1983, p.302. 
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The relationship between economic burden and political turmoil 
was even more dramatic in this period, for it was the suburban 
water crisis of 1910 that was largely responsible for 
precipitating the final acceptance of municipal unification in 
1913. This crisis influenced the terms of unification, 
perpetuating inherent conflict between city and suburbs and 
delaying the final resolution of the water crisis by several 
years. 
As in the case of earlier conflicts, water supply was intricately 
bound up with class relationships within the context of Cape 
Town's municipal politics, at a time during which the city 
continued to experience fundamental social and economic change. 
The unification of city and suburb did not take place within a 
vacuum, nor was it simply planned by city hall or by the town's 
economic elite. Unification and the problems that arose out of 
it, was the outcome of interaction between a wide range of 
conflicting interests, including the working classes. 
The climax of this chapter lies in the 1917 water referendum, in 
which the direction of the city's water supply was decided. The 
division and conflict that emerged during the referendum can only 
be understood in terms of the earlier conflicts over water. Its 
immediate causes had their origins in the process of municipal 
unification which had taken place between 1910 and 1913. 
MUNICIPAL UNIFICATION AND WATER SUPPLY. 
The concept of a unified peninsula had been debated even before 
the turn of the nineteenth century. Such attempts had a long 
history of failure. The first united municipality in the 
Page 165 
Southern Peninsula had collapsed in 1886, with the breakup of the 
fledgling Liesbeek Municipality. A major problem had been the 
cost of developing an infrastructure to service its vast 
undeveloped area.' 3 > By the turn of the century, the suburban 
municipalities had grown to such an extent that their municipal 
services, although underdeveloped, were often duplicated and 
were therefore inefficient and costly. The initiatives of the 
colonial government in 1902 had failed, partly because of Cape 
Town's reluctance to be burdened with the expense of developing 
the suburban infrastructure. Attempts at developing a joint 
peninsula water supply scheme had only reinforced the divisions 
between city and suburb. Later attempts at initiating joint 
municipal projects like a combined peninsula abattoir had also 
ended in failure.' 4 > 
By 1910 suburban resistance to amalgamation with Cape Town had 
diminished considerably, as a result of their increasing 
dependence on the city for water. As early as 1909 the Suburban 
Municipal Water Board had urgently proposed that it be 
amalgamated with Cape Town's waterworks.<e> This proposal was 
rejected by the city, which offered to increase its sale of water 
to the SMWB to an amount of up to 250 000 gallons daily.ce> 
Cape Town's refusal was hardly surprising as there were 
substantial profits to be made out of selling surplus water to 
the suburbs, whereas a merger would only result in the city 
inheriting the suburban water crisis. Cape Town's water 
(3) See Chapter One. It was argued that the main reason for the 
break-up of the Liesbeeck municipality arose from 
differences over the augmentation of water supply. 
(4) 3/CT 1/4/7/2/1/1-2, Joint Slaughterhouses Committee, 1909-
1910. 
(5) Minute of the Mayor, 1910, p.67. 
(6) ibid. 
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consumption had decreased marginally between 1907 and 1910 (see 
table 8 below) so there was little incentive for the city to 
address long-term water supply problems with any sense of 
urgency. 
TABLE 8 
DAILY AVERAGE WATER CONSUMPTION* OF CAPE TOWN AND THE SMWB FROM 
1907 TD 1910 SHOWING COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGE INCREASE/DECREASE 
Dail~ consumption I. Daily consumption I. 
MWB increase Cape Town increase/ 
decrease 
1907 1 290 OOOmg 2 650 OOOmg 
1908 1 320 OOOmg +2,3 2 450 OOOmg -7,5 
1909 1 414 OOOmg +7,1 2 200 OOOmg -10,2 
1910 1 494 OOOmg +5,6 2 400 OOOmg +9,0 
* consumption in million gallons ( 7' ) 
Since 1900 the suburbs had only managed to meet the demand of 
increased consumption by purchasing supplies from Cape Town, and 
by taking water illegally from the Liesbeek River which belonged 
to farmers with riparian rights.<e> By 1910 the SMWB ceased 
supplying water to peninsula railway authorities in its area.<~> 
Despite these measures water consumption averaged only 24 gallons 
a head per day in the suburbs,< 10 > far short of the recommended 
minimum of 30 gallons per day and even further behind Cape Town's 
average daily supply of 36 gallons per head or Durban's daily 
( 7) 
( 8) 
( 9) 
Report of the Municipal Union Conference: Aepointed to 
Report ueon and Prepare a Bill for the Unification of the 
Cape Peninsula Municipalities, March 1912, p. 20. 
J. Parker, Municipal Union in the Cape Peninsula 1911, 
p.19. The SMWB was illegally drawing 500 000 gallons daily 
from the Liesbeeck in violation of a Supreme Court decision 
that the water belonged to the farmers. One of the 
consequences of this was that the lower reaches of the 
river were left stagnant and polluted, posing a major 
health hazard. 
Report of the Municipal Union Conference, pp.20-21. 
(10) ibid. 
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average of 50 gallons of water per head.' 11 ' By the summer of 
1910, the SMWB could no longer meet the demand. 
The perpetual water shortage represented a major crisis for the 
suburbs as it affected other important areas of municipal 
development. It was largely responsible for the long delayed 
development of a suburban sewage and drainage scheme, presenting 
a major health threat for the entire Peninsula.< 1 ~> Perhaps 
more than any other factor, it was the impending water crisis 
that finally pushed the suburbs into seeking unification with 
Cape Town. Others included the prolonged economic depression 
after the Anglo-Boer war which forced the municipalities to 
investigate ways of economising through cooperating over matters 
of common concern such as a joint abattoir, fire brigade and 
electricity service.< 1 ~> This had become possible because of the 
physical blurring of the boundaries between municipalies. As the 
middle classes moved into the suburbs, but continued to commute 
to the city, so the city and suburb increasingly functioned as 
one economic, social and political unit.< 14 > In a more general 
sense, the movement to Union in South Africa provided an example 
for the centralisation of power.< 1 e> 
Unification gradually became generally accepted as the most 
obvious solution to the peninsula's problems, although resistance 
continued. As a result of municipal intransigence over this 
issue, a 'Peninsula Municipal Union Society' [PMUC] was formed in 
( 1 1 ) 
(12) 
(13) 
( 14) 
(15) 
J. Parker, Municipal Union, p.18. 
L.A.W. Beck, in J. Parker, Municipal Union, p.10 & p.14. 
3/CT 1/4/7/2/1/1-2, Joint Slaughterhouses Committee, 1909-
1910. 
The development of the suburban railwayline, perhaps than 
any other factor, was responsible for the geographic 
integration of city and suburbs. 
K.Wall, "The Unification of Cape Town: 1910-1913", 
unpublished paper prepared for Contree, 1988, p.4. 
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1910, with John Parker as chairman.ciQ) The efforts of the PMUC 
were to culminate in the establishment of a Municipal Union 
conference in the following year. Parker had been at the 
forefront in popularising of. unification ever since the 
establishment of the Peninsula Commission in 1902.ci 7 > Although 
his advocation of a single municipality had been closely linked 
with his campaign for the Berg River Scheme, since the collapse 
of this project he had urged unification on other grounds. Parker 
argued that a single large municipality would be more efficient 
as it would attract "more capable men",cie> an important matter 
when there were frequent accusations of municipal corruption and 
incompetence.ci•> He argued rather optimistically that a large 
body with more interests, powers and responsibilities would be 
more strenuous and straight in the performance of their duty ihan 
the small municipalities that were the most corrupt.c 20 > Parker's 
reasoning attracted wide support. The eight Peninsula 
municipalities had a total of 87 councillors, while the joint 
salaries of all the town engineers amounted to £1800 a year 
whereas, Parker argued, "half of this would attract an engineer 
of high standing and experience".c 2 i> While public opinion 
mounted in favour of unification a minority of councillors, 
particularly within the City Hall, were equally determined to 
oppose it. 
The critics of unification within Cape Town were led by 
councillors Hyman Liberman and David Bean and included amongst 
their ranks councillors Dr. Abdurahman and Henry Barn. Although 
(16) K. Wall, "The Unification of Cape Town", p.5. 
(17) For example through the Cape Town Publicity Association, 
and by publishing books and pamphlets on the subject. 
(18) J. Parker, Municipal Union, p.5. 
(19) For example the 'Nuttall contract' and 'Walter Steyn 
affair' 
(20) J. Parker, Municipal Union, p.4. 
(21) ibid., p.5. 
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they were opposed to unification to different degrees and for 
various reasons, their common concern was that Cape Town should 
not inherit the problems and cost of unification. This is 
abundantly clear from the preconditions demanded by these 
councillors before the city council should commit itself to 
participating in Parker's proposed Unification Conference to be 
held in mid-1911. They included that water accounts be kept 
separate from ordinary rates; that water tariffs within Cape Town 
not be raised; that the city ratepayers not be called upon to pay 
for any loss caused by an excess of water expenditure over 
revenue and that unification be on the lines of differential 
rating so that all services provided after unification for a 
particular area be paid for by such an area.' 22 ' These 
conditions made the position of the anti-unificationists 
abundantly clear. They had no desire to subsidise improvements in 
the suburbs, or to share the profits from the city's lucrative 
waterworks department. The basic principal that they embodied, 
that Cape Town should not have to pay for unification, was 
eventually to become incorporated into the unification ordinance 
of 1913 and it affected the course of development of the 
Peninsula's water supply in the post-unification period. It is 
also true that water supply affected the process and terms of 
unification, which in turn became the root cause of internal 
conflicts that were to plague the unified municipality over the 
choice of a hinterland water scheme. 
The conflict between unificationists and anti-unificationists 
is in many ways a manifestation of the earlier struggle between 
the water and anti-water parties. Firstly the argument for and 
against unification revolved around the question of its cost and 
benefit to Cape Town. Secondly, and more significantly, John 
Parker's drive for municipal unification was seen by Liberman and 
others as no more than a thinly disguised attempt to reintroduce 
(22) Minute of the Mayor, 1911, pp.34-35. 
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the Berg River scheme. Much of the criticism levelled against 
the supporters of unification alluded to, and was coloured by the 
earlier conflicts over water supply. 
At the Municipal Union Conference in March 1911, the issue of 
water supply was thrust onto centre stage. Soon after the 
Conference had begun its investigation into the necessity and 
terms of unification, the Cape Times urged that the first duty of 
a unified council would be to augment water supply.< 23 > Soon 
afterwards the Cape Times reacted angrily to an attempt made by 
anti-unificationists to "associate members of the Municipal union 
Conference with a specific water scheme 11 <24 > alluding to Parker's 
long-standing interest in the Berg River Scheme. This accusation 
emanated from Liberman, who used every argument to support his 
vehement opposition to unification. While Liberman's opposition 
appears to be personal, and even irrational,' 2 ~> others generally 
opposed unification on the grounds that they feared that Cape 
Town would have to bear the cost of a hinterland scheme, but even 
amongst these critics there were considerable differences in the 
degree of opposition to the principle of municipal union itself. 
On the one hand, Hyman Liberman totally opposed union on the 
grou~ds that the area and population of single peninsula 
authority was to large to be efficient,' 26 > and refused to accept 
the financial estimates of the Conference.< 27 > This position was 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
Cape Times, 11 April 1911. 
Cape Times, 26 April 1912. 
For example Liberman stubbornly refused to accept the 
accuracy of the statistics gathered by the unification 
conference. 
Cape Times, 26 April 1912. Liberman wanted the peninsula to 
be made up of boroughs, each with their own mayors and 
officials. 
Cape Times, 19 April 1912. 
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also supported by councillor Dr. Abdurahman who made the 
accusation that: 
"Those who sat on the Conference had done so with the 
intention of securing Unification, and ... sought for 
every argument to prove their case 11 .< 2 e> 
Abdurahman's opposition to unification was more firmly based on 
the assumption that any "big water scheme" initiated by a united 
municipality would not be beneficial to the city's working 
classes.' 2~> Later, the threatened inclusion of a colour bar 
clause in the draft unification ordinance intensified his 
opposition. <30 > 
Other anti-unificationists included David Bean, who was generally 
regarded as the leader of those opposed to unification in the 
city council. He was not entirely against the concept of a 
single municipality but sought unification at a reasonable 
price' 31 ' This meant that the city should not have to bear the 
cost of providing the suburbs with water, drainage and sanitation 
systems which it already possessed. 
Despite the different reasons for opposing unification, the 
campaign of the anti-unificationists focused on the issue of the 
cost of water supply. In an editorial the Cape Times noted that: 
(28) 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
Cape 
"One of the favourite devices of those ••• trying to 
defeat the scheme for Unification of the Peninsula 
municipalities is to attack the figures given in the 
Report of the municipal Union conference in regard to 
the anticipated cost of an augmented water supply for 
the Peninsula".<32> 
Times, 19 April 1912. 
ibid. 
Cape Times, 17 December 1912. 
Cape Times, 18 April 1912. 
Cape Times, 27 April 1912. 
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Indeed the campaign waged against Parker's unification conference 
resembled that of the earlier municipal water elections where 
attempts were made to link business interests to the development 
of a hinterland scheme. 
In spite of the anti-unificationists attempts to derail the 
Municipal Union Conference with what the Cape Times called the 
"big water bogy",<~3 > the work of the conference proceeded 
remarkably smoothly. The participating municipalities, which 
included Kalk Bay; Woodstock; Mowbray; Rondebosch; Claremont; 
Maitland; Sea Point and Cape Town reached consensus on most 
issues except that of the financial cost of unification. Only 
Wynberg municipality chose not to participate, for it had little 
to benefit from unification due to the advanced state of its 
municipal infrastructure as well as its independent water supply. 
This enabled it to remain in "splendid isolation" until the mid 
1920's.< 34 > 
The first draft report of the Conference issued in March 1912 
attempted to address the cost of unification by recommending a 
system of differential rating for specific improvements such as 
sanitation systems, drainage, street construction, and most 
important of all, for a water supply scheme. For such projects 
the united municipality was to be divided into three rating 
districts: (i)Sea Point; (ii)Cape Town and Kalk Bay and 
(iii)Woodstock, Mowbray, Maitland, Rondebosch and Claremont. 
Each was ranked according to the degree which each municipality 
was developed.c~e> Under this system each district would be 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
Cape Times, 3 December 1912. 
In 1927 Wynberg was similarly forced to join Cape Town as 
its reservoirs could no longer provide sufficient water. 
Report of the Municipal Union Conference: A~pointed to 
Report ueon and Prepare a Bill for the Unification of the 
Cape Peninsula Municipalities, March 1912 
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additionally and separately rated in relation to any improvements 
they received. This compromise had been designed to allay Cape 
Town's objection that it would have to bear the cost of any 
improvements in the suburbs. These concessions were not enough 
to satisfy all the anti-unificationists who continued to argue 
that Cape Town was paying too high a price for unification. 
Unification was depicted as no more than a euphemism for "a big 
water scheme".<~0 ' Given Cape Town's long history of failed 
hinterland schemes, there was a real danger that the opposition 
of a small group of anti-unification councillors might succeed in 
destroying the unification conference by mobilising ratepayers 
around familiar issues, or by demanding intolerable concessions 
from the suburbs. 
Following the release of unification conference's first report, 
an attempt was made by the city council to allay the suspicions 
of the anti-unificationists by proposing amendments to the 
clauses of the draft unification ordinance dealing with water 
supply and finance.<~7 ' Of importance was a recommendation to 
amend clause 137 to further limit Cape Town's financial liability 
and to establish restrictive conditions for the development of a 
hinterland scheme.< 39 ' An attempt to defuse a potential crisis 
was made with the nomination of two of the more moderate anti-
unificationist councillors, David Bean and Henry Bam, amongst 
Cape Town's six delegates to the unification congress, which was 
due to be reconvened in August 1912.< 3 •' The influential 
Citizens' Guild was not so compromising, and promised support to 
candidates pledged to Unification in the municipal election in 
September, representing an oblique threat to Liberman and Barn 
whose terms were due to expire.< 40 ' 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
(39) 
(40) 
Cape Times, 4 May 1912. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1912, 
Cape Times, 17 July 1912. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1912, 
Cape Times, 30 July 1912. 
pp.22-25. 
' 
pp.22-25. 
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Cape Town's compromise amendment of the 'water clauses' were 
rejected by the suburban municipalities, which had the effect of 
precipitating a renewed crisis in city hall. 
In mid November 1912 the Municipal Union Conference issued a 
amended report and draft unification ordinance.< 41 > These 
recommendations were accompanied by a minority report issued by 
David Bean and Henry Barn as well as Charles Gibbs, a councillor 
from the municipality of Sea Point.< 42 > This objected to the 
majority report's rejection of Cape Town's compromise amendments 
regarding differential rating and water rates. This situation 
had arisen because Cape Town's other four delegates to the 
conference gave in to suburban pressure, claiming that the 
amendments would have "wrecked the conference",c 4~> and for this 
reason had signed the majority report. At a meeting of the city 
council on the 25th of November the dissidents were defeated, and 
the Report of the Unification Conference was passed by 14 votes 
to 5. c 44 > The anti-unificationists did not see this as the end 
of their struggle, but shifted their attention to mobilising 
ratepayers against accepting the terms of unification at a poll 
set for the 19th of December 1912. 
The anti-unification councillor's attempt to rally ratepayers 
against unification was directed at the suburb's rejection of the 
compromise amendments, which they held to be proof that 
unification was no more than a conspiracy for a big water scheme. 
Ratepayers were asked to approve unification only if the water 
amendments were included in the unification ordinance. It was 
suggested that without these guarantees a vote for unification 
would be a "vote for the Berg River scheme".c 4 e.> Ratepayers were 
( 41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(44) (45) 
Minute of the Mayor, 1913, pp.17-18. 
Minute of the Matar, 1913, p.19. Sea Point received its 
water from Cape own thus had little to gain from 
unification. 
Cape Times, 21 November 1912. 
Cape Times 28 November 1912. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1913, pp.20-21. 
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not asked if they accepted or rejected unification, but if they 
approved of the final draft unification ordinance, or the re-
incorporation of the compromise water amendments that the city 
had proposed in July 1912.< 40 > 
Despite the backing of the South African News, the anti-
unificationist's campaign was undercut by the fact that there was 
widespread support for unification. Furthermore the city was 
experiencing a severe drought, and was beginning to encounter 
water shortages for the first time in nearly a decade. 
Despite a vigorous campaign for the inclusion of the water 
amendments, the unification ordinance was overwhelmingly 
accepted by 2681 to 1208 votes.< 47 > Significantly, the wealthier 
ratepayers who possessed up to three votes, tended to support the 
unamended ordinance, while working class ratepayers with only a 
single vote, tended to support the inclusion of the water 
clauses.< 4 e> This tendency is illustrated in the table below: 
TABLE 9 
VOTES IN FAVOUR OF UNAMENDED UNIFICATION ORDINANCE 
Ratepayers with: 
1 vote 
'2 votes 
3 votes 
total 
274 
302 
601 
1175 
Total votes 
274 
604 
1803 
2681 
as a I. of actual 
ratepar.ers 
23,21. 
25,71.. 
51,11.. 
100,0/. 
VOTES IN FAVOUR OF AMENDED UNIFICATION ORDINANCE 
Ratepayers with: 
1 vote 
2 votes 
3 votes 
total 
191 
138 
247 
576 
Total votes 
191 
276 
741 
1208 
(46) Minute of the Mayor, 1913, pp.20-21. 
(47) ibid. 
(48) Cape Times, 20 December, 1912. 
(49) ibid. 
as a I. of actual 
ratepar,ers 
33,21. 
23,9/. 
42,9/. 
100,0/. 
( 4'9') 
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This poll, like earlier municipal elections, reflects a general 
class division over the issue of water supply. It would seem 
that working class ratepayers, and to a lesser extent the middle 
c~asses, considered the issue of water as the prerogative of the 
wealthy suburban classes and business elite. Before the poll the 
Cape Times complained that there was a "conspiracy in certain 
quarters to prejudice the coloured voters of Cape Town against 
unification''. <~0 > The issue of water supply, which had been 
inextricably linked to municipal reform and improvement in the 
nineteenth century, and now to unification, was once again 
perceived to be in the interests of the city's elite in the eyes 
of these classes. 
In comparison to the conflict within Cape Town, the suburban 
ratepayers eagerly supported the unification ordinance in the 
hope that it would bring a swift end to their pursuit for an 
adequate water supply. Only the ratepayers of Wynberg 
municipality, with its independent source of water supply, 
rejected unification by 787 votes to 391.<~ 1 > 
Despite the suburb's earlier rejection of the compromise 'water 
clauses', the legislative basis of municipal unification cannot 
be seen as economically detrimental to Cape Town. Although the 
city was eager for unification, the fact that it was negotiating 
from a position of strength is reflected in the final unification 
ordinance. The Ordinance in fact contained several clauses that 
protected Cape Town's ratepayers from bearing the cost of 
excessive expenditure in the suburbs. The most significant of 
these was clause 22, which concerned differential rating. This 
stipulated that the former municipalities of Cape Town and Sea 
Point would only be responsible for a third of the cost of any 
(50) 
( 51) 
Cape Times, 17 December 1912. 
Cape Times, 20 December 1912. 
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1 
new water scheme.c 02 > A further safeguard against extravagant 
water schemes was clause 39 of the ordinance, which stipulated 
that sources of supply within the peninsula must be exploited 
first, and that if any such scheme's cost was to exceed £300 000, 
it could be vetoed by the ratepayers of Cape Town and Sea 
Point.co~> 
The principle that Cape Town should not have to pay for 
unification was thus embedded in the final unification ordinance. 
While this represented a victory for the city's ratepayers, this 
was only in the short term, for the cost of what was essentially 
an unequal agreement, was a protracted struggle over the choice 
of a scheme after unification. 
It was perhaps ironic, that no sooner had the unification 
ordinance ordinance been ratified by the peninsula 
municipalities in early 1913, that Cape Town experienced one of 
its most critical water shortages, which had the effect of 
pushing the issue of water supply to the fore. By April 1913 
water reserves had been depleted so seriously by the absence of 
rain that the municipality deemed it necessary to cut off the 
city's water supply daily between 4pm and 5am.ce4 > In the 
suburbs the situation was even more serious, as Cape Town was 
unable to make up the shortfall in their supply, forcing the 
Suburban Municipal Water Board to turn to Wynberg municipality 
for relief.cee> Fortunately, by May 1913, enough rain had fallen 
to enable water restrictions to be lifted. It had become 
(52) 
(53) 
(54) 
(55) 
The Ordinance to provide for the combination and better 
government of certain Municipalities in the Cape Peninsula, 
Ordinance 19/1913, clause 22. 
ibid., clause 39. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1913, pp.66-68. 
ibid. 
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apparent that the new unified council would have to confront the 
issue of water supply as one of its first priorities. 
Appropriately, John Parker was elected as the first mayor of the 
new unified municipality. It seemed as if Cape Town was poised on 
the brink of an era of rapid development. In his inaugural 
speech, Parker described the accomplishment of unification as: 
"The dawn of a new era in the Municipal life of this 
Peninsula. It is the day of high hopes and buoyant 
expectancy, and we see no shadow in the future. This 
Peninsula, so long divided municipally, is now united, 
and the bonds of union never will be broken. 11 <=--e> 
Parker's optimism was misplaced, for unification was to bring 
about many problems, especially those relating to water supply, 
the final solution to which was to allude the city until the 
1920's. 
THE 1917 WATER REFERENDUM 
Despite the recurrence of severe water shortages after 
unification, little progress was made in developing supplies 
during the next few years, largely due to the outbreak of the 
world war in 1914 but also due to the fact the municipality's 
energy was directed at restructuring the various departments of 
the old authorities.<e 7 > A month after unification, the issue of 
water supply was referred to the city Waterworks Committee. As an 
interim measure it recommended that the Table Mountain catchment 
area be expanded and that the Peninsula's resources be 
rationalised.cee> 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
Minute of the Mayor, 1913. 
3/CT 1/5/8/1/1, Report of a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, to be considered at the 
meeting of the council to be held on 26th April 1917. 
ibid. 
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Unification resulted in the amalgamation of the autonomous 
Suburban Municipal Water Board with Cape Town's water works in 
1914, as well as the acquisition of the Muizenberg reservoirs 
belonging to Kalk Bay Municipality, but this was inadequate for 
the requirements of the Peninsula. By February 1915 a report by 
the Waterworks Committee made it clear that the city could no 
longer rely on the Table Mountain dams,<~~> and that immediate 
action was needed if the city's wartime industry was to be 
sustained and if the health of the population was to be 
improved. < =0 > It also warned that the construction of the 
suburban drainage system, which was due to commence in 1915, 
would unable to function unless additional water could be 
provided. < = 1 > The report urged that the time had arrived for the 
development of a major scheme outside of the Peninsula, and 
recommended that particular attention be given to the Wemmershoek 
and Steenbras catchment areas.'= 2 > 
This report was an important turning point and resulted in the 
city council creating a new special committee to investigate the 
development of a scheme capable of supplying between three to 
five million gallons daily to the Peninsula. The Special 
Committee was to have the power to appoint a board of experts, or 
engineers, to report on all possible schemes, both within and 
outside of the Cape Peninsula.<=~> 
(59) 
(60) 
( 61) 
(62) 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1; Minutes of the Water Works Committee, 2 
February 1915, pp.49-51. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/1; Minutes 1914-1915, First Report from the 
Waterworks Committee in re Augmentation of Water Supply, 
p.67. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1915, pp.38-42. 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/8/11 Minutes 1914-1915 1 First Report from the Waterworks Commi~tee in re Augmenta~ion of Water Supply, 
p.67. 
(63) 3/CT 1/5/8/1/1 1 Augmentation of Water Supplies: Minutes 1915-1917, Mee~ing of the Special Committee in re 
augmentation of water supply, 5 May 1915, pp.1-2. 
MAP 7 
WATER SOH~ES PROPOSED WITHIN THE CAPE PENINSULA 
EXISTING SCHBOS (RED) 
r Table Valley .Reservoirs 
2 WoannA~n n.:.m 
\ 
' 
' 
' ... 
PROPOSED SCHEJijES (YELLOW) 
I Disa River Reservoir 
Page 180 
The work of the special water committee differed from earlier 
investigations in that its work was more thorough and 
professional, due to the extensive use it made of the engineering 
and other professions. This was an indication that the city 
council attempted to avoid controversy, as well as accusations of 
vested interests, such as those which had arisen as a consequence 
of the amateurish explorations of hinterland schemes during the 
time of the Peninsula Commission. 
In October 1915 a board of experts consisting of four 
engineers< 04 > issued a preliminary report outlining immediate 
measures that could be taken for short and long term solution to 
the water crisis. Firstly it was suggested that further small 
dams could be built within the Peninsula at Waai Kap on Table 
Mountain as well as in the Silvermine valley near Muizenberg, 
(see map 7 opposite page) as a short term, although expensive 
solution. <0 =-> Furthermore, the development of additional 
reservoirs within the Peninsula would represent a drain on the 
city's capital, which would result in the postponement of the 
development of a hinterland scheme.< 00 > As an alternative, it 
was suggested that Cape Town enter into an agreement with Wynberg 
municipality to upgrade its reservoirs to the benefit of both 
municipalities.< 07 > Secondly, the engineer's report urged that 
extensive investigations be immediately undertaken at 
Wemmershoek; Steenbras; and the Berg River Hoek valleys as 
possible sites for a major dam as a long-term source of water 
supply.cos> 
(64) 
(65) 
(66) 
(67) 
(68) 
These included the city engineer Mr. D.E. Lloyd-Davis; 
Thomas Stewart; Mr. W. Tait (British consultant); and an 
electrical engineer Mr. Heather. 
3/CT 1/5/8/1/1; Report from a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, paragraph 11, 25, October 
1915. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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Given the high cost of building a reservoir at either Waai Kap or 
at Silvermine, the city council decided that the best short-term 
solution would be to approach Wynberg municipality with a plan to 
build a joint reservoir on one of their sites. This was estimated 
to cost about £195 ooo.ce 9 ) Although protracted negotiations 
between Cape Town and Wynberg took place from December 1915 until 
June 1916, that municipality saw no need for an additional water 
supply for the foreseeable future, and was reluctant to enter 
into a partnership with Cape Town despite the offer of favourable 
terms.' 70 ' When it became clear that Wynberg had no intention of 
cooperating, the city once again turned its attention to 
Silvermine, with the reluctant approval of the Board of 
Engineers. c7 i' 
While the development of a water scheme within the peninsula had 
been delayed, the two most promising hinterland sites at 
Wemmershoek and Steenbras were also threatened by numerous 
obstacles. The Wemmershoek site was restricted by the provisions 
of the Southern Suburbs Water Supply Act of 1907 which guaranteed 
comprehensive riparian rights to landowners along the valley.' 7 ~' 
Any dam built in that area would have been limited to providing 
only 1 million gallons of water a day unless the Act was amended 
by parliament. Approaches made towards the provincial 
authorities to support the amendment of the Act were thwarted by 
the government, because it would be ultra vires to the provisions 
of the 1912 Irrigation Act.c 73 ' In addition to this it was 
expected that opposition to a private amendment bill from farmers 
possessing riparian rights, would have brought considerable delay 
to the scheme.c 74 ' 
(69) 
(70) 
( 71) 
(72) 
(73) 
(74) 
Minute of the Mayor, 1916, p.35. 
3/CT 1/5/8/1/1; Report from a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, paragraph 15-16,20, December 
1915. 
ibid. 
3/CT 1/5/8/1/1; Report from a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, paragraph .26. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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The other promising site situated in the Steenbras valley 
similarly developed a number of problems. The municipality of 
Cape Town had inherited options to purchase farms in the valley 
from the former municipalities of Rondebosch and Mowbray, but it 
was discovered that these were practically worthless as a dam 
could not be built before land belonging to two speculators, the 
brothers A. and C. Struben, was acquired.' 7 ~' In March 1913 the 
Strubens approached the municipality of Cape Town with a proposal 
to supply the city with five million gallons a day as well as 
electricity from a hydro-electric scheme at a cost of 
£525 000. <7 => While this private scheme had been rejected out 
of hand, the Strubens were determined to retain their water 
rights, and gambled that the municipality would be forced to pay 
the price they demanded. 
While the two most promising hinterland sites were similarly 
handicapped by legal problems, they differed in their potential 
and cost,< 77 > (see table 10 below) which were significant for the 
council's final choice of a scheme. 
TABLE 10 
COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED WEMMERSHOEK AND STEENBRAS SCHEMES 
Wemmershoek Steen bras 
Total possible daily 
supply (gallons) average 40 000 000 15 000 000 
Mean annual rainfall (inches) 76 48 
Length of pipeline (miles) 44 38 
Catchment area (sq miles) 34 23 
Total cost for a scheme for 2 102 000 850 000 
5 million gallons per day(£) 
(75) 3/CT 1/5/8/1/1; Report from a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, paragraph 26. 
(76) ibid. 
(77) Minute of the Mayor, 1917, pp.25-31. 
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At first it would appear that the Wemmershoek scheme was more 
suitable for the long term development of Cape Town's water 
supply. Although the development of a 5 million gallon a day 
scheme at Wemmershoek was estimated to cost nearly 2~ times as 
much as a similar size scheme at Steenbras, in the long term its 
daily supply could be increased to 40 million gallons compared to 
only 15 million gallons for its rival scheme. The increased 
capacity of Wemmershoek was subject to the repeal of the 1907 
Southern Suburbs Water Supply Act with its guarantees of riparian 
rights. Another factor favouring Wemmershoek lay in the fact 
that its water supply was far purer than that of Steenbras whose 
water was a dark copper brown, discoloured by peaty soil and from 
the rotting palmiet reed. 
Despite these drawbacks, the Steenbras scheme had the advantage 
of being far cheaper than the Wemmershoek scheme,c 7 e) an 
important consideration within the context of a war time economy. 
Wemmershoek's greater distance from Cape Town meant that it 
required an additional 4500 tons of iron for pipes which was 
costly and difficult to transport during the war. In addition to 
this, the site in the Steenbras valley allowed for the 
construction of a far cheaper semi-perminant dam which could be 
upgraded after the war, while the Wemmershoek site demanded a 
costly masonry dam.< 7~) From the perspective of the city council 
and of the board of engineers, the Steenbras scheme was seen as 
the best choice given the city:s financial constraints as well as 
the continuation of the war. 
In April 1917 the Special Water Committee issued its final report 
in favour of the immediate development of the Steenbras scheme. 
It was decided that given the urgent need for water by all parts 
of the city, section 22 of the unification ordinance would be 
(78) 
(79) 
Minute of the Mayor, 1917, pp.25-31. 
ibid. 
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repealed to enable the scheme to be financed by uniform rather 
than by differential rating.ceoi To compensate for this the 
council approached the provincial authorities to empower the 
municipality to levy a special water rate at an amount of ~d. in 
the £. What the City Council did not anticipate, was widespread 
public opposition to the Steenbras scheme. A demand was made for 
a ratepayer's referendum on the issue. The outcome of this 
almost resulted in the scheme being abandoned in favour of the 
Wemmershoek site. 
The extent of the opposition against the Steenbras scheme is 
difficult to understand if the conflict is viewed only as an 
isolated revolt against the dictates of the city hall. It 
represented the culmination of a long history of dissent over the 
city's water supply. 
Opposition to Steenbras was sparked by plans to scrap clause 22 
of the unification ordinance which gave ratepayers of the former 
Cape Town municipal area a degree of protection from financing 
water schemes for the suburb's benefit. A meeting of city 
ratepayers in July 1917ceii rejected the Steenbras scheme and 
called for a poll to decide the issue. The conflict went far 
beyond the scrapping of clause 22 and the introduction of a 
special water rate, or even the council's choice of the Steenbras 
Scheme, but drew upon a multitude of past issues, which were 
deeply embedded in the popular consciousness. Indeed, the many 
contradictions in the arguments for and against Steenbras can 
only be explained and understood in terms of those earlier 
struggles. 
The main opposition to Steenbras was coordinated by the 
(80) 3/CT 1/5/8/1/1; Report from a Special Committee in re: 
Augmentation of Water Supply, paragraphs 30-31. 
(81) Minute of the Mayor, 1917, p.32. 
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Citizen's Water Supply Committee.[CWSCJ Although united against 
Steenbras, this body represented a loose alliance of different 
interests, drawn mainly from the middle and working classes. 
Amongst this group were those who supported the Wemmershoek 
scheme on the basis of the supposedly superior quality of its 
water. Others who fought against Steenbras's 'polluted' water, 
did not specifically campaign for Wemmershoek as an alternative 
scheme. Some in this group believed that sufficient water could 
still be obtained from Table Mountain, while others, drawn mainly 
from the former suburban municipalities, argued that Cape Town 
should continue to strive to reach an agreement with Wynberg 
municipality. Such a scheme, it was suggested, could serve as a 
"stopgap" until after the war, when a hinterland scheme could be 
afforded. The argument for economy drew widespread support, as 
both hinterland schemes had the problem of the high cost of 
importing iron pipeline at the height of the War. 
The leadership of the Citizen's Water Supply Committee reflected 
these different interests at work. Those arguing for the Wynberg 
stopgap scheme were drawn mainly from the Rondebosch and 
Claremont wards, which lay in close proximity to that 
municipality. Included amongst this group were Frank Molteno, a 
former Claremont council member; Thomas Henshilwood, a Claremont 
merchant; dnd Charles Pearce, the MPC for Newlands. 
Another major group within the CWSC consisted of the spokesmen of 
the working class. These included Albert Batty and Edward von 
Witt, both unsuccessful Labour Party candidates in the 1914 
municipal elections.< 92 > Others were councillors representing 
working class wards: Isaac Honikman [East Central]; William 
Barton [Woodstock]; Alexander MacCullum [Castle], as well as Dr. 
Abdurahman, the MPC for Woodstock.< 93 > One of the most vocal of 
Cape Times, 7 September 1914. (82) 
(83) Minute of the Mayor, 1917, List of councillors. 
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this latter group was William Black, who it will be remembered 
had been one of the supporters of the anti-water party in the 
1906 municipal election, and who now championed the fight against 
Steenbras "in the interests of the poorer people in the 
community".<194) 
Supporting the Steenbras Scheme was a rival Citizen's Steenbras 
Water Committee [CSWC], which represented the business interest, 
as well as the majority of city councillors, particularly those 
representing middle class wards. This organisation was strongly 
supported by the Cape Times, the Citizens' Guild and the Cape 
Town Publicity Association. The most vocal Steenbras supporters 
included William Duncan-Baxter, Frederick St Leger, John Parker, 
Sir William Thorne and J.W.Jagger, all of whom had a long 
association with the promotion of a hinterland scheme. The CSWC 
defended Steenbras on the grounds that the Wemmershoek Scheme or 
the Wynberg stopgap scheme were too costly in the short to medium 
term. < 19 ~' On the issue of Steenbras's discoloured water, the 
Committee garnered a wide range of support from leading doctors 
who assured the public that the water was not harmful.< 196 ' 
While the issues of cost and water quality were relatively clear 
cut, the inclusion of the working class on the side of those 
advocating the more costly Wemmershoek scheme is more difficult 
to explain. Although the CWSC was supported by a number of 
working class leaders, the majority of its leadership was drawn 
from the professional and middle classes. A close examination 
of the rhetoric of the working class leadership reveals that the 
basis of the opposition to Steenbras lay in their suspicion of 
the motives of the business classes controlling city hall, rather 
(84) 
(85) 
(86) 
Cape Times, 10 July 1917. 
Citizen's Steenbras Water Committee; More Points for 
Steenbras as against Wemmer's Hoek, (Pamphlet), 1917 [SAL] 
Citizen's Steenbras Water Committee , Doctors Say:-
Steenbras is Right, 1917. 
TH.E. WAT~R PR,OBLEM. 
,.·' 
• _ _.,,"wi'j ~-t ...... ""i• ··-· ..__ ........... L 1"-i-·i,._~ • .... "1 0 :~ .. , •.• , •-•· .-... ' • .. ,._'I •. ; ... , o I ' .- • •l -• • • ' ' • r '' • 
- • _..,._ '- •• .J ••• , • ... -~ ---~ .,..., ~ -_ .... _ .. • • " - ~ • ·~-:-
( 'I r//, aclwnululgmmls /., the l'roprulors ef l'tan' Soap.) 
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than opposition to the scheme itself. Thus in the words of one 
of the leaders of the anti- Steenbras campaign, the issue of 
'Steenbras vs. Wemmershoek' came to represent one of "Gold vs. 
the People".< 197 > Another claim was that they "had wealth against 
them",< 99 > while S Eddy, the MPC for Rondebosch, described the 
campaign as one of the "press against the public". <9 •> The Cape, 
the only newspaper that took a relatively neutral view on the 
conflict, explained the phenomenon of working class opposition as 
distrust of the Citizens' Guild and its mouthpiece, the Cape 
Times, which it accused of "riding roughshod" over pubi"ic 
opinion. <• 0 > The Cape Times was seen to support Steenbras at 
all cost. In a cartoon parody of the famous Pear's 
advertisement, the editor of the Cape Times, Sir Maitland Park, 
was compared to the baby trying to get the Steenbras soap (see 
cartoon 16 facing page) The Cape went on to warn that: 
"If the Steenbras scheme is defeated at the poll. •• much 
of the blame should fall on the shoulders of the petty 
politicians of the city hall who despise public 
opinion almost up to the moment when the vote went 
against Steenbras at the ratepayers meeting. 11 <• 1 > 
In a similar vein the South African Review attacked the motives 
of the Citizen's Guild, which: 
"professes to look after the ratepayers interests ••. [who it thinks of as] a well clad citizen with a gold 
watch and chain, and a motor car, and a rent 
roll •••• (It] is no place for the poor ratepayer who 
has to work for a living in some workshop, factory or 
office. c•:z~ 
Another vocal opponent of the council's scheme, Jasper Smith, 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
(90) 
( 91) 
(92) 
Cape Times, 18 July 1917. 
ibid. 
Cace Times, 21 July 1917. 
The Cape, 13 July 1917. 
ibid. 
South African Review, 22 June, 1917. 
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went further by arguing that the supposedly poor quality of 
Steenbras water would be: 
"bad for health, bad for manufacturers, and, as 
ratepayers, bad for their pockets, because they did 
not know what it was [ultimately] going to cost". C•3> 
Despite of the Citizens' Water Supply Committee's mobilisation of 
householders and the city's working classes, the arguments of its 
leaders were sometimes contradictory. This illustrates that the 
campaign was not simply one of a conflict of class interests, but 
also included, for example, the old issue of conflicting 
interests between city and suburb. On the one hand the champions 
of the working class suggested that those who favoured Steenbras 
and the abolition of differential rating represented the 
suburban interest, a reference to the long-standing popular 
perception, that the city's businessmen living in the suburbs, 
intended to make the city ratepayers bear the cost of municipal 
improvements in the suburbs.<•4 > Others supporting the CWSC, 
particularly those drawn from the Southern Suburbs, saw Steenbras 
as in the city's interest, yet supported the council's attempt to 
abolish differential rating. Charles Pearce, the MPC for 
Newlands, complained that although the suburbs had entered into 
municipal unification because of "the prospects of a better water 
supply", they had in fact got "less water since union".<•~> 
Stephen Eddy, the MPC for Rondebosch accused Cape Town of not 
fulfilling its promises: 
(93) 
(94) 
(95) 
"If the suburbs had remained out of unification they 
would by now have had a water scheme though •••. The 
suburbs had not benefited through unification, and had 
to pay their share of seaside pavilions and the like. 
The basis of the unification compromise has been an 
unjust one, and the suburbs had signed the agreement 
including differential rating, because if it were not 
for that, unification would not have been brought 
about. I~ was now onlr, fair that the unjust clause 
should now be removed'. <••> 
Cape Times, 10 July 1917. 
It was suggested that water was needed for speculative 
building for the housing estates boom in the suburbs 
Cape Tim•s, 1~ July 1917. 
(96) ibid. 
. - _- ... ,. -. ~ . ; 
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The fact that by 1917 the municipal rate for the Southern Suburbs 
had reached 4.5d in the Pound exceeding the rate of 4.2d for the 
city area had not been anticipated by the suburbs in 1912.<•?> 
They had already borne the cost of the 1915 drainage scheme and 
suburban councillors were now unwilling to bear the additional 
cost of hinterland scheme on the basis of differential rating. 
This attitude was at variance with the spokesmen of the working 
class such as Albert Batty, Edward von Wit and William Black who 
perceived the move to abolish differential rating and introduce a 
special water rate as a move to make poorer householders pay for 
water needed by the city's elite. 
The Steenbras Scheme was also attacked on a whole range of issues 
outside the sphere of class interest and city and suburban 
conflict. Thus Steenbras was emotively critisised by Jasper 
Smith on the grounds that it was 'unpatriotic' to consider such a 
scheme during the height of the war, and as such: 
"A more awful crime has never been counted in the 
history of a municipality. Shall it go down to 
gosterity that Cape Town is the only part of the 
Empire which failed in its duty, and that at the 
crisis of war Cape Town, instead of helping, actually 
hindered and blocked the supply of munitions by asking 
England to spare men and materials in order that we 
might get our water pipes".c••> 
A major issue on which Steenbras was attacked was that of the 
perceived poor quality of its water. This played on fears of a 
recurrence of disease and plague. One advertisement in the press 
calling for the rejection of Steenbras, pleaded so, "For the sake 
of the little ones" and that such a decision would "influence the 
whole of your life and that of future generations".c••> (see 
facing page) Indeed, the issue of water and health was an 
important one, and the opinions of doctors were used by both 
(97) Minyte of the Mayor, 1917, Report of the City Treasurer. 
(98) Cape Times, 24 July 1917. 
(99) Cape Times, 24 July 1917 
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sides to assure voters of the 'facts'. One medical practitioner, 
a supporter of Wemmershoek invoked biblical imagery in his 
criticism of the city council in a style reminiscent to that of 
Hyman Liberman in the 1906 municipal elections. 
"The Town Council reminded him of the Children of 
Israel who in their wanderings through the wilderness 
suffered from want of water ...• Yet they set up a 
golden calf when their leader was up the mountain and 
turned from the Great Giver of all Good - but they 
were punished for it. The Great Giver offers unto us 
purest water in abundance ..• but we are asked to take 
second best". < i•:•o > 
While the Citizens' Steenbras Water Committee took fright at the 
extent of the opposition, the city council had at least one 
powerful supporter, the Administrator of the Cape, Sir Frederick 
De Waal, on whose authority the repeal of section 22 of the 
unification ordinance rested. De Waal saw the lack of progress 
since unification as being due the "shadow" of "differential 
rating".< ioi > In a speech given before the Cape Provincial 
Council, De Waal drew attention to the duties of city government 
and to the dangers inherent if these were not carried out: 
"The first thing a municipality must look after [is] 
drainage and water, these things [are] of more 
importance than a beautiful City Hall, a fine pier, or 
a splendid orchestra. The City once had a bubonic 
plague, and it cost the Government half a million [Pounds] to eradicate it".< 102 > 
As far as De Waal was concerned the Unification Ordinance was not 
an "absolutely agreed upon Bill" as: 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
(103) 
Caee 
Caee 
"the great bogey to unification had been that a certain 
water scheme might be forced on an unwilling section 
of the ratepayers, and for that reason the principles 
of differential rating had been introduced 11 .<io~> 
Times, 24 July 1917. 
Timgs, 7 July 1917. 
ibid. 
ibid. 
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De Waal suggested that if differential rating divided the 
southern suburbs and Cape Town and stood in the way of water, 
then it would have to be amended.c 104> 
The water referendum took on the proportions of a general 
election, with dozens of different pamphlets being issued,c10~> 
scores of public meetings held and hundreds of advertisements 
placed in the press, as may be seen from the leader page of the 
Cape Times.(see facing page) The CWSC and CSWC conducted 
ruthless and emotive campaigns in order to solicit the support of 
ratepayers. 
ratepayers: 
Alfred Batty complained that CSWC was intimidating 
"Terrible things ... were being told. [if the ratepayers 
were to reject Steenbras] They were told that the 
capital would be moved from Cape Town, and that the 
Council would resign, [and] that the Labour Party 
would capture the Council".< 10•> 
Both sides were far from honest, the evidence of the Board of 
Engineers Report was manipulated, financial statements were 
misquoted and a variety of contradictory expert opinion was 
paraded before the electorate in the weeks preceding this 
extraordinary referendum. 
In spite of fears that the Steeribras scheme would be lost because 
of massive working class mobilisation against it, the referendum 
resulted in a narrow victory for the Citizen's Steenbras Water 
Committee. The result of the poll showed 8006 votes for 
Steenbras as against 6905 for Wemmershoek; a majority of 1101 
(104) Cace Times, 7 July 1917. 
(105) Citizen's Steenbras Water Committee: " Steenbras is Right"; 
"Doctors Say: Steenbras is Right"; "Steenbras vs. Wemmer's 
Hoek"; " Steenbras versus Wemmer's Hoek: The Facts"; and 
"More Points for Steenbras as against Wemmer's Hoek". 
Citizen's Water Supply Committee: "Steenbras or Wemmer's-
Hoek"; "Steenbras WhY,"?"; "Think of these True Facts about 
Wemmer's Hoek"; and 'What Ten Councillors said about 
Wemmer' s Hoek" • . 
(106) Cace Times, 4 July 1917. 
M.1P 8 
I9I7 WATER REPERENl>UM 
WARDS VO TING FOR STEENBRAS 
I Sea Point 
2 Harbour 
3 West Central 
4 Kloof 
5 Park 
II ?i'Iai tland 
IO Mowbray 
!2 Rondebosch 
I4 Kalk Bay 
WARDS VOTING AGAINST STEENBRAS 
6 East Central 
7 Castle 
8 Woodstock 
9 Salt River 
I3 Claremont 
.. ~ ........... . 
' •• 
.. ·· ·~ 
• 
• 
······, 
• l 
... 
• l 
Page 192 
votes.< 107 > The actual margin was much narrower than it first 
appears. The existence of a plural voting system skewed the 
result in the favour of the more affluent ratepayers who had up 
to three votes. Based on actual voter turnout, only 4835 people 
voted for Steenbras while 4929 voted for Wemmershoek. On a 
straight vote, Steenbras would have been defeated by 94 
votes.< 10•> Furthermore the results showed that the four 
predominantly working class wards of East Central City, Castle, 
Woodstock and Salt River voted overwhelmingly against 
Steenbras.< 10~> ( see map 8 facing page) The only other ward to 
vote against Steenbras was Claremont, presumably due \o its close 
proximity to Wynberg. Since it had become apparent that Cape 
Town was to proceed with a hinterland scheme, Wynberg softened 
its isolationist stance, and was eager to engage in a cooperative 
scheme with Cape Town. 
One result of the Steenbras referendum was that it finally 
brought an end to a period of over forty years during which the 
issue of water supply had played an important role in Cape Town's 
municipal history. Yet at this juncture, the 1917 referendum 
also reflects many of the earlier conflicts; such as between the 
rentier classes and merchants over municipal reform and 
sanitation, between businessmen and householders over municipal 
spending, the conflicting interests between city and suburb as 
well as the wider emergence of class conflict during this period. 
Although the central issue in the 1917 water referendum concerned 
that of the comparative cost of the rival water schemes, the 
significant support given to Wemmershoek by working class 
ratepayers, who had a history of rejecting costly water schemes, 
(107) Cape Times, 24 July 1917. 
" (108) South African Review, 27 July 1917. 
(109) Cape Times, 24 July 1917. 
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indicates the referendum reflects far deeper issues. One of 
these concerns that of working class suspicion of the motives of 
the businessmen and the middle classes of the suburbs, as is 
embodied in the accusation of "gold vs. the people". 
This reaction was rooted in the popular perception of the issue 
of water supply as a symbol of the middle class struggle for 
municipal reform for over fifty years. As the most expensive 
aspect of municipal reform, the question of water supply, 
particularly hinterland schemes, were seen as the prerogative of 
businessmen and the suburban middle class. The origins of these 
perceptions may lie in the political upheavals of the 1880's, 
when advocates of reform such as the Cape Times estranged the 
city's underclass through its persistent definition of them as 
'dirty' people who were branded as enemies of municipal reform 
who had no interest in the provision of water or sanitation. 
Similarly, in the 1900's working class householders rallied 
against John Parker's attempt to develop a hinterland water 
scheme as this was seen to be to the benefit of 'suburban 
interests' and not those of the city. Even by 1913, the 
suspicion of a 'big water scheme' continued to plague the process 
of municipal unification, which was seen in certain quarters as 
being against the interest of Cape Town. 
The fact that the 1917 conflict arose at all, is largely the 
result of the terms of municipal unification, an agreement that 
was partly shaped by the issue of water supply. Indeed it has 
been seen that water supply, which was one of the main motives 
for unification, was not resolved by this agreement. 
The 1917 referendum, as in the case of the earlier water related 
conflicts, illustrates that the whole issue of municipal reform, 
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unification and water supply were not simply the product of the 
will of a monolithic ruling class, but were the result of a 
process of conflicting interests, between ratepayers, amongst 
businessmen and the professional classes, within the city hall, 
between city and suburban interests and through conflicting class 
interests. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the acceptance of the Steenbras 
did not bring an immediate end to Cape Town's water crisis. The 
Steenbras scheme represented the biggest municipal undertaking in 
South Africa at that time. Contracts for its construction, which 
included a forty mile pipeline, were only signed in 1918 after 
the war.< 110 > During this interim period the water crisis 
deepened to such an extent that water was rationed and cut off 
for twenty hours a day.< 111 ' Work on the scheme was speeded up 
to enable it completion in 1921.< 112 > (see photograph 12 facing 
page) Within two years of the inauguration of the scheme it was 
found that the supply was insufficient, due to increased 
consumption and a period of protracted drought. Such was the 
frustration that calls were made for the scheme to be abandoned 
and for government to provide aid for a new scheme 
elsewhere.< 11 ~> 
It was decided to enlarge the dam by raising its walls, thereby 
increasing its capacity from 600 million gallons to 5 991 million 
gallons, almost ten times that of the original scheme at a cost 
of over a £1 000 000. <114 ' 
(110) Cape Town City Council; Steenbras Water Scheme, 
Contract no.2, Tunnel and Approaches, 1917. 
(111) J.Burman, The Cape of Good Intent, 1969, p.112. 
(112) Souvenir of the inauguration of the Steenbras water scheme 
by H.R.H Prince Arthur of Connaught, 9 March 1921. 
(113) ibid. 
(114) ibid. 
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While the Steenbras scheme was not the last of Cape Town's dams, 
it nevertheless represents the end of a period in which the issue 
of water supply was to interact with municipal politics, which 
may justifiably be called the era of the politics of water 
supply. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PARISH PUMP POLITICS? 
CAPE TOWN'S WATER SUPPLY PAST AND PRESENT 
From today's perspective it is perhaps difficult to appreciate 
the degree to which the process of augmenting water supply has 
shaped the development of Cape Town's early municipal government. 
Apart from minor water restrictions in the 1950's and 1970's, 
water supply has been taken for granted in the recent past. 
The cost of augmenting supplies are no longer borne entirely by 
municipal government but is shared by the state, reducing the 
economic impact on ratepayers. No longer does the massive cost 
of extending supplies bring political turmoil. In this final 
chapter the relevance of the issue of water supply is evaluated, 
and placed within the broader context of Cape Town's history, 
elevating it from its conventional relegation under the heading 
of parish pump politics. 
A recurring theme of this dissertation concerns the political and 
social repercussions brought about by the high cost of water 
supply. Less emphasis has been given to the related aspects of 
sanitation reform, such sewers and drains, or to its connection 
to the imposition of segregation and class control, as have been 
examined by Bickford-Smith, Van Heyningen and others.<i> This 
(1) For example: V. Bickford-Smith2 "Commerce, class and 
ethnicity in Cape Town, 1875-1~02", Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Cambridge, 1988; E.B. van Her,ningen, "Public 
Health and Society in Cape Town, 1880-1910', Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1989; and also M.W. Swanson "The 
sanitation Syndrome"~ Journal of African History, Volume 
18, No.3, 1977,pp.381-410. 
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chapter therefore attempts to locate the narrow aspect of water 
supply within these broader debates and to evaluate its overall 
importance and significance within the context of an urban 
history of Cape Town. 
Accepting that the issue of water supply was a significant factor 
in Cape Town's history, this chapter examines the extent which 
water affected the development of South African and other cities. 
It must be established whether the role of water within Cape Town 
is unique or if it is a common factor that must be applied to the 
equation that makes up urban history. 
It is with this in mind that this chapter draws comparisons from 
the experience of cities outside South Africa in an attempt to 
develop a model for understanding the role of water supply by 
placing it within the context of the social, political and 
economic conflicts typical of a city in transition. 
THE ISSUE OF WATER SUPPLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 
CAPE TOWN'S URBAN HISTORY: 1840-1920 
While this dissertation covers a broad period in Cape Town's 
history, it nevertheless represents a coherent phase, not only in 
terms of the development of its water supply, but also in 
relation to its transformation from a pre-industrial colonial 
town to a modern industrialising city. During this period Cape 
Town experienced a process of fundamental economic, social and 
political change that altered the structure and function of its 
society. The position and importance of the issue of water 
supply is therefore subordinate to these greater forces. 
The period covered by this dissertation also falls within the 
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1 
scope of three recent historical studies of Cape Town which 
examine various aspects of social, political and economic change 
which coincide or overlap with the issue of water supply. When 
these are correlated with the various conflicts involving water, 
the beginnings of an integrated interpretation of Cape Town's 
municipal history may be discerned. 
In terms of municipal politics, Digby Warren's examination of the 
Board of Commissioners and Wardmasters between 1840 and 1954c~' 
and Vivian Bickford-Smith's'~' study of the ascendancy of the 
municipal reformers between 1875 and 1902, represent part of an 
ongoing pattern of conflict for control aver Cape Town's 
government by classes who sought to serve their interests through 
the domination of the council. A recurring feature of these 
conflicts was the prominance of water supply, a consequence of 
the fact that it touched upon numerous aspects of everyday 
existence. 
It has been established that the lack of water adversely effected 
two areas of Cape Town's life. Firstly it was essential for trade 
and commerce, and the of supply shipping and industry. Secondly 
it was a central aspect of sanitation reform, and was needed far 
the proper functioning of drains and sewers in order ta combat 
disease and epidemics. While these were the motives far 
improving supplies, the inherent reason for water being at the 
site of conflict was that it represented an enormous source 
expenditure. For a municipality with limited revenue it 
generated political discord within the town council. 
Warren describes the rise of the rentier classes, householders 
( 2) D. Warren, "Merchant'si. Commissioners and wardmasters: 
Municipal Politics in 1..;ape Town, 1840-1954", MA 
dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1986. 
(3) V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, class and ethnicity" 
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and small businessmen in the 1840's and 1850's. This group came 
into conflict with the elite merchant classes, whose influence 
over the Town House they sought to reduce. In this objective 
they were united by a common. desire of keeping municipal 
expenditure to a minimum. In Chapter One it is shown that this 
objective conflicted with the concept of effective local 
government. By the late 1850's, an attempt was made on the part 
of the mercantile elite as well as sections of the commercial and 
professional classes to reverse the influence of the rentier 
class and their allies amongst the Board of Commissioners. While 
the re-emergence of divisions amongst the dominant classes had 
their origins in wider political differences such as the convict 
crisis of 1849 and the franchise question of 1853, they soon 
manifested themselves within local government. In Chapter One it 
was argued that an acute water and sanitation crisis and the 
outbreak of smallpox in the late 1850's, presented an opportunity 
for the mercantile elite to challenge the structure of municipal 
government and attempt to divide its authority. The most 
important example of this was the drive for of an independent 
water board to facilitate water and sanitation reforms. This 
challenge was further aided by divisions that arose between the 
Wardmasters and Commissioners, when the latter tried to abolish 
the position of wardmaster in the new municipal ordinance which 
was due to be enacted in 1860. 
The period from the late 1850'.s to the early 1860's was one 
in which local government was torn between opposing forces that 
either wanted to centralise municipal power or to dilute it. But 
the merchant interests were not yet in a powerful enough position 
to make a direct political challenge, and the Commissioners 
succeeded in consolidating power with the institution of the town 
council in 1867. 
It was not until the 1870's that the mercantile elite and their 
f=age :oo 
adherents in the professional and commercial classes again 
attempted to reform Cape Tnwn's municipal government. The i·ssue 
of water supply and sanitation were similarly at the centre of 
this conflict, but the supporters of municipal reform now sought 
to extend their influence within the Town House by seeking 
election to the cGuncil. It was not until the early 1880's that 
reformers were in a position to make an all out bid for the 
control of the municipality. A water and sanitation crisis, the 
outbreak of a smallpox epidemic and the bungling of the 
construction of the Molteno Reservoir provided a· opportunity for 
the clean party to defeat the dirty party in ti1e municipal 
elections of 1882. 
The as c e :1 d an c y of the c 1 ea n party is re 1 ate d to the under 1 yin g 
changes that ~ad been taking place in Cape Town's economy . .:. ._ ,_ ........ I 1,.__,,11 
about 1875. T~e shift in ~ne town's economic function as an 
administrative centre an~ port for agricultural produce to t~at 
c" a commercial and industrial city, placed new demands on 
municipal gove~nment and brought its structure and functicn into 
question. This was to undermine the political hegemony af the 
rentier classes and the property based economy. 
The ascendance of merchant capital in the town council was not a 
sudden event ior ~as it completed in the 1880's. The raisir .. J of 
large municipal loans for a water supply scheme and sanitation 
system gave rise to resistance from householders and p~opert; 
owners in the late ~890's. While the reformers succeeded in 
staving off a challenge from the ·wreckers'in 1897, after the 
turn of the century an informal alliance of small businessmen and 
householders managed to gain control over the town council. This 
was accomplished mobilising ratepayers against a proposed 
hinterland water scheme and the question of Cape Town's 
cooperation with the suburbs. As a consequence of the erosion ~f 
their power in the 1904 and 1905 elections, the old merchant 
reformers began to redefine their role in municipal government. 
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The formation of the Citizen's Guild in 1906, which aimed to re-
establish control over City hall, represents the emergence of a 
modern business elite within Cape Town's government. Increasingly 
this group sought to place the city's municipal government on a 
more professional footing, and accepted that its political 
integration with the suburbs was necessary to address the Cape 
Peninsula's social and economic problems. 
While the above analysis correlates the rise and fall of the 
various fractions of the dominant classes with the economics of 
water and sanitation reform, the development of water supply 
must be linked to the wider social and political changes taking 
place at this time. Central to this is Vivian Bickford-Smith's 
study of commerce, class and ethnicity< 4 ' and Elizabeth van 
Heyningen's examination of public health and society.<~> Both 
are concerned with the last quarter of nineteenth-century Cape 
Town, and give prominence to the issue of class and race in the 
context of municipal and social reform. It is argued that the 
question of sanitation and disease were central in the battle for 
political control of the city. As an adjunct to both sanitation 
and public health, the issue of water supply was similar1y locked 
into this battle for control. Unlike the issue of sanitation, 
the quest to augment water supply came to be strongly associated 
with-merchant interests, and for this reason it became the focus 
of attention in the reaction against reform, particularly on the 
part of the working class. 
The working class's perception of water supply as the prerogative 
of the dominant class may at first appear to be a contradiction, 
given that the lack of an adequate supply was a major reason for 
disease and high mortality rates amongst that section of the 
(4) V. Bickford-Smith, "Commerce, class and ethnicity". 
(5) E.B. van Heyningen, "Public Health and Society". 
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population. It could be expected that while merchants would have 
benefited from regular supplies to commerce and shipping, so too 
would benefits have accrued to the working classes. This 
assumption must be questioned as the link between health and 
water supply had only begun to be fully appreciated by medical 
doctors let alone by those who lived in the most squalid parts of 
Cape Town. Furthermore, it may be argued that working class's 
perception of the reformer's priorities may have been justified, 
for in retrospect, the process of augmenting water supply brought 
little benefit in terms of improved health or falling mortality 
rates. Cb> 
Another reason for the working class's opposition to water 
schemes arises from their close political association with the 
rentier classes in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
During this period expenditure on water was rejected on the basis 
that it would result in an increase in municipal rates, which 
would in turn be reflected in rising rents, or in the 
introduction of a tenants rate. It has also been suggested that 
the alliance between coloured ratepayers and especially the 
Dutch-speaking landlords and Commissioners was also based on 
their common desire for a low economic franchise with the 
establishment of the Cape Parliament in 1853. 
In the mid-1850's, calls for the augmentation of water supply by 
English-speaking merchants on the behalf the working classes, 
seem to have been ignored by these ratepayers. By the late 1870's 
similar calls for water supply on humanitarian grounds had 
diminished considerably, as the working classes increasingly came 
to be seen as a political obstacle to municipal and social 
reform. Epidemics that swept through the town's slums came to be 
(6) P. Buirski! "Mortality Rates in Cape Town, 1895-1980, A 
Broad Outline", Studies in the History of Cape Town, Volume 
5, eds. C. Saunders et.al., University of Cape Town, 
pp.125-132, 1984. 
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seen as a direct threat to the middle classes. Working class 
support for the representatives of property owners was seen to 
underpin the dirty party's control of the Town House, thus 
blocking attempts at reform. The English press sought to unhinge 
this alliance in its attack on the dirty party. In an attempt to 
mobilise English-speaking middle classes, its supporters were 
isolated through the use of stereotypes of dirty Moslems and/or 
Malays and attacks on Dutch speakers as foreign and uncouth. 
Once they had gained control over the Town House in 1882, the 
reformers or Clean Party sought to reduce the influence of the 
mainly coloured working class by narrowing the municipal 
franchise. Furthermore, opposition to excessive spending on 
water and sanitation schemes in the 1890's and early twentieth 
century was met by similar attempts to isolate working class 
ratepayers through use of racial stereotypes which fed on middle 
class fears of disease and disorder.< 7 J These fears were to 
thrive on the fertile ground of change as Cape Town underwent a 
period of rapid urbanisation, immigration and industrialisation. 
As a consequence of the political and social isolation of the 
coloured working class, the reformers attempt to augment water 
supply in the early twentieth century were met with resistance 
from the poor whose perception of water as an interest of the 
merchant and middle classes had been gradually reinforced by the 
rhetoric of sanitation and reform. This found its expression 
between 1904 and 1906 when businessmen who proposed economy in 
municipal spending, gained control of the town council by 
mobilising householders and the working classes against the 
proposed hinterland water schemes. Similarly, opposition was 
expressed against cooperation with the suburbs and later to 
(7) V. Bickford-Smith, "Dangerous Cape Town: Middle-class 
Attitudes to Poverty in Cape Town in the Late Nineteenth 
Century" Studies in the History of Cape Town, Volume 4, 
eds. C. Saunders et.al., On1vers1ty of Cape Town, pp.29-65, 
1984. 
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municipal unification as this too was perceived to be to the 
benefit of the Adderley Street interest. 
After unification in 1913, working class opposition to a water 
scheme in the hinterland once again became the focus of a 
political conflict within the council. It was argued in Chapter 
Three that working class opposition to the cheaper Steenbras 
water scheme in the 1917 municipal referendum, can be explained 
in terms of their long-standing perception of the dominant 
class's self-interest. 
The development of Cape Town's water supply between the 1850's 
and 1920 is therefore closely bound up with the wider changes 
being brought about by a society in the process of social, 
political and economic transition. The augmentation of water 
supply was not only the product of a struggle within the dominant 
class, but was also shaped by the reaction of the working classes 
against a process of reform that was not seen to be in their 
interest. The working class reaction against sanitation reform 
had taken on many forms such as the cemetery riots and revolt 
against smallpox vaccination in the nineteenth century. cei In the 
case of water supply, the Table Mountain dams and hinterland 
schemes symbolised yet another aspect of the self concern of the 
dominant classes, which was perhaps made more poignant by the 
fact that many of the houses in District Six remained without 
running water until the early twentieth century. 
It can be seen that the issue of water supply in Cape Town during 
this period impacted on the municipality's development and 
interacted in the process of the transformation of its economy 
( 8) A. Davids, "'The Revolt of the Malays', A Study of the 
Reactions of the Cape Muslims to the Smallpox Epidemics of 
Nineteenth Century Cape Town" Studies in the History of 
Cape Town, Volume 5, eds. C. ~~unders et.al., University of 
Cape Town, pp.46-78. 
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and society. It must now be considered if the impact of water 
supply is unique to Cape Town or if it must be considered an 
ingredient of all towns experiencing process of change. 
WATER SUPPLY AND URBAN HISTORY 
In the introduction to this dissertation it was argued that Cape 
Town's environmental and geographic situation placed it in a 
comparatively difficult position to augment its water supplies 
in comparison to other major cities of the world. It was argued 
that British cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leicester, 
Nottingham and Derby faced similar problems in bringing in water 
over long distances.< 9 > It was suggested that it was not 
distance but the type of water resource available that determined 
how water supply and sanitation systems evolved. Defined as a 
'salt water city', Cape Town had the benefit of being able to 
dispose of its sewage at sea without contaminating rivers which 
provided drinking water. <10 > Cape Town's position was also 
similar to that of minor river cities which had to draw water 
from multiple sources, at considerable expense.< 11 > The issue 
to be considered however is not simply the availability of water, 
but the political trauma that is generated when supplies suddenly 
have to be augmented to meet the demands of rapid growth and 
( 9) 
( 10) 
( 1 1 ) 
P.J. Waller, Towni City, and Nation, England 1850-1914, 
1983, p.302. Wal er gives the following examples of 
distance between cities and their source of water supply: 
Livepool(50 miles); Birmingham (70 miles); Manchester (80 
miles)i· Leicester(60 miles); Nottingham (40 miles); Derby (35 mi es). 
L.P. Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location and 
Sanitation", P. Uselding (editor), Research in Economic 
History, University of Illinois, Volume 2, 1977, p.342. 
ibid.' p.344. 
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industrialisation. The problem was more than matching demand but 
meeting the requirements of rising standards living.< 1 ~' 
Cities such as Johannesburg, Kimberley and Durban experienced 
periods of rapid growth which demanded an increase in water 
supply to facilitate industrialisation and improvement in living 
conditions. In the case of Johannesburg and Kimberley water was 
controlled either by private water companies or by independent 
water authorities, thus obviating political conflict at the site 
of municipal government. The restricted municipal franchise in 
these and other cities deadened the resistance of the working 
classes to reform, whereas in Cape Town they first had to be 
isolated and neutralised before sanitation reforms were allowed 
to proceed relatively unhindered. 
The cities of Great Britain and its colonies on the other hand do 
reveal many similarities with Cape Town's experience of water and 
sanitation reform but the added racial dimension and the colonial 
context makes Cape Town's experience somewhat different. The 
conflict arising from Liverpool's Rivington Pike scheme bears 
remarkable similarities with regard to the divisions that were 
created within its municipal government. Indeed many aspects of 
the development of water supply in a variety of British town's 
correspond to Cape Town's experience even though there are 
important differences~ 
The experience of towns and cities in British colonies as well as 
the United States concerned conflicts between water companies and 
municipalities as the latter attempted to take over their 
function where supplies were inefficient and costly.< 1 ~' In 
( 12) 
( 13) 
L.P.Cain, "An Economic History of Urban Location", p.203. 
E. Jones and D. McCalla, "Toronto waterworks 1840-77: 
Continuity and Change in Nineteenth-Century foronto 
Politics", Canadian Historical Review, Volume LX, Number 3, 
1979, pp. 300-323. 
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Britain this was the experience of Exeter, Sheffield, Bradfield, 
Rochdale, Bolton, Leeds, Liverpool and London. <14 > The substance 
of these conflicts involved the ascendence of men supporting 
municipalisation against the old landed and merchant interests 
who often had invested in these companies. Once reformists had 
gained control over town councils, lengthy and often expensive 
battles were waged against water companies unwilling to surrender 
their water rights. Waller has pointed out that municipal 
purchase of water companies was wasteful and that ratepayers 
"literally paid for a principle" in the drive for 
municipalisation.< 1 ~' While this aspect of the history of water 
supply is absent in Cape Town, equivalent struggles took place in 
towns such as Kimberley, < 10 ' and even in the Cape Peninsula, as 
with the suburban municipalities conflict with the Cape Town 
District Water Company at the close of the nineteenth 
century.< 17 ' As water companies became dislodged from their 
positions in British cities, investors often turned to the 
colonies. Sir Henry Knight, the chairman of London's Southwark 
( 14) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
( 17) 
For examp,les of Exeter, Sheffield and Bradford, see A. 
Elliot, 'Municipal Government in Bradford in the mid-
nineteenth century", D.Fraser (ed. li Munici~al Reform and 
the Industrial City, 1983, pp.119-1L2; For ochdale and 
Bolton see J.Garrard, Leadershi~ and ~ower in 
Victorian Industrial Towns, 198 , pp. 1-93; for Leeds see 
B.Barber, "Municipal Government in Leeds, 1835-1914", 
D.Fraser (ed.), Munici~al reform and the Industrial 
~ifh' 1983, pp.85-89;or Liverpool see D.Fraser, Power and 
u ority in the Victorian City, 1979, pp.31-36; and for 
London see D.Owen, The Government of Victorian London 1855-
1889: The Metropolitan Board of Works, the Vestries and the 
City Corporation, 1982, pp.134-141. 
P.J. Waller, Town, City and Nation, p.307. 
B. Robertsi Civic Centurl, The first one hundred years of 
the Kimber et mun1c1pal1 a' 1978, p.18, p.25. 
The municipa 1ty attempte to purchase the Griqualand West 
Water Company in 1879, but due to its lack of finance it 
was forced to enter an agreement lasting 25 years. When 
this contract expired in 1905, it was extended until 1921, 
when the municipality finally took over the company. 
SMW ADD 1/42-44, Papers re: Cape Town District Waterworks 
Company Ltd, versus Woodstock and Claremont Municipalities 
re taking over of Waterworks arbitration case, 1897-1900. 
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scheme, claimed that this provided a reliable source of income 
due to the fact that there were few financial failures. cie> 
In general Cape Town's experience was opposite from that of most 
British cities, as water supply had always been under the control 
of the local government. At times the municipality was seen to 
be incompetent to meet the demand for increased supply. This gave 
rise to attempts to remove its power over the waterworks and 
invest it in the hands of either a water company or an autonomous 
water board. As water became an important source of income in 
the twentieth century, Cape Town's municipal history might have 
been very different if these attempts to dilute its control over 
water supply had been sucessful. This had been the route 
followed by cities such as Melbourne in Australia, which had it 
powers distributed amongst various authorities,<i 9 > and to an 
extent, Johannesburg, with the creation of the Rand Water 
Board.< :.:o > 
There are however as many similarities as there are differences. 
Comparisons may be drawn between Cape Town and the experience of 
Bolton and Rochdale in their competition and conflict for the 
water resources of the hinterland,< 2 i> or with Leeds where there 
were divisions over the choice of schemes.< 22 > But an underlying 
problem common to all cities, concerned the cost of augmenting 
supplies, which formed the basis of political conflict within 
( 18) 
(19) 
(20) 
( 21) 
(22) 
A.1-1907, Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Re~art of the Select 
Committee on the Southern Suburbs Waterupply Bill, p.94, Qs.1125-1129. 
D.Ounstanl Governing the Metropolis. Politics, Technolo~~ 
and Socia Change in a Victorian City: Melbourne 1850-1 1, 
1984. 
J. Shorten, The Johannesburg Saga, Johannesburg, 1970, 
p. 571. 
J.Garrard, Leadership and power in Victorian Industrial 
Towns ,pp.91-93. 
B.Barber, "Municipal Government in Leeds", pp.85-89. 
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their town councils. In Britain these often took place along the 
lines of party political allegiance, in Cape Town divisions 
within the town council were not overtly along political lines, 
but represented a split within the dominant classes rather than a 
conflict between different classes. 
E.P.Hennock's analysis of local government in Britain during the 
Victorian era provides a useful tool in understanding the 
dynamics of municipal politics. c23 > Hennock argues that 
divisions over expenditure that arose within town councils were 
the product of conflict over which type of business attitude 
should be dominant; that of caution or enterprise.c= 4 > Put 
another way, this conflict may be described as one between 
'improvers and 'economists', 
issue in local government. c=~> 
which Hennock sees as a central 
The economists, who advocated 
fiscal caution, came to the fore during economic depression or 
during periods when town councils had overextended themselves. 
Improvers thrived during times of economic boom or were sometimes 
stimulated by social necessity. This analysis may be applied to 
Cape Town, where Hymen Liberman would be a typical example of the 
economists, while his counterpart, John Parker, could be 
described as being representive of the improvers. 
When Hennock's categories of improvers and economists are applied 
to Fraser's examination of the conflict arising from the 
Rivington Pike Scheme, this provides the basis for a further 
analogy which may extended to Cape Town's experience. 
Liverpool's Rivington Pike affair resembles both the conflict 
between the water and anti-water parties between 1904 and 1906 as 
well as the 1917 water referendum. As in the example of 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
E.P. Hennock, Fit and Pro~er Persons. Ideal and Reality 
Nineteenth Century Orbanovernment, 1973. 
ibid, p.317. 
ibid. 
in 
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Liverpool, the division between economists and improvers coincide 
with a substantial variation in the economic status of the anti-
water and water parties. Fraser argues that in Liverpool, the 
'Pikests' were generally drawn from the ranks of wealthy 
merchants and professional men while the 'Anti-Pikests' tended to 
be representative of shopkeepers and tradesmen who were opposed 
to increases in rates. c~ei A similar, although less obvious 
class difference may be discerned amongst the dominant classes 
Cape Town. The anti-water party tended to represent smaller 
businessmen and householders in attempting to keep municipal 
expenditure at a minimum. Cape Town's experience represents a 
combination of both the Hennock and Fraser models, in that the 
conflict was based on differing economic attitudes within the 
dominant class, and to a certain extent, reflected divisions 
between the middle and working classes. 
Further parallels may be drawn from the analysis of Hennock and 
Fraser. For ex amp 1 e Hennoc k argues that "ignorant e 1 ec tors" were 
often mobilised against reform, a factor that was evident in both 
Liverpool and Cape Town where working classes resisted what they 
perceived to be exorbitant water schemes. In Cape Town working 
class resistance was deeply rooted in their alienation and 
isolation by racial and sanitation rhetoric, which had been 
utilised to mobilise middle class support for reform in the 
nineteenth century. 
Ultimately, the improvers, which may be broadly identified with 
commerce, came to dominate Cape Town's unified council after 
1913. The municipality's development of a hinterland water 
scheme in this period symbolises the beginning of the rise of a 
professional local government with the predominance of officials 
and expert opinion. Despite the transformation that was brought 
about by unification, the earlier conflicts over municipal and 
(26) D. Fraser, Power and Authority, pp.34-35. 
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sanitation reform left an indelible mark on municipal politics. 
Indeed the Steenbras versus Wemmerhoek debate of 1917 echoed half 
a century of the politics of water supply. 
The role played by water supply in Cape Town's municipal history 
is not entirely unique, as it has been shown to have had a 
varying impact on the development of other major cities. In 
stressing these similarities and differences, it should be 
remembered that its real significance lies in the contribution it 
may make to a fuller understanding of Cape Town's history. While 
it has been argued that the issue of water supply should be 
linked to the broader process of urban history, it is also true 
that a model or pattern should be identified to facilitate the 
study of sanitation and municipal reform *1 other South African 
cities. Although such studies of water supply have been 
undertaken in some town's, they have been marred by the lack of 
an analytical approach.<~7 > Any such history should take into 
account geographic factors, as have been espoused by Cain, the 
political context of the local and central state; the underlying 
economic trend of industrialiation and economic cycles; as well 
as social factors such as urbanisation and class conflict. 
More specific trends should also be taken into account when they 
commonly occur in histories of water supply. It has been noted 
that water supply became an issue when a sanitary threshold was 
reached. This is often underlined by the outbreak of a major 
fire which cannot be extinguished through lack of water, the 
outbreak of disease and epidemics, or the occurance of a major 
drought. It is at this point that the form of control over water 
supply is determined, usually that of municipal authority or a 
government sponsored water board. Lack of finance often delayed 
progress, while many governments were unwilling to accept 
reponsibility. The extension of municipal control over water 
(27) For examP,lei A. de V. Minaari Graaff Reinet's Water 
Problems', Lontree, Number 2L, pp.26-28. 
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often brought political conflict within town councils, as it 
represented a source of considerable expenditure. Even where the 
demand for water supply is met, renewed conflict often arose from 
the fact that supply lagged behind demand. After the completion 
of major schemes, periods of complacency set in, compounding the 
crisis. Increased utilisation rates, or the rapid escalation of 
consumption which takes place after a city typically annexes its 
suburbs, creates new demands that were difficult to meet and 
which renewed political conflict. 
These represent some of the patterns of the politics of water 
supply. The history of Cape Town's water supply echoes many of 
these themes, whereas other city's may only display a few. The 
real significance of the issue of water supply in Cape Town's 
history lies in the fact that it was inextricably linked to the 
development of its municipal government for an extended period of 
time. Furthermore it was bound up with emergent class and social 
relationships, which shaped the greater city. 
WATER SUPPLY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. 
The development of the Wemmershoek scheme in the mid 1950's at a 
cost of £8 000 0000 was the last time the issue of augmenting 
water supply became a public issue in Cape Town's municipal 
politics. Although water restrictions have been imposed at 
times, shortages have never reached the same proportions as 
those at the beginning of the century. Since the 1950's numerous 
schemes have been undertaken by the city and the state, drawing 
on a large area of the hinterland. The potential for further 
schemes in the Western Cape has decreased as the exploitation of 
water resources nears its potential. In the future competition 
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for these remaining resources may develop between the urban and 
rural areas, and even between cities, towns and regions, and once 
again become a source of political conflict. 
As the next century approaches, it is anticipated that the limits 
of Cape Town's water resources will be tested once again. 
Political change has brought about a new phase of rapid 
urbanisation which will make new demands as standards of living 
rise and industrialisation takes place.· Some conception of the 
magnitude of these demands may be gleaned from the example of the 
new township of Khayelitsha which now absorbs most of the water 
from the old Steenbras dam, whose water no longer reaches the 
city. 
As water resources are finite, it is fair to assume that future 
shortages will again become an issue in local government. In the 
vast informal settlements springing up around Cape Town, the lack 
of water supply and sanitation systems are already an issue. The 
provision of services for new urban developments is certain to 
place renewed strains on the city's economy. Questions concerning 
the ability of the underprivileged classes to pay for water and 
other services is likely to be drawn into the debate of the 
redistribution of wealth, 
subsidise the poor. 
with the rich being expected to 
Another issue that may arise is the question of the privatisation 
of water supply. The privatisation of water authorities is 
related to the old water companies that once thrived in an era 
when municipalities did not have the ability to finance capital 
development. Indeed Cape Town may once again become forced to 
consider this option as increasing demands are made on its 
revenue. 
Water supply has been shown to have had an enormous impact on 
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Cape Town's history. When we look to the past, and consider the 
future, we may well wonder what political turmoil may emerge from 
new and changing circumstances which will soon face the city. By 
examining the past it may be learnt that the problem of 
augmenting water supply involves far more than overcoming 
engineering problems such as developing tunnels, pipelines and 
gravitational schemes to squeeze ever last drop from the 
hinterland. The impact that it once had on the city's politics, 
economy and society may be experienced again. 
APPENDIX A 
SHORT BIOGRAPHIES OF LEADING PERSONALITIES 
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1. William Duncan-Baxter (1868-1960) 
Born Dundee Scotland. Owned a large retail business in Cape 
Town. Was active in organised commerce and was president of 
the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce.(1916-18/1926-28) He was a 
member of the city council from 1904 and served as mayor in 
1907-08. He was elected to the Cape Parliament in 1908 
(Progressive)and to the Union Parliament (Gardens 
constituency) in 1910. (Unionist Party) 
2. William Henry Black (1869-1922) 
Born in Victoria, Australia. An architect and civil 
engineer by profession. He designed the Cape of Good Hope 
Seminary building, the Wynberg Town Hall and St. Lukes Church 
at Salt River Arrived in Cape Town 1892. Served as a city 
councillor. 
3. Hyman Liberman (1854-1923) 
Born in Poland and emigrated to Britain before arriving in 
Cape Town in 1873. A prominent grain and wine merchant. 
Served on city council from 1900-15. He was involved in 
relief work for refugees during the Anglo-Boer War. 
Mayor of Cape Town from 1903 to 1906. 
4. John Parker (1866-1921) 
Born in Scotland and arrived in Cape Town in 1883. A noted 
architect he des~gned the S.A. College School, the Great 
Synagogue in Gardens, the Civil Service Club, the Tivoli 
Music Hall, Rustenberg School and the Presbyterian 
Church in Mowbray. A founder member of the Cape Institute of 
Architects. He was elected to the Mowbray town council in 
1898 and for Cape Town on several occasions 
5. Sir John Woodhead (1832-1898) 
Born in Yorkshire. Originally a ship's engineer before 
establishing an ironworks and merchant business in Cape 
Town. Elected on the city council in 1881 and focused on 
the water and drainage problem. Three times mayor of Cape 
Town. 
SOURCE: South African Dictionary of Biography, 
Volumes I-5. 
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APPENDIX B 
ADDITIONAL GRAPHS AND TABLES 
1. Cape Town's rainfall 1900-1920. 
2. Statistics for Cape Town's dams and reservoirs. 
3. Mayor's of Cape Town 1867-1917. 
4. Comparative water consumption of cities c.1915 
5. Comparisons of Water Schemes proposed for Cape Town 
in 1805 
~05 
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NUMBER 1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL MONTHLY RAINFALL OF CAPE TOWN 1900-1920 
INCHES 
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1900 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
YEAR 
SOURCE MINUTE OF THE MAYOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE WATER 
ENGINEER, 1900-1920. 
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NUMBER 2 
STATISTICS OF CAPE TOWN MAJOR RESERVOIRS AND DAMS 1850-1925 
NAME YEAR COST(£) CAPACITY(Gallons) 
No.1 Reservoir 1849/52 2 700 2 500 000 
No.2 Reservoir 1856/60 8 100 12 000 000 
Molteno Rsrvr. 1877/86 96 000 43 000 000 
Woodhead tunnel 1890/91 45 000 
Woodhead Dam 1892/97 154 000 210 000 000 
Macke Rsrvr. 1896 2 870 200 000 
Hely Hutchinson 1898/1904 200 000 200 000 000 
Kloof Nek Rsrvr. 1907/08 25 700 3 000 000 
Steen bras 1917/21 1 252 000 600 000 000 
Steen bras Ext. 1924/28 1 124 000 5 991 000 000* 
SOURCES: 3/Ct 1/4/4/4/6/1 Augmentation of Water Supplies; 
sub committee minutes, appointed 1 October 1914, 
Memoranda, "8" Existing Works, pp.10-15. 
Minute of the Mayor, 1898-1930 
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NUMBER 3 
MAYOR'S OF CAPE TOWN 1867-1917 
1867 G.J. de Korte 1893 J. Woodhead 
1868 G.J. de Korte 1894 G. Smart 
1869 G.J. de Korte 1895 J.W. At we 11 
1870 G.J. de Korte 1896 J. Woodhead 
1871 P.J. Stigant 1897 H. Boal ch/ T. Bal 1 
1872 G. J. de Korte 1898 T. Bal 1 
1873 G.J. de Korte 1899 T. Bal 1 
1874 P.J. Stigant 1900 T.J. O'Reilly 
1875 P.U. Liebrant 1901 w. Thorne 
1876 c. Lewis 1902 w. Thorne 
1877 J. Phillip 1903 Sir w. Thorne 
1878 J.C. Hofmeyer 1904 H. Liberman 
1879 P.J. Kotzee 1905 H. Liberman 
1880 P.J. Kotzee 1906 H. Liberman 
1881 w. Flemming 1907 W.D. Baxter 
1882 w. Flemming 1908 F.W. Smith 
1883 c. Lewis 1909 Sir F.W. Smith 
1884 P.J. Stigant 1910 Sir F.W. Smith 
1885 T.J.C. Inglesby 1911 Sir F.W. Smith 
1886 J. Woodhead 1912 H. Hands 
1887 T. J. O'Reilly 1913 J. Parker 
1888 D.C. De Waal 1914 J. Parker 
1889 D.P. De v. Graaf 1915 H. Hands 
1890 D.P. De v. Graaf 1916 H. Hands 
1891: D.P. De v. Graaf 1917 H. Hands 
1892 J. G. Macke 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayor, 1917. 
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NUMBER 4 
COMPARISON OF CONSUMPTION IN GALLONS PER HEAD IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
CITIES AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES IN THE WORLD. c.1915 
TOWN POPULATION DAILY SUPPY CONSUMPTION PER 
GALLONS HEAD PER DAY 
CHICAGO 1,698,000 322,620,000 190 
BOSTON 560,900 80,209,000 143 
NEW YORK 2,049,000 245,880,000 120 
DURBAN 46,300 4,500,000 94 
SAN FRANCISCO 343,000 25,039,000 73 
PORT ELIZABETH 30,700 1,340,000 44 
BRISBANE 129,600 5,520,000 43 
SYDNEY 731,200 30,520,000 42 
PERTH 91,500 3,630,000 40 
WYNBERG 14,000 520,000 37 
LONDON 6,940,000 222,080,000 32 
LIVERPOOL 940,000 28,200,000 30 
CAPE TOWN 151,900 4,400,000 29 
CARDIFF 222,000 6,050,000 27 
BRISTOL 377,000 9,802,000 26 
SOURCE: 3/CT 1/4/4/4/6/1 Augmentation of water supplies: 
Minutes 1914-1915. 
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NUMBER 5 
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT WATER SCHEMES PROPOSED FOR 
CAPE TOWN'S HINTERLAND. 
SCHEME DISTANCE FROM CAPACITY COST* 
CAPE TOWN MILLION GALLONS 
STEENBRAS 38 miles 2000 639 
PALM I ET 44 miles 1500 860 
ZACHARIAS HOEK 41 miles 1600 1 262 
WEMMERS HOEK 43 miles 2600 1 256 
BERG RIVER 44 miles 1000 910 
WARM BERG 47 miles 1000 860 
* Cost based on a million gallon a day scheme 
SOURCE: 3/CT 9/5 Final Report of the Joint Water Committee, 
1905, page 29. 
L 
400 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
NUMBER 6 
CAPE TOWN'S WATER CONSUMPTION 1900-1913 (gallons per day) 
1900 698 389 330 
1901 773 881 968 
1902 817 435 700 
1903 905 652 000 
1904 919 920 000 
1905 964 732 000 
1906 970 444 000 
1907 918 088 000 
1908 855 681 000 
1909 807 353 000 
1910 832 347 000 
1911 913 999 000 
1912 939 736 000 
1913 972 037 000 
SOURCE: Minute of the Mayor 1900-1913 
Annual Report of the City Engineer 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
A wide range of sources were used in compiling the dissertation. 
Archival sources yielded rich detail, especially engineers 
reports and technical reports of various waterworks committees, 
but were of limited value due to the political emphasis of the 
study. 
Government publications, particularly the reports of 
parliamentary select committee's, amounting to over 3000 pages 
of evidence, were a major source of information, which is ironic 
given that the government generally avoided involving itself with 
municipal affairs. These provide clear evidence of the 
conflicting attitudes to municipal reform within the dominant 
class. The published mayoral minutes were also useful for 
providing an overview, avoiding convoluted petty politics that 
often obscured the facts. 
Newspapers were another valuable source of information for 
commentary on political conflict. Newspapers such as the Cape 
Times, were deeply involved in the debate over sanitation and 
and municipal reform and therefore provided a window into the 
minds of the reformers. A more unusual source are the numerous 
cartoons which underline the import~nce of the issue of water in 
local politics as well as provide insight into personalities and 
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capture contemporary emotions. 
Unpublished theses on Cape Town provided a vital link in 
developing an argument as this dissertation covers a wide 
period and is therefore supported by their findings. 
Published literature and journal articles were used for 
comparative purposes as well as for developing an understanding 
of municipal government. 
Photographs were used as visual statements to convey an 
impression of the scale of the water schemes, an aspect that was 
not emphasised in the text. 
SOURCES 
1. Unpublished Sources 
A. Archival Material 
2. Printed Official Sources 
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A. Government Publications 
B. Municipality of Cape Town 
C. Other 
3. Contemporary Newspapers and Periodicals 
4. Contemporary Published Literature 
5. General Literature 
A, Unpublished Theses 
B. Published Literature 
C. Journal and Other Papers 
D. Reference Works 
E. Pamphlets and Magazines 
6. Maps 
7. Photographs 
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SOURCE LIST 
1. UNPUBLISHED MANUSCRIPTS AND PRIVATE PAPERS 
A. GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES- CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 
(i) 3/CT Series: Archives of the Municipality of Cape Town 
3/CT 1/5/6/1/1 :Cape Peninsula Unification Minute Book, 
1910-1911. 
3/CTl/4/4/4/6/1 Minutes of the Sub Committee appointed 
1 October 1914 re: Augmentation of Water 
Supplies (1914-1915). 
3/CT 1/5/8/1/l Minutes of the Sub Committee re: 
3/CT 1/1/1/1-170 
3/CT 1/1/5/1-205 
3/CT 1/4/4/4/1-21 
Augmentation of Water Supplies (1915-
1917). 
Cape Town Municipal Record Books. 
Appendix to the Record Books. 
Waterworks Committee: Minutes (1913-
1937). 
3/CT 1/4/4/2/1/1-11 Electric, Waterworks and Fire Brigade 
Committee: Minutes (1899-1913). 
3/CT 1/4/4/1/1/1-2 Waterworks and Fire Brigade 
Committee: Minutes 1892-1897/1897-
1899. 
3/CT 9/1-5 Waterworks Papers, 1840-1905: Reports and 
data prepared in connection with the Cape 
Peninsula water supply (1903). 
3/CT 9/4 Waterworks Note Book (undated) 
3/CT 9/5 Joint Water Committee Minutes (1903) 
3/CT 1/7/1/1 : Mayoral Minutes 1881, 1887-1893. 
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3/CT 1/7/1/2 Mayoral Minutes 1886-1892. 
3/CT 1/7/1/3 Mayoral Minutes 1892-1896. 
3/CT 1/7/1/4 Mayoral Minutes 1897-1900 
3/CT 8/1/2/1-2 : City Treasurers Weekly Statements, 1867-
1913. 
(ii) SMW Series: Secretary Suburban Municipal Waterworks 
Committee and other Water Committees. 
SMW 1-4 
SMW 32 
SMW 33 
SMW 35 
SMW 36 
SMW 39 
SMW 65 
SMW 67 
SMW· 69 
SMW 70 
:Minute Books of Main Committee and Digest of 
Minutes (1900-1904). 
:Papers received Wemmershoek 1908-1910. 
:Papers received Wemmershoek 1909-1913. 
:Walter S~eyn Case. 
:Papers Received Steenbras Water Scheme(1900-01). 
:Wemmershoek 1907-1910 (Papers Received). 
:Sundry Papers and Reports. 
:Water Schemes and investigations, 1902-1907, Cape 
Town Committee: Notices of proceedings of meetings 
with Cape Town Council. 
:Diverse: Evidence regarding Water Bill (1907). 
:Memoranda in connection with Wemmershoek (1907-
1908) 
SMW ADD 1/42 Secretary, Cape Town District Waterworks 
Co.Ltd. Papers re: Cape Town District 
Waterworks Company, Ltd. versus Woodstock and 
Claremont Municipalities re: taking over of 
Waterworks Arbitration Case (1897-1900). 
SMW ADD 2/4 Secretary, Claremont and Woodstock Joint 
Committee: Report for the Joint Waterworks 
Committee on the affairs of the Cape Town 
District Waterworks Company, Ltd., 1889-1899. 
SMW ADD 3/1-4 Secretary, Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee (1905-1908), Minutes 1905-1910. 
SMW ADD 3/6 
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Secretary, Suburban Joint Water and Drainage 
Committee: Report of the Suburban Joint 
Water and Drainage Committee to the 
Municipal Councils of Claremont, Mowbray, 
Rondebosch, and Woodstock (1907). 
(iii) Woodstock Municipality Series 3A/6 
3A/6 volume 101 Suburban Municipal Waterworks. 
(iv) Other 
CWC Secretary Water Committee Cape Town 1834-1840. 
CHB Table Bay Harbour Board 
LCB Legislative Council Minutes and Appendices 1859 
B. UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN ARCHIVES 
William Duncan Baxter Papers 
C.2.1-C.2.103 
Cape Town Municipal Matters, 
J.T. Wylde Papers Reports and Minutes of Evidence of a 
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2. PRINTED OFFICIAL SOURCES 
A. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS (Cape of Good Hope) 
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